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ABSTRACT 
Corporate scholars rely on traditional theories of the firm to analyze corporate 
organization and corporate contracting.  Traditional theories of the firm, however, have long 
neglected the role of knowledge in shaping the internal structure of firms.  Current analyses of 
firm structure that rely on these theories therefore suffer from serious shortcomings.  This paper 
begins to address this gap by analyzing knowledge resources and investigating their influence on 
internal corporate governance structures.  We propose a new typology that explains firm internal 
governance structure based on the types of knowledge used in the production process. We 
analyze the interaction of law and knowledge management.  We investigate how firms can bind 
knowledge by means of patents, trade secrets and private contracting, such as covenants not to 
compete.  We propose a principle of efficient knowledge allocation, which holds that 
organizational structures result from the necessity to maximize the use of knowledge resources.  
We discuss specific hazards that emerge from transactions with knowledge inputs.  We discuss 
particular applications of the typology.   
We show how the management of knowledge resources required in mass 
production, high tech and law firms differentially affects the decisional hierarchies of these firms 
and also their compensation structure in certain instances.  We argue that knowledge resources 
drove the change in the organizational structure of mass production firms from the U-form to the 
M-form, affecting decision making rights.  We show how the adoption of stock options plans in 
high tech firms aims at constraining knowledge hazards.  Stock options prevent leakage by 
retaining individual knowledge and discouraging hoarding of knowledge.  We argue that the 
model of profit splitting and the hierarchy between partners and associates in law firms are also 
explained by the necessity of maximizing the use of knowledge resources.  We then examine 
how the change of knowledge types used in law firms is affecting their organization.  Finally, we 
investigate how certain business transactions like mergers, joint ventures and licensing contracts 
are shaped by knowledge inputs.  We show that knowledge considerations provide a positive 
explanation for firm structure and a normative view in that the principle of efficient knowledge 
allocation should be an important concern of policy makers concerned with corporate reform. 
Gorga & Halberstam 3 
 
Doc #:NY7:262178.1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................................................4 
II. THEORY OF THE FIRM ................................................................................................................................................8 
A. Traditional Theories of the Firm .......................................................................................................8 
1. The Neoclassical Theory of the Firm..................................................................................8 
2. The Transaction Cost Theory of the Firm...........................................................................8 
3. Nexus of Contracts and Agency Cost ...............................................................................13 
4. Property Rights Theory.....................................................................................................15 
B. The Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm.....................................................................................17 
III. A KNOWLEDGE TAXONOMY...................................................................................................................................20 
A. The Location of Productive Knowledge (Kp, Ko, Ki) ....................................................................20 
B. Tacit versus Standardized Knowledge ............................................................................................23 
C. The Dynamics of Productive Knowledge .......................................................................................25 
1. Ki Can Be Transformed Into Ko.......................................................................................26 
2. Ko Can Give Rise To Ki...................................................................................................26 
3. Ki Can Be Transformed Into Kp.......................................................................................27 
4. Kp Can Give Rise To Ki...................................................................................................27 
5. Kp Can Give Rise To Ko..................................................................................................27 
6. Ko Can Be Transformed Into Kp......................................................................................27 
7. Summary...........................................................................................................................27 
IV. LAW AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT..................................................................................................................28 
1. Law and Contract as Mechanisms of Knowledge Management .......................................29 
2. The Co-Evolution Of Intellectual Property Rules And Firm Governance ........................30 
a) Patents and Copyrights bind Kp...............................................................................37 
b) Trade Secrets Bind Kp And Ko And Ki ...................................................................38 
c) Covenants Not To Compete Bind Ki........................................................................39 
3. Other Bodies Of Law And Types Of Agreements ............................................................42 
V. KNOWLEDGE ALLOCATION AND TRANSACTION COSTS ...........................................................................................42 
A. Efficient Knowledge Allocation .....................................................................................................42 
B. Knowledge Hazards ........................................................................................................................45 
1. The Public Goods Characteristics of Knowledge Resources ............................................45 
2. Leakage.............................................................................................................................46 
3. Hoarding/Failure to Share.................................................................................................46 
VI. REVISITING SOME ASPECTS OF FIRM ORGANIZATION FROM THE KNOWLEDGE RESOURCES PERSPECTIVE............47 
A. Correlating Knowledge Structures and Governance (Decisional/Ownership) Structures...............47 
1. Centralization vs. Decentralization of Decision Making and Knowledge 
Location ............................................................................................................................49 
2. The Nature of the Problem................................................................................................52 
B. The Sole Proprietorship  and Small Partnerships ............................................................................54 
C. Mass Production Firms ...................................................................................................................54 
1. The Shift from C-Form to the M-Form Structure .............................................................56 
D. High-Tech Engineering...................................................................................................................63 
1. Restrictive Covenants and the Structure of High Tech Firms...........................................64 
2. Employee Stock Option Plans As An Alternative Means to Binding Knowledge 
to the Firm ........................................................................................................................67 
E. Law Firms .......................................................................................................................................72 
1. A Knowledge-Based View Of The Organizational Structure Of Law Firms ...................75 
2. The changing organizational structure of law firms .........................................................78 
F. The Implications of Knowledge Transfer for the Choice of Business Transactions .......................80 
VII. CONCLUSION.........................................................................................................................................................83 
4 KNOWLEDGE INPUTS, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FIRM STRUCTURE 
Doc #:NY7:262178.1 
 
“An explanation of when, why, and how managerial hierarchies developed 
in certain industries and rarely appeared in others remains a challenge to 
economists, sociologists, practitioners of management science, and 
economic and business historians.”
- ALFRED CHANDLER & HERMAN DAEMS,
MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 
“Considering the acknowledged importance of 
knowledge and competence in business strategy and 
indeed the entire system of contemporary human 
society, it is striking that there seems to be a paucity 
of language useful for discussing the subject . . . . 
there seems to be a serious dearth of appropriate 
terminology and conceptual schemes.” 
- Sidney G. Winter, Knowledge and Competence as 
Strategic Assets 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The literature on the theory of the firm and corporate organization has treated 
extensively several variables that affect firm boundaries and internal corporate structure.  
Management and economic scholars have thus accounted for firm boundaries and internal 
corporate governance patterns by explanations based on transaction costs,1 agency costs,2 and 
property rights over physical assets.3
One very important variable, however, has been largely ignored by this literature, 
and certainly by legal scholars.  This variable concerns perhaps the core ingredient that firms use 
to achieve their corporate objective, namely to generate the products or services they will sell on 
the market:  The knowledge resources that firms use in the production process.  This ingredient 
is tantamount to the whole business enterprise.  First the entrepreneur must come up with an 
idea, which, in turn, requires the application of additional knowledge and skill to develop a 
product or service that can be sold in the market. 
 
1 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 115 (FEB. 1937); OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM; FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTS (1985). 
2 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
3 Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:  a Theory of Vertical and 
Lateral Integration, 94 J. POLIT. ECON. 691, 693-694 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the 
Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POLIT. ECON. 1119 (Dec. 1990). 
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A theory of the firm that focuses on knowledge resources required in the 
production process, and their differential effects on internal firm organization, is absent in the 
legal literature.  And yet, knowledge resources affect internal corporate governance.  And the 
reverse is also true in that internal corporate governance can affect knowledge management and 
production.4 Internal organizational practices can promote or inhibit the efficient use of 
knowledge resources within the firm.  Moreover, largely absent from the corporate organization 
literature is a discussion of the effects that intellectual property rights mechanisms and private 
contracting involving knowledge resources exert over firm internal governance structures.5 To 
be sure, while recent literature has pointed out the importance of human capital and capabilities 
for corporate governance practices,6 there has been no consistent attempt to explain how 
knowledge requirements of the production process, more generally, affect internal corporate 
governance in concrete and specific ways, and vice-versa.7
This paper begins to fill this gap.  Economists and management scholars have 
increasingly pointed to the special nature of knowledge resources as an explanation for firm 
boundaries.8 Knowledge resources can explain both why firms exist, and why firms develop a 
 
4 ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., INVENTING THE ELECTRONIC CENTURY 85-86 (2001), for example, attributes the 
failure of Remington Rand in the computer business to its failing in built an integrated learning base.  So, a problem 
in the management of knowledge resources led to the failure of the business. 
5 The study of Gilson provides an exception in this regard for it makes the connection between intellectual 
property and corporate structure.  Ronald Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999). Gilson analyzes the impact of legal structure on the development of high technology 
industrial districts.  Gilson, however, looks at the high tech industry from an aggregate perspective and does not 
develop the consequences of knowledge resources for firm internal governance structure . We pursue his insight 
further in this paper and complete his story by looking at how high tech firms in Silicon Valley have a different 
governance structure from high tech firms on Route 128. See also Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 4 (2004) (doing the reverse, that is, “considering intellectual property in light of the theories of 
the firm.”)  The author proposes to examine “whether existing intellectual property law provides for efficient 
allocation of intellectual property rights within firms in a manner that comports with property-based theories of the 
firm.”)  There is an increasing awareness in intellectual property and employment law literature that the regulation 
of knowledge resources impacts the financial and organizational structure of firms. See Robert P. Merges, The Law 
and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. L. J. & TECHN. 1 (1999); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property 
Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857 (2000); Catherine L. Fisk, Working 
Knowledge:  Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 
1800-1920, 52 HAST. L. J. 441 (2001); Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work:  Disputes Over Ownership of 
Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 271 (2002). 
6 Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe, eds., Brookings Institution Press, 1999), available at SSRN:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=167848; Thomas F. McInerney, Implications of High Performance Production and Work 
Practices for the Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, _COL. BUS. L. REV_. (2004). 
7 Blair, supra note__, at 86 reviews the economic literature on firm-specific human capital and argues that the 
law and economics literature has fixated for too long on the relationship between shareholders and managers (the 
principal-agent approach) to model corporate governance.  However, she concludes with a very general proposal:  
“arrangements for governing the relationships among employees, and between employees and the firm, can no 
longer be treated as something separate from corporate governance.”  And she does not explain how the corporate 
governance literature should take human capital into consideration. 
8 See, e.g., ASHISH ARORA, ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND 
CORPORATE STRATEGY (2001); Kathleen R. Conner & C.K. Prahalad, A Resource-Based Theory of the Firm:  
Knowledge Versus Opportunism, 7 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 477 (1996); Jack A. Nickerson & Todd R. Zenger, A
Knowledge-Based Theory of Governance Choice- A Problem-Solving Approach, 1, available at 
http://www.olin.wustl.edu/workingpapers/pdf/2002-06-006.pdf. Robert M. Grant, Toward a Knowledge-Based 
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particular internal organizational structure.9 The corporate law literature, however, has not yet 
recognized these developments in economics and organizational theory.  And, in turn, these 
theories have not fully recognized the role of legal institutions in shaping knowledge transactions 
and firm structure.10 
In this paper, we argue that the organization of business firms cannot be explained 
entirely without reference to the knowledge structure of the firm.  We advance the thesis that a 
firm’s internal governance structure is influenced by the type of knowledge required by its 
production process.  Knowledge that individuals bring to bear on production affects firm 
organization, while firm organization can also affect the production of new knowledge during the 
course of work.  Knowledge-based transaction costs can help explain both why firms exist – that 
is why firm organization vs. market contracting is preferred in the production process –  and why 
the firm has a particular organizational form. 
The structure of the firm in a competitive environment can be viewed as a result 
of three imperatives:  (1) A firm must produce knowledge within the firm; (2) A firm must 
transfer and diffuse knowledge within the firm;11 (3) A firm must bind knowledge to the firm, 
that is, prevent the transfer of knowledge outside of the firm.  How a firm produces knowledge, 
transfers and diffuses it within the firm, and binds it to the firm is intricately related to the 
organizational structure of the firm.  The organizational structure varies accordingly, which 
variation, we imagine, is capable of being described as a complex function.  The type of 
knowledge that is used in a firm’s production process is a crucial variable in this function 
(though by no means determinative).  We therefore propose a revision of current theories of the 
firm suggesting that a key element in firm organization is the type of knowledge that it deploys to 
accomplish its goals. 
 
Theory of the Firm, 17 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 109 (1996); Richard N. Langlois & Nicolai J. Foss, 
Capabilities and Governance:  the Rebirth of Production in Theory of Economic Organization (Druid, Working 
Paper No. 97-2, 1997), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=77668.  
9 Some scholars have lamented the insufficiency of the traditional theories of the firm to account for the way 
production is organized within the firm. See, e.g., Bengt Holmströn & John Roberts, The Theory of the Firm 
Revisited, 14 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 73, 90 vol. 14, note 4 (Fall 1998) (advocating a broader view of 
the firm and its boundaries:  “...it is surprising that the leading  economic theories of firm boundaries have paid 
almost no attention to the role of organizational knowledge.”  (citation omitted); see also, id. at 75 (“[Firms] have to 
deal with a much richer variety of problems than simply the provision of investment incentives and the resolution of 
hold-ups.  Ownership patterns are not determined solely by the need to provide investment incentives, and 
incentives for investment are provided by a variety of means, of which ownership is but one.  Thus, approaches that 
focus on one incentive problem that is solved by the use of a single instrument give much too limited a view of the 
nature of the firm, and one that is potentially misleading... Our examples suggest that ownership patterns are 
responsive to, among other things, agency problems, concerns for common assets, difficulties in transferring 
knowledge, and the benefits of market monitoring.”). See also Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 
in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM 185 (OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER eds., 1993).
10 ASHISH ARORA ET AL., supra note __, at 14 (“Intellectual property are the means for defining the object of the 
transaction and the property rights in the markets for technology.”).  Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna, The 
Structure of Licensing Contracts, 48 J. OF INDUST. ECON. 103, 128 (Mar. 2000) (discussing the failure of the 
literature in distinguishing properly how legal institutions protect knowledge in different industries). 
11 The extent of knowledge diffusion or knowledge sharing will of course depend on the strategy of each firm 
aiming to maximize the use of its knowledge resources in the face of the knowledge hazards that it may face and the 
characteristics of legal institutional environment to which it is subject.  A firm may adopt a strategy of restricting its 
knowledge to but a few top employees, or may want to share it as much as possible in order to provide an 
environment suitable to innovation.  
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We show that law and contract affect knowledge management and knowledge 
production in complex ways thereby ultimately influencing corporate structure.  We analyze how 
law or contract affect the creation of organizational structures suitable to knowledge production, 
diffusion, and conservation, such that the relevant knowledge is efficiently collocated with 
decision-making authority within the firm.  We propose a principle of efficient knowledge 
allocation according to which firms will try to maximize the use of knowledge resources in the 
coordination of their activities.  Finally, we examine what organizational mechanisms emerge to 
meet the objective of efficient knowledge allocation. 
Firms build less or more hierarchical structures, establish particular 
decision-making procedures, and design specific compensation packages and incentives because 
they are compelled to maximize the value of their knowledge resources in highly competitive 
environments.  Different types of relevant knowledge resources will require different corporate 
strategies to maximize their value.  We therefore explain the use of intellectual property 
protections, restrictive covenants, and features of compensation systems as responses to a firm’s 
need to manage knowledge efficiently. 
By taking such a “knowledge-based” approach, we are able to shed light on some 
internal organizational features of mass production, high tech, and law firms, as well as certain 
business transactions.  Thus we show how the management of knowledge resources required in 
mass production and high tech firms differentially affects their decisional hierarchies, and in 
certain instances also their compensation and ownership structure.  Further, we explain the role 
of more hierarchical decision-making structures in mass production firms and of flatter 
hierarchies in high tech and law firms, as means for achieving an efficient knowledge allocation.  
We show how particular characteristics of the compensation policies in high tech and law firms, 
such as the use of stock options and the sharing model, serve to maximize efficient knowledge 
allocation in these firms.  We investigate how certain business transactions like mergers, joint 
ventures and licensing contracts are shaped by knowledge inputs.   
The paper is organized as follows.  In Part II, we discuss some of the major 
economic theories of the firm and show their shortcomings in providing a convincing 
explanation of a broad range of firm production organization.  We then introduce an alternative 
view of the firm proposed by knowledge theories developed by economists and management 
scholars. 
In Part III, we propose a typology that distinguishes between three types of 
knowledge resources used in the production process. 
In Part IV, we explain how legal rules impact firm organization, by a) binding 
knowledge to the firm, b) permitting its diffusion within the firm among employees who need 
access to this knowledge and c) preventing knowledge transfer outside the firm.  We show that 
certain intellectual property protections can shape firm organization, affecting knowledge 
production and firm organizational structure.  In doing so, we begin to make use of the typology 
introduced in Part III. 
In Part V, we present a principle of efficient knowledge allocation and discuss 
some specific knowledge hazards. 
In Part VI, we then show that different organizational structures rely on the 
different types of knowledge resources.  We show how knowledge inputs shape their 
organizational structure.  We focus on mass production, high tech and law firms.  We also 
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discuss some business transactions such as mergers, joint ventures and licensing.  We explain 
some of the internal governance features in such organizations as responses to the necessity of 
achieving an efficient knowledge allocation and management. 
Part VII concludes. 
II. THEORY OF THE FIRM 
In the following, we examine some of the most important economic theories that 
try to explain firm boundaries and governance structure.  In order to understand the contributions 
of the knowledge-based theory of the firm we must revisit at least some of the most basic 
assumptions of the more traditional theories of the firm. 
A. Traditional Theories of the Firm 
1. The Neoclassical Theory of the Firm 
Firms are characterized by technological transformations.  In neoclassical theory, 
firms are, in a sense, seen as repositories of productive knowledge.  Orthodoxy does not, 
however, engage in detailed inquiry as to the role of knowledge in the firm’s organization.  
Sidney Winter has pointed out this shortcoming of orthodox economics: 
By taking production sets or functions as given ... [orthodoxy] 
fails to provide a framework for explaining why society’s 
capabilities should be packaged at a particular time in one 
particular way and not some other way.  By treating the storage of 
a particular knowledge as costless – the analogue in this context of 
the assumption of costless and perfect contracts- it forecloses to 
economic analysis the performance of the very role that it claims is 
central.12 
Neoclassical theory posits that all firms have the same knowledge, know-how or 
capacity to produce.  All firms in an industry are assumed to have the same production function 
in the long-run.  But as Winter suggests capabilities and organizational knowledge may vary 
even among firms that produce in the same industry and rely on similar technologies.13 
2. The Transaction Cost Theory of the Firm 
In The Nature of the Firm, Coase proposed a transaction cost explanation of the 
existence of the firm and its boundaries.  The theory was ground breaking and it remains an 
 
12 Sidney G. Winter, On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, 185 supra note 
__, at 185. 
13 See also Richard R. Nelson, Production Sets, Technological Knowledge, and R & D:  Fragile and 
Overworked Constructs for Analysis of Productivity Growth?, 70 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 62 (1980) 
(criticizing the economic theoretical constructs of production sets, technological knowledge, and research and 
development).  Nelson argues that orthodoxy assumes that technological knowledge is in the form of codified how-
to knowledge as if contained in a “blue print book” which provides sufficient guidance to any firm that has access to 
the book. However, there is no logical reason why this book should be available to all firms, as if it were in a public 
library.  Furthermore, each firm will learn largely on its own, in an inimitable way, according to its particular 
organizational features and human capital. 
Gorga & Halberstam 9 
 
Doc #:NY7:262178.1 
extremely compelling account of governance structures in the developed form that it has 
assumed through the work of Williamson.  Coase, however, subscribes to an account of the 
employment relationship that obscures the effects of knowledge resources on firm structure and 
boundaries. 
Coase noted that the distinguishing feature of the firm is the allocation of 
resources by the entrepreneur, rather than the price mechanism.  Coase argued that production 
takes place in the firm whenever transaction costs involved in firm production are lower than the 
transaction costs would be for that same type of production on the market.  For example, in order 
to produce a coat on the market, one would have to seek out and contract separately with a tailor, 
a cloth supplier, a supplier of buttons, perhaps a furrier, and so forth.  Each such transaction 
involves transaction costs from contracting in the form of information costs, negotiating costs, 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.  By vertically integrating these activities a firm can 
economize on transaction costs and produce more efficiently.  While contracts are not eliminated 
within the firm, they are greatly reduced by the authority of the entrepreneur. 
Central to Coase’s explanation of the firm is an understanding of the employment 
contract as an open-ended commitment by the employee to obey the direction of the entrepreneur 
over the long term (within certain limits).  According to Coase, the existence of the firm can be 
explained by reference to the transaction cost savings associated with the employer’s fiat-control 
over the employee. 
We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in practice by 
considering the legal relationship normally called that of “master and servant” or “employer and 
employee…. it is the fact of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of “employer and 
employee” . . .14 
Coase thus explains how the organization of production within the firm reduces 
transaction costs that would otherwise occur in the market.  But his explanation relies on a very 
narrow understanding of firm organization, as one that is based on the fiat control of the 
entrepreneur.  Coase uncritically adopts this view of firm hierarchy by generalizing from 19th 
century conceptions of the relation between employer and employee which indeed obtain in 
certain types of firm production, as we shall discuss below.15 But Coase thereby fails to 
appreciate what characterized the fundamental shift between the 19th and 20th century 
organization of production in firms, namely the emergence of a new class of salaried managers, 
who were both employees (i.e. non-owners) and decision makers.16 
According to Alfred Chandler, the new type of business enterprise brought the 
separation of ownership from management:  “The enlarged enterprises came to be operated by 
teams of salaried managers who had little or no equity in the firm.”17 These salaried managers 
were employees, usually with engineering degrees, hired largely by the families who owned and 
ran large firms to exert control over a firm’s organization and coordination of production. 
 
14 Ronald H. Coase, The Theory of the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM supra note __, at 29. 
15 Coase, supra note __, at 30 (citing treatise by BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT). 
16 CHANDLER, supra note __, at 1. 
17  CHANDLER, supra note __. 
10 KNOWLEDGE INPUTS, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FIRM STRUCTURE 
Doc #:NY7:262178.1 
History shows that while hierarchy was crucial to the rise of the modern industrial 
enterprise, entrepreneurs (owners) did not exercise fiat control over their most important 
employees. As Chandler points out: 
In production the new middle managers – both line and staff – 
had to learn intimately the technology of the products made and 
the processes used in the different factories under their control.  
So, too, in marketing and distribution middle managers had to 
come to know the similarities, differences, vagaries, and 
opportunities of different regional markets.  In both production and 
distribution the line managers had to recruit, train, and motivate 
their own staffs as well as the lower-level managers under their 
command – the managers of plants, branch sales and purchasing 
offices, and laboratories.  And even more than these lower-level 
executives, the middle managers had to learn to administer; that is, 
they had to learn to coordinate, to evaluate and act on such 
evaluations, in addition to recruiting, training, and motivating 
subordinates.  For top managers such administrative duties were 
paramount.  They not only had to learn to coordinate and monitor 
the activities of the functional departments but also to plan, 
allocate resources for, and implement long-term programs to 
maintain the enterprise’s facilities and skills, if they were to retain 
their share of existing markets and to move into new ones.18 
What is striking about the emergence of this new institutional form, as Chandler’s 
widely accepted account of the managerial revolution describes, is the significant discretion that 
was given to salaried managers in coordinating production within the firm.  The salaried 
managers were accorded considerable discretion, because of their technical knowledge and their 
training in the coordination and organization of production; in other words, because of their 
ability to make decisions as opposed to merely following orders.  Coase’s theory that the fiat 
relationship between employer and employee was the key organizational feature of the firm thus 
does not square well with the historical evidence. 
It is true that rigid hierarchical relations frequently existed between employees at 
lower levels of the firm’s hierarchy and were indeed necessary.  More careful analysis, however, 
shows that the firms in which rigid, top-down authority became the defining feature of the 
employment relationship engaged in certain types of production.  The paradigmatic example of a 
firm characterized by such authority relations is the Taylorist manufacturing firm that 
spearheaded assembly-line mass production.  In firms that adhered to Frederick Taylor’s 
principles, production was entirely restructured by the decomposition of the production process 
into isolatable, repetitive motions.  Taylor’s science of production conceived of employees as 
slightly more complex mechanical instruments, or machines.19 As we further develop in Section 
III, Taylorism involved a process of embedding knowledge in the production technology.  It is 
this type of production, in which employees are treated like replaceable assets, that displays 
 
18  CHANDLER, supra note __, at 598. 
19  See FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1916). 
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authority relations most resembling those that Coase describes.20 Indeed, the very purpose of 
Taylorism was to eliminate the entrepreneur’s reliance on the judgment of his employees 
concerning every aspect of the production process, including the movement of their own 
bodies.21 
Such fiat relations in firm hierarchy, however, hardly obtain in the context of 
other types of firm organization.  Take, for example, high-tech firms.  High-tech firms are 
characterized by shared decision making among highly specialized employees, who exercise 
considerable control over their work agendas and project development.22 High tech firms depend 
on employees exercising significant  discretion in their work.  And employees could not, and 
would not, engage in productive cooperation if their reasoned judgments and their thoughtful 
approaches to problem-solving were supplanted regularly by appeals to authority.23 Coase’s fiat 
theory, therefore, does not supply a universal account of firm structure, although it may account 
for the organization of a particular type of firm – that engaged in the Taylorist organization of 
mass production. 
Even firms that organized their production according to Taylor’s principles, 
however, were only partially characterized by fiat relations of authority.  As already described, at 
the level of managerial employees such firms depended on expanding the discretion of 
non-owners. 
As has been pointed out by others, a further shortcoming of Coase’s theory 
consists in his too general account of transaction costs.24 Coase fails to sufficiently specify the 
nature of the transaction costs that he has in mind.  Any variable can thus be invoked as a 
determinant of firm boundaries, as long as it is defended as a transaction cost.25 In order to 
 
20  See also Richard Adelstein, Knowledge and Power in the Mechanical Firm:  Planning for Profit in Austrian 
Perspective (2003) (working paper at __, on file with authors. 
21  See Taylor, supra note __, at __. 
22  See e.g., Nicolai J. Foss, Coase vs Hayek, 5-6 (Copenhagen Business School, Working Paper No. __, 2001), 
available at http://www.cbs.dk/departments/ivs/wp/wp01-08.pdf.  (“Overall, a consensus seems to be emerging that 
tasks and activities in the knowledge economy need to be coordinated in a manner that is very different from the 
management of traditional manufacturing activities, with profound transforming implications for the authority 
relation and the internal organization and boundaries of firms” ... “[t]he increased reliance on knowledge networks 
tends to erode authority-based definitions of the boundaries of the firm, because authority increasingly shifts to 
expert individuals who control crucial information resources …”). 
23 In a study of the retention of human capital in acquisitions of high-tech firms, Ranft and Lord find that 
granting autonomy and relative status to the management and employees of acquired high tech firm’s enhanced 
retention of key employees, but that economic incentives did not. Annette L. Ranft & Michael D. Lord, Acquiring 
New Knowledge:  The Role of Retaining Human Capital in Acquisitions of High-Tech Firms, 11 THE JOURNAL OF 
HIGH  TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT RESEARCH 295 (2000).  See also Julia Porter Liebeskind, Amalya Lumerman 
Oliver, Lynne Zucker, Marilynn Brewer, Social Networks, Learning and Flexibility:  Sourcing Scientific Knowledge 
in New Biotechnology Firms, 7 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 428, issue 4 (Jul./Aug, 1996) (describing decentralization 
of management in biotech firms). 
24 Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, supra note__, at 164 (arguing that the lack of specification of 
what are transaction costs deprives transaction cost theory from any predictive content). 
25  Coase himself has admitted that his theory is too general to provide specific applications. See Coase, The 
Theory of the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note __, at 73 (“in that article [The Nature of the Firm] I 
emphasized the comparison of the costs of transacting with the cost of organizing and did not investigate the factors 
that would make the costs of organizing lower for some firms than for others. This was quite satisfactory if the main 
purpose was, as mine was, to explain why there are firms. But if one is to explain the institutional structure of 
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explain firm boundaries and organization, however, we must identify the most relevant types of 
transaction costs. 
Accordingly, we argue that the cost of coordinating knowledge turns out to be a 
significant transaction cost that affects firm boundaries and structure.  In consequence, we focus 
exclusively on such knowledge costs and inquire their effects by holding constant other 
transaction costs in our analysis.26 
Coase himself had a sense of how crucial knowledge requirements are to firm 
organization, even as he failed to explicitly develop this variable in his analysis of firm 
boundaries.  In explaining why all production is not carried on by one big firm, Coase appears to 
have identified the costs of organizing production within a firm, as primarily the result of 
bounded rationality27: “It may be,” Coase speculates, “that as the transactions which are 
organized increase, the entrepreneur fails to place the factors of production in the uses where 
their value is greatest.”28 And “[o]ther things being equal … a firm will tend to be larger …[t]he 
less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes and the smaller the increase in mistakes with an 
increase in the transactions organized.”29 Coase here appears to suggest that firm size is a 
function of the problem solving capabilities of the entrepreneur who directs production and of 
the organization’s ability to provide an effective conduit for the entrepreneur’s problem solving, 
rather than an impediment to it. 
Pursuing this insight further than Coase does himself, we advance the hypothesis 
that the knowledge required in the production process imposes limits on firm size, because a 
single firm cannot coordinate infinite types of knowledge.  Each firm has command of a specific 
body of knowledge that it deploys in its production process.  For a firm that produces food 
products to engage in activities in the pharmaceutical industry would be inefficient as this would 
require marshalling entirely different knowledge sets, i.e. those appropriate to developing 
chemical products and drugs.  That, we suggest, is also the reason why firms tend to expand the 
scope of their activities to fields in which the firms’ already accumulated knowledge can afford a 
competitive advantage.30 It seems clear from this that even if all other transaction costs that 
Coase sets forth were zero, not all production would be carried out exclusively in the market31 or 
 
production in the system as a whole it is necessary to uncover the reasons why the cost of organizing particular 
activities differs among firms.”) (emphasis added). 
26  This is not to say that opportunism is not an important factor for it can raise many hazards in knowledge 
exchanges as we will see. 
27 Adelstein, supra note __, at 7. 
28 Coase, The Theory of the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note __, at 23. 
29 Coase, supra note at __. 
30 See Sidney G. Winter, On Coase, Competence and the Corporation in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note 
__, at 190-91 (“Of course, when a firm grows by vertical integration, it is not just a question of “more of the same.”  
But it is more of something closely related, something about which the firm already has some degree of relevant 
knowledge.”) 
31 Transaction costs economics tends to argue that if transaction costs are zero, there is no firm as a collective 
entity. This is because it is assumed that each individual will act as a firm. However, Demsetz already highlighted 
the weakness of that argument.  See Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, supra note __ at 163:  “the 
inference…that all production is individualized if transaction costs is zero, is wrong.  Multiperson firms are fully 
consistent with zero transaction cost if management is subject to scale economies.  Zero transaction cost inform us 
only that these cooperating efforts will be organized with greater reliance on explicit negotiations than would be true 
if transaction cost were positive.(…). ...the substance of the firm is reflected in the style of cooperative behavior that 
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exclusively by one big firm,32 because the cost associated with possessing and coordinating the 
relevant knowledge for organizing every type of transaction within the firm would be 
prohibitive.  No entrepreneur could have enough knowledge to manage every type of production 
within a single firm. 
Knowledge costs are, therefore, an important determinant of firm boundaries and 
must be studied separately.  They cannot simply be subsumed within the general concept of 
transaction costs advanced by Coase.33 
3. Nexus of Contracts and Agency Cost 
In A Theory of the Firm, Jensen and Meckling treat the firm as a nexus of 
contracts subject to agency costs.  The firm is viewed as a “nexus of a set of contracting 
relationships . . . mak[ing] clear that the  . . . firm is not an individual . . . [but] is a legal fiction 
which serves as a focus for a complete process in which the conflicting objectives of individuals 
(some of which may ‘represent’ other organizations) are brought into equilibrium within a 
framework of contractual relations.”34 Agency costs are those transaction costs of contracting 
that result from the irreducible difference of interest between the principal(s) and the agent(s). 
Agency costs can be reduced through monitoring (and enforcement) mechanisms.  
Monitoring is necessary to limit the agent’s pursuit of his own interest to the detriment of the 
principal’s interest.  As such, monitoring costs count as agency costs.  Similarly, the agent 
herself incurs costs that arise solely from the inability of the principal to fully control her agent.  
The agent must bond herself in order for the principal to entrust her with her interests.  Thus 
 
obtains.”  We argue that knowledge gained through the coordination process within the firm will make production 
within the firm efficient even if transaction costs were zero. 
32 See Coase, supra note     at     . (“Why is not all production carried on by one firm?”; see also Demsetz, The 
Theory of the Firm Revisited, supra note __ at 173 (arguing that “[t]he process of product …refinement is halted 
when the next version of the product will be put to many multiple uses downstream that rely on different bodies of 
knowledge.  A single firm if it was vertically integrated would have difficulty acquiring and maintaining the stocks 
of knowledge necessary to control cost and quality and to make good managerial decisions when downstream uses 
are multiple in this sense . . ..  Roughly speaking . . . the vertical boundaries of a firm are determined by the 
economics of conservation of expenditures on knowledge.”) (emphasis added). 
33 We can find more passages where Coase implicitly admits the importance of knowledge for determining firm 
organization structure:  “Apart from variations in the supply price of factors of production to firms of different sizes, 
it would appear that the costs of organizing and the losses through mistakes will increase with an increase in the 
spatial distribution of the transactions organized, in the dissimilarity of the transactions, and in the probability of 
changes in the relative prices. As more transactions are organized by an entrepreneur, it would appear that the 
transactions would tend to be either different in kind or in different places…All changes which improve managerial 
technique will tend to increase the size of the firm.”  (citations omitted) (25). Coase also realized, footnote 31, that 
inventions will not always make the size of the firm bigger. Giving the example of the telephone, Coase argues that  
if it reduces the costs of using the market, more than it reduces the cost of organizing production in the firm, then it 
will contribute to firms be smaller and not larger.  And we believe this conclusion derives directly from a knowledge 
economizing strategy.  A firm will not need to produce a telephone, if it wants to use one.  This would increase the 
organization costs of a firm that doesn’t have knowledge or capabilities to produce a telephone to start to producing 
it.  This cost would be prohibitively high.  So the firm can buy the telephone in the market. See also the 
correspondence of Coase with Fowler in Coase, The Nature of the Firm:  Origin, (“There may be technical 
advantages in increasing complexity but it is decreasing returns to managerial ability which seems to set the 
limit.”) (emphasis added).  In our opinion, therefore, Coase appears to understand the cost of organizing knowledge 
as a crucial cost in determining firm’s size. 
34 Jensen & Meckling, supra, note __, at 311-12. 
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monitoring, bonding, and residual costs are defined as agency costs and are used by Jensen and 
Meckling to explain the organization structure of the firm.35 
It is important to note that by focusing on agency costs, Jensen and Meckling 
actually do not, in fact, explain why firms exist.  Instead, they analyze how firms constrain 
agency costs, making production within the firm possible, and they explain some aspects of the 
financial structure of firms.36, 37 Agency cost is the result of a conflict between the agent’s 
self-interest and the will of the principal.  The agency cost framework suggests that the greater 
the “gap” between the agent and the principal, the greater the agency costs.  Greater autonomy 
for groups or individuals within an organization, on this logic, results in increased agency costs – 
all else being equal.  If containing agency costs is viewed as the most important feature of 
successful business organization, then the following prescription would appear to follow:  
Concentrate decision making authority in the hands of as few agents as possible, who are closely 
monitored and directed by the principals.38 
Interestingly, recent developments in management strenuously question this 
conclusion.  Contemporary CEOs and management theorists champion the value of decentralized 
decision making.  “Traditional industrial corporations concentrated power in top management,” 
writes Peter Senge, “yet many of the most successful corporations in recent years have 
implemented radical changes in governance systems.”39 These changes attempt to capture the 
gains of localism.  The core dilemma, according to Senge is “how to gain the advantages of local 
autonomy and decision making while increasing the ability to understand and manage 
interdependence.”40 
Shell Oil, for example, engaged in an abrupt, full-scale shift from centralized to 
decentralized governance beginning in 1994.  It chose a federalist governance model in which 
“power was held as much as possible by independent entities with profit-and-loss 
accountability.”41 The separate entities would still have interaction and responsibility to one 
 
35 Jensen & Meckling, supra, note __, at __. 
36 The criticism of C.K. Prahalad & Gary Hamel, The Core Competence of the Corporation, supra note __, 
applies.  (“How strange that SBU managers, who are perfectly willing to compete for cash in the capital budgeting 
process, are unwilling to compete for people – the company most precious asset. We find it ironic that top 
management devotes so much attention to the capital budgeting process yet typically has no comparable 
mechanism for allocating the human skills that embody core competencies. Top managers are seldom able to look 
four or five levels down into the organization, identify the people who embody critical competencies, and move 
them across organizational boundaries.”) (emphasis added). 
37 In an article not well-known in the corporate law and economics literature, however, Jensen and 
Meckling,have recognized the crucial role of collocating relevant knowledge with decision making authority in the 
firm. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Specific and General Knowledge, and Organization Structure, in 
CONTRACT ECONOMICS 251-274 (Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander eds., 1992) (“Knowledge considerations are one 
cause for the emergence of firms.”). 
38 This is not necessarily what agency-cost theory posits, but note that this is the logic behind some current 
proposals for strengthening shareholder power, that is, let’s contain agency costs by making the principals have 
more power in business decisions. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833 (2005). 
39 PETER SENGE, THE DANCE OF CHANGE, 361 (      ). 
40 SENGE, supra note __, at 363. 
41 Senge, supra note __, at 385. But see, Shell Structure Has to Change, Investor Says, NEW YORK TIMES,
February 9, 2004 at C3 (reporting that investors called for greater centralization of Shell’s organizational hierarchy). 
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another and to the center, but they had their own capital structures and internal debt levels, and 
could make their own investment decisions.  Shell created internal boards of directors for advice 
and oversight and for sharing ideas.  These boards were linked through interlocking membership.  
Further structures were put into place to ensure business alignment and overarching mission.  In 
this way Shell Oil “pushed decision making, including capital decisions, down to four newly 
formed autonomous business units.42 
This development does not square well with traditional proposals that rely on 
agency-cost theory.  How can a firm contain its agency costs by devolving decision making 
authority down onto an increasing number of agents with local autonomy?  Would this not raise 
agency costs?  Would opportunism not increase?  The most plausible explanation that agency 
cost theorists could come up with for whatever success such organizational structures produce 
would be a cost-benefit argument.  If the benefits of such a decentralized organization outweigh 
the resulting agency costs, the outcome will still be desirable.  But such an answer begs the 
question why decentralization encompasses such benefits. 
Agency cost theory does not provide a sufficient theoretical framework to explain 
why granting agents greater autonomy is a good idea at all, without a proportional increase in 
ratification and monitoring mechanisms.43 Clearly, however, greater dispersion of decision 
making authority within firms is a result of the increasing knowledge intensity of productive 
activity, forcing companies that want to remain competitive to make use of their human capital at 
every level of the company hierarchy.  This development away from traditional hierarchical 
governance structures by companies like Shell cannot be fully understood without reference to a 
knowledge-based theory of the firm. 
4. Property Rights Theory 
Property Rights Theory explains firm boundaries based on the ownership of 
physical assets.  A firm “consist[s] of those assets that it owns, or over which it has control.”  
Property Rights Theory, therefore, does not distinguish between ownership and control, but 
defines ownership as the capacity to exercise control.  Control is thus achieved through the 
ownership of physical assets. 
Property Rights Theory derives its appeal from its elegant mathematical 
formalizations that shed light on the firm structure of certain types of firms.  For example, Hart 
and Grossman’s theory may be most useful in explaining the structure of mass production 
systems, and specifically those engaged in Taylorist production.  In a Taylorist firm, the physical 
 
42 SENGE, supra note __, at __. 
43 Eugene Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. LAW & ECON. 301, 301-302 
(June 1983).  In trying to explain the survival of organizations in which agents make important decisions but do not 
bear a significant share of the wealth effects of such decisions, Fama and Jensen state:  “We contend that separation 
of decision and risk-bearing functions survives in these organizations in part because of the benefits of specialization 
of management and risk bearing but also because of an effective common approach to controlling agency problems 
caused by separation of decision and risk-bearing functions. In particular, our hypothesis is that the contract 
structures of all these organizations separate the ratification and monitoring of decisions from initiation and 
implementation of the decisions.”  Nonetheless, when we nowadays observe the decentralization trend in some 
organizations, it is not clear that the process of separation between initiation and ratification occurs at all levels 
where important business decisions are taken. In many instances, agents may have enough power so as to initiate, 
implement and ratify decisions which will not even reach, for example, the board of directors, which is the organ to 
which Fama and Jensen attribute the ratification and monitoring authority. 
16 KNOWLEDGE INPUTS, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FIRM STRUCTURE 
Doc #:NY7:262178.1 
ownership of machines is very important; but employees are replaceable.  But this circumstance 
is very particular to a type of production that permits that the knowledge necessary to produce is 
embedded in the production process, or rather in the machines themselves. 
The theory assumes that ownership gives the owner all rights to dispose of 
physical asset that the owner hasn’t given away, or that the government hasn’t taken by force. 
However this theory fails to perceive that, as we know from law, ownership does 
not necessarily afford legal control to dispose of the property.  As property law tells us, 
ownership consists of a bundle of rights.  For example, I may own an easement on a property.  
But suppose that easement was donated to me, with some clause that does not give me the right 
to dispose of the property as I wish.  If I inherited the easement, it is also not some right that I 
have shaped on my own terms.  This is clear in corporate law, in that the shareholders own the 
corporation, but do not have the legal right to control the everyday business decisions of the 
corporation.  The average shareholder also never gave away such right!  Moreover, even if the 
shareholder wanted to retain the right to make everyday decisions, or ask that it be returned to 
him, he would not be so entitled under corporations law.44 Ownership, therefore, does not 
always provide the right to exercise control. 
Hart and Grossman define the firm “as being composed of the assets (e.g.,
machines, inventories) that it owns.”45 Their entire focus is on physical assets.  They fail to 
recognize that in many situations physical assets cannot be used independently of expertise.  
Assume that an entrepreneur owns a chemical laboratory.  What is the purpose of owning such a 
physical asset without the knowledge required to develop drugs and thereby extract value from 
these assets? In the pharmaceutical or chemical industries, one may thus buy lots of physical 
assets, but if one does not have the knowledge capabilities to use the assets, one is making an 
irrational investment. 
In his later work, Hart has argued that the property rights approach can explain 
how the purchase of physical assets will lead to control over human assets.46 He has defended 
the position that a worker will better pursue the objectives of a principal, if that principal is the 
worker’s boss.  The reason for this, according to Hart, is that the boss controls the assets the 
worker works with.  Hart believes the logic underlying his result is different from the Coasian 
explanation:  Coase thinks a boss can tell a worker what to do, while Hart argues that it is in the 
worker’s self-interest to obey his boss, because this will put the worker in a better bargaining 
position with his boss later on.  “[T]he employer can deprive the employee of the assets he works 
with and hire another worker with these assets.”47 
44 Hart has admitted that the property rights approach cannot account for the separation of ownership and control 
of large publicly held corporations. Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1757, 1173 (1989). 
45 Grossman & Hart, supra note __ at 692. 
46 Hart, An Economist’s Perspective, supra note __, at 1170-1771. 
47 Id. at 1771.  See also, Hart & Moore, supra, note __, at __; Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the 
Theory of the Firm, in  THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note __, 151 (“Authority and residual rights of control are 
very close and there is no reason why our analysis of the costs and benefits of allocating residual rights of control 
could not be extended to cover human, as well as physical, assets. In fact, residual rights of control over employees 
and over physical assets are likely to be related. In particular, an important difference between an employment 
contract and a contract between independent parties is that the former allows the employer to retain the use of assets 
used by the employee on the event of a separation (he can hire another employee to operate them). In contrast, an 
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According to Hart, the control over physical assets can lead to the control of 
human assets that are part of an organization’s capital.  We believe that this constitutes a serious 
shortcoming of the property rights theory.  There are many cases where the employees 
themselves are the most important assets for firm production.  If employees are the most 
important assets, as for example in law firms or high tech firms, the physical assets are largely 
irrelevant to control.  If the employee leaves, he may potentially take with him the main asset 
required for the development of a firm’s products or services.48 Hart’s theory is therefore 
incomplete, because it can only explain the type of relationship that exists between a boss and his 
employees in a Taylorist firm. 
B. The Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm 
In the previous section we have examined gaps in traditional theories of the firm, 
concerning their ability to account for human capital-intensive production.  Proponents of the 
knowledge-based theory of the firm point out that the literature has unreflectively relied on a 
dichotomy between production costs and exchange costs.  In analyzing exchange costs the 
literature recognizes that exchange itself is not costless, but involves transaction costs from 
imperfect information and opportunism.  But in analyzing production costs, there has been an 
implicit assumption that price theory tells us all we need to know about production.49 However, 
it is very likely that knowledge about how to produce and that knowledge about how to link 
together one person’s (or organization’s) productive knowledge with that of another are 
imperfect.50 These issues of capabilities and coordination are distinct from the hazards of 
contracting that traditional theories have focused on.  But these costs of production have been, 
until recently, largely neglected. 
As Demsetz states: 
Economic organization, including the firm must reflect the fact 
that knowledge is costly to produce, maintain, and use.  In all these 
respects there are economies to be achieved through specialization. 
…. [W]e generally identify industries, and firms in these 
industries, as repositories of specialized knowledge and of the 
specialized inputs required to put this knowledge to work.  Steel 
firms specialize in different stocks of knowledge and equipment 
than do firms in investment banking or industrial chemicals, and 
even firms in then same industry differ somewhat in the knowledge 
and equipment upon which they rely.51 
Both knowledge resources and production costs can be said to differ depending on 
the attributes of a production process, in the same way that transaction costs differ depending on 
 
independent contractor would typically own some of these assets and would be able to decide how they should be 
used if the relationship terminates.”). 
48 We refer here to situations where there are no intellectual property protections that could bind the knowledge 
to the firm. 
49 Langlois & Foss, supra note __, at 4. 
50 Langlois & Foss, supra note __, at 4. 
51 Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, supra note __, at 171-172. 
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the asset and exchange attributes of investment projects.52 Thus, instead of holding technology 
constant across alternative modes of organization as a useful strategy for explicating, for 
example, the influence of transaction costs on the decision to integrate, or on monitoring 
structures and control, we suggest holding transaction costs constant as a strategy to assess the 
differential impact of production costs on firm organization. 
With the rise of the knowledge economy, organizational structures and relations 
of production have been undergoing significant changes.  There has been an increasing demand 
for education and skill since the mid-twentieth century.53 Scholars have been discussing the shift 
of economic paradigms from scale-based competition to knowledge-based competition.54 
The financial structure of “knowledge companies” can differ dramatically from 
the financial structure of more traditional industrial companies.  Microsoft and IBM provide an 
interesting example.  IBM, “the talismanic corporation of the fifties, sixties, and seventies,”55 has 
sales more than fifteen times greater than those of Microsoft, and its fixed assets at the beginning 
of 1996 (net of depreciation) were $16.6 billion worth of property, plants, and equipment, with a 
market capitalization of about $70.7 billion.  In contrast, Microsoft’s net fixed assets totaled just 
$930 million.  But Microsoft’s total capitalization was $85.5 billion, despite its much lower 
sales.  As Thomas Stewart points out, “an investor who buys Microsoft is clearly not buying 
 
52 See, e.g., Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM, supra note __, at 
90, 97 (1993); Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, supra note __, at 174.  (“Two firms facing the same labor 
transaction costs may choose different employment arrangements because the benefits they derive from these 
arrangements differ.  Particularly important in determining these benefits are knowledge-based considerations.
Continuing association of the same persons makes it easier for firm-specific and person-specific information to be 
accumulated (see the large literature on specificity of human capital). Knowledge about the objectives and 
organization of the firm is learned “cheaply’ through continuing association, and so is knowledge about the 
capabilities and limitations of the persons involved in this association.  Continuing association, however, implies 
commitment, and commitment has the disadvantage of inflexibility.  The benefits to be derived from continuing 
association must be set against the cost of inflexibility in determining the best manner in which to acquire the talents 
and services of many persons.”) (Emphasis added). 
53 Kelvin M. Murphy & Finis Welch, Occupational Change and Demand for Skill, 1940-1990, 83 THE AMER.
ECON. REV. 122, (1993) (arguing there was a huge increase in the demand for skill and education between 1940 and 
1990).  See also Chinhui Juhn, Kelvin M. Murphy & Brooks Pierce, Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns to 
Skill, 101 J. POL. ECON. 410 (1993) (finding a consistent increase in wage inequality favoring the most skilled 
workers). 
54 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., & Takashi Hikino, The large industrial enterprise and the dynamics of modern 
economic growth, in ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., FRANCO AMATORI & TAKASHI HIKINO, BIG BUSINESS AND THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 33 (1977). We don’t provide an exhaustive bibliography of scholarly work that has addressed 
the special features of the knowledge economy, but some of the important references include:  FRITZ MACHLUP,
KNOWLEDGE, ITS CREATION, DISTRIBUTION, AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE __ (1980);  THOMAS STEWART,
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL __ (____); Joseph Stiglitz, Public Policy for a Knowledge Economy, World Bank, January 
1999 at 1 ( “the movement to a knowledge economy necessitates a rethinking of economic fundamentals.”);  PETER 
F. DRUCKER, POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY 39 (____) (“far too few people realize that the application of knowledge to 
work created developed economies by setting off the productivity explosion of the last hundred years.  
Technologists give the credit to machines, economists to capital investment.  Yet both were as plentiful in the first 
hundred years of the capitalist age, before 1880, as they have been since.  With respect to technology or to capital, 
the second hundred years differed very little from the first one hundred.  But there was absolutely no increase in 
worker productivity during the first hundred years – and consequently very little increase in worker’s real incomes 
or any decrease in their working hours.  What made the second hundred years so critically different can only be 
explained as the result of applying knowledge to work.”); THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Dale Neef ed., 1998). 
55  STEWART, supra note __, at __. 
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assets in any traditional sense.  For that matter, he is not purchasing much in the way of assets if 
he buys IBM or Merck or General Electric.  A dollar invested in a corporation buys something 
different from the same dollar invested in the same corporation a few years ago.”56 In other 
words, in many industries ownership of physical assets has become less and less important while 
the significance of human resources has increased tremendously.  This predominance of 
“intangible assets” in a firm’s market value calls for a revision on traditional theories of the 
firm.57 
Production in a competitive economy requires different use of knowledge 
resources.  Knowledge resources are both purchased on the market and produced by the firm.  
The particular nature of knowledge resources presents unique characteristics that provide 
powerful reasons for differentially structured firm production.  The way a firm develops the 
knowledge it will use in its production process and the extent that the firm can bind this 
knowledge to its structure will influence its organizational structure. 
The theory we advance distinguishes between three basic knowledge inputs.  
Based on different forms of knowledge applied in the production process, we can offer a more 
complete explanation and fulfill the gaps left by the traditional theories described above.  As we 
will explain in the next part, knowledge can be embedded in 1) physical assets such as machines,  
2) in the organization itself, and 3) in individuals.  When knowledge is embedded in physical 
assets, our explanation has many similarities with Coase’s and Hart’s account of the Taylorist 
firm described.  Where physical assets are important for firm production, the control of physical 
assets can lead to control of human assets, at least to some extent, because the knowledge 
necessary to the production process is embedded in the physical assets.  Therefore, both Coase’s 
fiat notion and Hart’s physical asset control explain a part of the story.  However, when 
knowledge is embedded in individuals, as it happens in law firms and high tech firms, a boss 
cannot “control” in the traditional terms an employee even if he is the owner of the physical 
assets, for these assets will not be the determinant assets for firm production.  The type of 
knowledge important to the production process explain important features of law firms 
organizational structure and why high tech employees have much more discretion over the 
production process when compared to their mass production employees counterparts.  In these 
knowledge intensive settings, both Coase’s and Hart’s theory do not make much sense.  So, we 
argue that the particular type of knowledge applied in the productive process (being it Kp, Ko, or 
Ki) will shape firm governance and organization, as we further develop in the next section. 
 
56  STEWART, supra note __, at 33. 
57  Human capital is now widely regarded as a significant factor in developing and nourishing a firm’s productive 
knowledge.  In the organizational management literature, an increasing emphasis is placed on knowledge 
production.  Books on “the learning organization,” “intellectual capital,” “human capital” and “knowledge 
management” abound.  Firms are considered repositories of productive capabilities.  Langlois and Foss’ interpret the 
capabilities perspective “as reaching for a distinct theory of economic organization, one that is based on a 
conceptualization of the firm as a repository of productive knowledge with certain non-standard characteristics, . . . 
.In this story, incentive issues are suppressed in favor of a focus on problems of coordinating knowledge and 
expectations.”  Richard Langlois & Nicolai Foss, Capabilities and Governance; the Rebirth of Production in Theory 
of Economic Organization ____, available at www.isnie.org/ISNIE98/Langlois-Foss.doc. 
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III. A KNOWLEDGE TAXONOMY 
A. The Location of Productive Knowledge (Kp, Ko, Ki) 
Firms depend on knowledge resources.58 Knowledge formation within the firm is 
crucial to production in competitive markets.  Firms that compete in mass production, however, 
have different knowledge requirements than firms that compete in high-technology fields.59 In 
order to analyze how knowledge requirements affect firm structure, we distinguish between 
different forms that knowledge resources take.  We use a typology that distinguishes three types 
of knowledge structures. 
We use the term KP to designate knowledge embedded in physical assets, such as 
machines or products.  Taylorist production provides perhaps the best example of this type of 
knowledge structure.  In assembly-line production, the knowledge required in the production 
process is embedded in machines.  Assembly-line workers are largely “de-skilled.”  The 
employee is easily replaceable in this sort of production.  The machine is the principal asset that 
makes production feasible and embodies the knowledge required in the production process.  
Products also embody knowledge, allowing consumers to extract knowledge benefits without 
themselves having to master the knowledge.  For example, most anyone can operate a computer 
through software that performs highly complex and/or labor-intensive procedures without 
knowing all the stages necessary to produce either the tool or the specific output the tool 
supplies.60 In other words, products and machines embody useful knowledge that performs key 
functions in any production process.  Such products of machines are vehicles of 
“knowledge-substitution” in that they permit the application of knowledge embedded in the 
machine (including the knowledge necessary to build the machine), by the mere use of the 
 
58 We distinguish between information and knowledge.  Knowledge that is transferable readily and almost 
without cost is information. Knowledge is the processing and understanding and processing information to some 
means.  Information can be processed into some input.  This is what knowledge does. The mere knowledge of facts 
is likely to be information. The data we currently find in our days is mostly information. But this information can be 
processed and become knowledge of an individual. 
59 J. Rogers Hollingsworth, Continuities and Changes in Social systems of Production:  The Cases of Japan, 
Germany, and the United States in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 265, 268 
(1998) (arguing that “firms that successfully employed a mass production strategy had to engage in a particular form 
of industrial relations, use specific types of machinery, and relate in particular ways to other firms in the 
manufacturing process”); Harold Demsetz, Comments on Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Specific and 
General Knowledge, and Organization Structure, in CONTRACT ECONOMICS, supra note__, at 276, (advancing that 
different types of firms rely on different types of knowledge “because their activities are so dissimilar, 
biotechnology firms, steel firms, and retail establishments, by design, inventory different stocks of knowledge. 
Generally, these stocks are “housed” in the people employed. These firms locate control within their organizations 
in ways that are appropriate to these different distributions of knowledge.”)  See also, CHANDLER, SCALE AND 
SCOPE 45 (____) (arguing that the rise of the multidivisional modern industrial enterprise was limited to “those 
industries where technologies of production had the potential for extensive economies of scale and scope and where 
product-specific marketing organizations provided further competitive advantages). 
60 See Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, supra note __, at 173 (“Because it is uneconomical to educate 
persons in one industry in the detailed used in another, recourse is had to developing or encapsulating this 
knowledge into products or services that can be transferred between firms cheaply because the instructions needed 
to use them do not require in-depth knowledge about how they are produced…The economical use of industrial 
chemicals by steel firms does not generally require knowledge of how these chemicals are produced; similarly, the 
use of steel by industrial chemical firms does not require transfer of knowledge of how the steel is produced. A 
production process reaches the stage of yielding a saleable product when downstream users can work with, or can 
consume, the “product” without themselves being knowledgeable about its production.”). 
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machine.  An employee performing routine work typically relies heavily on knowledge 
embedded in machines and other products in performing her work.  In many instances, her 
technical expertise may be crude and limited to the ability to operate the machine.  We call this 
knowledge embedded in machines and other products KP.
We term KO knowledge embedded in the organizational structure, in the group of 
individuals that constitute the firm.61 It comprises the habits, practices and routines of a firm’s 
organizational structure and organizational culture.62 Generally this asset is transferable only by 
selling the firm or a part of it.63 The knowledge, in this case, is embedded in a “production 
team,” that can operate and be maintained in the absence of the owner or any one specific 
member.64 Individual employees are replaceable because knowledge resources are dispersed 
across many different co-workers and individuals. In contrast, KO is collective knowledge 
created through, and residing in, patterns of interaction among individuals within the 
organization.65 
We term KI knowledge embedded in the individual.  The skills of a craftsperson, 
an artist, or a professional athlete are paradigmatic examples of such knowledge.66 Knowledge 
of this sort cannot be transferred costlessly from one person to another.67 And often the cost of 
 
61 Nelson and Winter identified this knowledge location in their evolutionary model of economic institutions. 
RICHARD NELSON & SIDNEY WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982). 
62 Sherwin Rosen, similarly, refers to such knowledge as knowledge vested “in the firm.”  Sherwin Rosen, 
Learning by Experience as Joint Production, 86 Quarterly J. Econ. 366, 367 (1972).  See also, Ranft & Lord, supra 
note __, at 298 (discussing the acquisition of knowledge sets that are “embedded in relationships among individuals, 
or in a firm’s more general social and organizational fabric, rather than in any particular person.”). 
63 There is, of course, an overlap between knowledge embedded in the individual employee and knowledge 
embedded in the organizational and organizational structure.  See Ranft & Lord, supra note __, at 298 (“Critical 
organizational competencies are often embedded in relationships among individuals, or in a firm’s more general 
social an organizational fabric, rather than in any particular person.  A significant portion of a firm’s knowledge may 
be located in the formal and informal networks of relationships within the organization and even across 
organizational boundaries.  In other words, a firm’s valuable knowledge-based resources may reside not only in 
particular individuals, but also in socially complex relationships among different individuals and organizational 
subunits.  Socially complex knowledge ‘resides primarily in specialized relationships among individuals and groups 
and in the particular norms, attitudes, information flows, and ways of making decisions that shape their dealings 
with each other’.  In the case of socially complex knowledge, no single person has the full set of skills and 
capabilities required to create a commercially viable product or service. This social complexity makes knowledge 
difficult to manage because critical interrelationships can be easily disturbed, such as when key individuals or teams 
leave the firm.  Consequently, retention of key employees is not only a critical issue for retaining individual 
knowledge, but also for preserving valuable types of knowledge that are socially complex.”)  But increasingly firms 
that acquire certain productive capabilities have also served as vendors of their own know-how.  STEWART, supra 
note __, __. 
64 Id. In the corporate law literature, from a somewhat different perspective.  Margareth Blair and Lynn A. Stout 
have contributed to the development of this idea. See, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VIRGINIA L. 
REV. 247 (1999). 
65 An actual problem of mergers and acquisitions is maintaining Ko, that it, the production team responsible for 
knowledge development in the organization ex post. See Ranft & Lord, supra note __ at __.  We assume for reasons 
of simplification that collective action costs are high and employees cannot organize themselves to leave the firm in 
a group, which will conserve Ko in the firm even if a certain amount of turnover exists. 
66 Individuals accumulate such knowledge “of the particular circumstances of time and place” through personal 
experience in the Hayekian sense. 
67 Sherwin Rosen, Learning by Experience as Joint Production, 86 Quarterly J. Econ. 366, 367 (1972).  Rosen, 
for example, refers to knowledge completely vested in the owners (or managers) of the firm. Knowledge has to do in 
22 KNOWLEDGE INPUTS, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FIRM STRUCTURE 
Doc #:NY7:262178.1 
knowledge transfer between persons is very high because the relevant knowledge is based on 
experience and is tacit.68 Where knowledge is tacit, relocating individuals to the site where such 
learning takes place may be necessary to achieve knowledge transfer.  KI is defined as 
specialized knowledge.  Its loss has a measurable effect on firm structure.69 Knowledge that has 
been formalized, standardized and is thus easily transferable generally does not qualify as KI.
But the capacity of an individual to assimilate such specialized knowledge due to formal or other 
education is considered KI.
Note that the bright line categories we have created here are fluid and can blur in 
reality.  Knowledge of the KO and KI types is most likely to overlap.  This occurs, for example, 
where the knowledge possessed by one individual is also possessed by other individuals that 
comprise the organization.  In this situation, KI will be similar to or overlap with KO to a 
considerable extent.  One important difference between KI and KO is the length of the 
horizon/time required for rational decision making.  KI implies a finite horizon, as the capital 
will vanish when the owner of the knowledge departs (retires, or passes away).  KO implies an 
infinite horizon, since the knowledge can be preserved within the structure of the firm and 
transferred with the firm.70 Note also that these variables are interdependent to some extent.  Ko 
may depend on Kp, for certain routines arise in order to manage certain machines and products.  
KO is not readily transferable from firm to firm. Routines that work in some environments may 
not work in other environments.  Furthermore, KI may vary depending on different experiences 
that individual have with the same products or machines.  This will be further developed in the 
next section. 
 
this case with pure “entrepreneurship”.  The asset is not salable, though the owners may rent the services of their 
knowledge to the firm and elsewhere. This is what we mean by Ki, the knowledge is embedded in the individual, 
whether she be the owner of the firm, a manager or an employee. 
68 See POLIANYI, supra note _. 
69 As Ron Gilson points out in his discussion of interfirm knowledge spillovers in the high tech industry, “[t]acit 
information associated with an employer’s technology is embedded in the human capital of its employees.  When an 
employee changes jobs, that tacit information is available to the new employer.”  Gilson, supra note __, at 585.  See 
also, id. at 595 (“This [tacit] element of the employer’s intellectual property is embedded in the employee’s human 
capital, and can be most effectively transferred through proximity and, in particular, by an employee changing 
jobs.”). 
70 Rosen, supra note__, at 368. 
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Below we present a table that systematizes these concepts. 
TABLE __: KNOWLEDGE TYPES 
KNOWLEDGE TYPE 
KP KO KI
General 
Description 
Knowledge Embedded 
In Machines And 
Products. 
Knowledge Embedded In 
A Firm’s Organizational 
Structure (Not Codified) 
Specialized, Technical, 
Particular Knowledge 
And Skills Embedded In 
Individuals 
Examples 
• Codified Production 
Technology 
• Machinery 
• Products 
• Legal Opinions 
 
• Structuring Of 
Decision-Making 
Processes. 
• Coordination And 
Division Of Work 
• Knowledge 
Management Practices 
• Monitoring Structures 
• Quality Control 
Procedures 
•Scientific Training 
•Professional Training 
•Craft And Skill 
•Acquaintance With 
Professional Networks 
•Personal Experience 
•Knowledge Concerning 
A Firm’s Customers, 
Clients, Or Markets. 
Source:  authors’ elaboration 
B. Tacit versus Standardized Knowledge 
In the development of our taxonomy, and throughout this paper, we make 
reference to a crucial dimension of knowledge or competence assets:  the degree to which 
knowledge can be articulated, codified or standardized on the one hand, and the degree to which 
it is tacit or uncodifiable, unstandardizable and unarticulable on the other hand.  The distinction 
has been put in different ways.  Some have spoken of the difference between knowing-that and 
knowing how. A prime example of tacit knowledge is an individual skill, such as a local pilots 
ability to safely bring a ship into the harbor and to its berth.  “What the pilot knows are local 
tides and currents along the coast and estuaries, the unique features of local wind and wave 
patterns, shifting sandbars, unmarked reefs, seasonal changes in microcurrents, local traffic 
conditions, the daily vagaries of wind patterns off headlands and along straits, how to pilot in 
these waters at night, not to mention how to bring many different ships safely to berth under 
variable conditions.”71 This know-how supercedes the general rules of navigation, cannot be 
codified or standardized, but depends upon sense and long experience working within a 
particular local context. 
The point for our purposes is that individual knowledge, or Ki, is often highly 
tacit in the sense that “the aim of a skillful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of 
 
71 JAMES SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE __ (1998).  
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rules which are not known as such to the person following them.”72 While all knowledge 
(including perhaps the most formal knowledge) originated with tacit knowledge (witness 
Pythagoras’ contemplation of geometric figures drawn in the sand) some types of knowledge 
remain hard, or even impossible to articulate or codify.  As Polanyi has said:  “we can know 
more than we can tell.”73 Such inherently tacit knowledge is hard to transfer.  A person with 
tacit knowledge will not be able to provide a useful explanation of the rules that he is applying in 
the pursuit of his skillful activity.74 
Once knowledge is codified, standardized and rendered explicit, however, it is no 
longer embedded in the individual, but “can be communicated from its possessor to another 
person in symbolic form, and the recipient of the communication becomes as much ‘in the know’ 
as the originator.”75 Such knowledge may take the form of manuals, blueprints, books, etc, that 
permit the ready dissemination of knowledge.  Knowledge embedded in products, Kp, 
necessarily has to have been standardized and rendered explicit at some point before it was 
creatively deployed in a product.   
Because codified and standardized knowledge is readily communicable, it is also 
much more susceptible to the public goods problems and the related opportunism that we discuss 
in Part V of this paper, which, without certain external protections, may render market 
transactions of this sort of knowledge more costly. 
While tacit knowledge is hard to transfer and is thus less susceptible to 
opportunism, this does not necessarily render market transactions of tacit knowledge less 
complicated or costly.  The very difficulty of describing tacit knowledge raises special 
difficulties.  Tacit knowledge may not be readily transferred through an exchange, but may 
require context-specific learning.  The non-communicable character of tacit knowledge76 
suggests it is best obtained by integrating individuals, who possess it, into a firm’s production 
process as employees, rather than seeking to acquire such knowledge inputs through market 
transactions.  The production of knowledge resources may require extensive communication and 
 
72 M. POLYANI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 49 (1962) cited by Sidney Winder, Knowledge and Competence as 
Strategic Assets, in __________________, 170-171. 
73 MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 4 (1966). 
74 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 21-22 
(1975) (“Language limits refer to the inability of individuals to articulate their knowledge or feelings by use of 
words, numbers, or graphics in ways which permit them to be understood by others.  Despite their best efforts, 
parties may find that language fails them (possibly because they do not possess the requisite vocabulary or the 
necessary vocabulary has not been devised), and they resort to other means of communication instead.  
Demonstrations, learning by doing, and the like may be the only means of achieving understanding when such 
language difficulties develop.”). 
75 Winter, supra note ___, at 170-171. 
76 See Richard R. Nelson, Production Sets, Technological Knowledge, and R & D:  Fragile and Overworked 
Constructs for Analysis of Productivity Growth?, 70 The American Economic Review 62, 65 (1980) (“What if 
whatever it is that permits a firm to operate a technique in a particular way and with particular outcomes is only in 
small part describable in a blueprint, or teachable by example, or purchasable in the form of a machine? Then the 
fact that firm A can operate a particular technique with a particular outcome does not mean that firm B or firm C 
can, even if firm A helps out their learning in every way it can. The presence of particular and rather special 
personal talents, or important organizational features, signals that codified aspects of technique may only be a part of 
the story.”) 
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exchange of ideas and personal experience,77 and therefore we suggest that tacit knowledge can 
be better shared in the structure of a firm, as opposed to the market.  We develop these ideas 
further below. 
C. The Dynamics of Productive Knowledge 
The typology of knowledge structures given so far presents a static picture.  
Knowledge structures, however, change over time and we must, accordingly, incorporate such 
dynamics into our analysis. 
Such transformations will depend, among other things, on the standardization 
process that knowledge deployed by organizations and individuals typically undergoes.78 
Standardization is the process through which tacit knowledge is made explicit, formalized, and 
then codified or instantiated in physical processes and products.79 For example, standardization 
takes places, where knowledge previously embedded in an individual (Ki) is formalized, 
reconfigured, and embedded in a newly created machine or product (Kp).  In the mature stage of 
the industry life cycle, “most of the technical aspects of the product have become standardized, 
and the nature of demand is well known.”80 The focus of the industry becomes standardized 
production.81 In such circumstances, tacit knowledge becomes relatively less important to the 
production process and in the organization of the firm. 
The transmission of tacit knowledge both within and between firms benefits from 
proximity,82 while explicit or codified knowledge renders the cost of transmitting information 
 
77 Kenneth J. Arrow, Classificatory notes on the production and transmission of technological knowledge. 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, vol 59, issue 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-first Annual Meeting of the 
American Economic Association (May 1969), 29-35. See C.K. Prahalad & Gary Hamel, supra note __, attributing 
significant importance to communication in their concept of “core competence” (“Core competencies are the 
collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple 
streams of technologies....Core competence is communication, involvement, and a deep commitment to working 
across organizational boundaries. It involves many levels of people and all functions.... The skills that together 
constitute core competence must coalesce around individuals whose efforts are not so narrowly focused that they 
cannot recognize the opportunities for blending their functional expertise with those of others in new and interesting 
ways”). 
78 See, e.g., Robin Cowan & Dominique Foray, The Economics of Codification and the Diffusion of Knowledge,
6 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 595, 604-05 (1997) (discussing the process of codification of tacit knowledge).  But see 
MARYANN P. FELDMAN, THE GEOGRAPHY OF INNOVATION 53 (1994) (“Some aspects of knowledge have a tacit 
nature and cannot be completely codified and transferred through blueprints and instructions.”). 
79 For one attempt to theorize knowledge creation dynamics in firms, see Ikujiro Nonaka, et al., Managing and 
Measuring Knowledge in Organizations:  Three Tales of Knowledge Creating Companies, in KNOWING IN FIRMS 
(Georg von Krogh, et al, eds. 1998) 146, and Ikujiro Nonaka & Hirotaka Takeuchi, A Theory of the Firm’s 
Knowledge-Creation Dynamics, in CHANDLER, ET AL., EDS., THE DYNAMIC FIRM 214 (____).  Nonaka et al. focus 
on the effects of organizational structure on knowledge creation and try to understand the constraints (and 
opportunities) that the dynamics of knowledge creation represent for structuring organizations.  Their focus is thus 
somewhat different from ours.  They also do not isolate standardization as a distinct process, preferring instead to 
talk about “externalization” (from tacit to explicit) and “combination” (from explicit to explicit), and, more 
generally, a “knowledge spiral.”  Id., at 220-224. 
80 David B. Audretsch & Maryann P. Feldman, Innovative Clusters and the Industry Life Cycle, 11 REV. INDUS.
ORG. 253, 259 (1996). 
81 Gilson, supra note __, at 585. 
82 See Nelson & Winter, supra note __, at 76-82, 115-116  (describing tacit nature of skills). 
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over geographic space trivial.83 One result of codification and standardization of knowledge in 
products (Kp), for example, is that constraints on the production and distribution of products 
across large geographical areas (and internationally) are thus significantly reduced, enabling 
reproduction of this knowledge on a much greater scale. 
The reverse transformation may also occur.  The creation of a new machine or 
product, such as a software, may educate the worker/user, slowly weaning her from reliance on 
help screens, aids and by-the-book routines to a more efficient and sophisticated deployment of 
the tool’s core functions by means of user-defined short-cuts and creative applications.  
Employees may develop routines to operate the machine in a way that avoids depreciation and 
affords it a longer life cycle.  Kp can thus give rise to Ki, and probably to Ko, as this knowledge 
is spread from a single employee to others within the firm through the refinement of the firm’s 
organizational routines. 
In addition, engagement with physical assets will yield entirely new knowledge in 
the form of Ki that was not initially contemplated by the creator of the machine or embedded in 
the product.  Such a transformation occurs where, by observing how the machine operates, an 
employee conceives of new ideas for the creation of a different type of machine or process.84  In 
other words, the employee develops ideas for new technologies, which, at this stage, will still be 
tacit and thus knowledge embedded in this particular employee.  Hence Kp gives rise to Ki. 
In the following, we discuss the possible types of knowledge transformation. 
1. Ki Can Be Transformed Into Ko 
A routine or a process developed by an individual or small team can spread to the 
entire organization and beyond, if others find this knowledge useful.  An example in this case is 
the Japanese system of “just in time”.  Because of its efficiency, this process was soon 
transmitted to other organizations and became embedded in the structure of organizations.85 
2. Ko Can Give Rise To Ki 
A new employee will come into contact with organizational knowledge which is 
dispersed in the firm structure.  She will have formal and informal orientation sessions, learn 
organizational routines and receive specialized training in the use of communication technology 
and the division of work.  As she begins to share work experiences in the firm, this employee 
will assimilate a lot of organizational knowledge which will become Ki, knowledge embedded in 
 
83 Robin Cowan & Dominique Foray, The Economics of Codification and the Diffusion of Knowledge, 6 INDUS.
& CORP. CHANGE 595, 604-05 (1997). 
84 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., & Takashi Hikino, The large industrial enterprise and the dynamics of modern 
economic growth, in ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., FRANCO AMATORI & TAKASHI HIKINO, BIG BUSINESS AND THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 33 (1977) (“Just as the capabilities that were learned by exploiting the physical economies of 
scale led to capital augmentation through improvement of processes and products, so the organizational skills 
developed in pursuing joint production at the manufacturing establishment level led not only to improvement in 
existing processes and products but also to the systematic commercialization of new processes and products. This is 
particularly true in industries in which joint production rested on the systematic exploitation of chemistry, biology or 
physics.”   
85 Going further, the technique of just in time is now codified in management books, being transmuted into a 
“product” with the characterizes of Kp. However, the specific way in which a firm applies this technique may 
change a little bit from firm to firm, which still characterizes a type of Ko. 
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the individual.  She may even leave the organization and start up a business based on similar 
organizational routines and processes and thus take this knowledge with her. 
3. Ki Can Be Transformed Into Kp 
As knowledge becomes formalized and standardized it becomes embedded in 
physical objects. An idea for a tool is thus developed into a machine.  In this case, the knowledge 
that was embedded in the individual becomes embedded in the machine.  This process of 
embedding knowledge in the machine has important consequences:  the other actors that 
subsequently operate the machine do not need to know how the machine was conceived and 
developed. They will merely need a specialized technical knowledge of how to operate it.  The 
result is that less educated employees are able to operate the machine in order to produce the 
final product envisaged by perhaps yet a different inventor, without having to acquire the 
knowledge sets of the machine’s inventor or that of the product developer.  This knowledge 
embedding process, therefore, effects a knowledge-substitution; it is therefore a highly 
economizing process that permits the use of a highly complex knowledge sets by others who do 
not possess them. 
4. Kp Can Give Rise To Ki 
Use of a product or a machine in the production process will give rise to large and 
small improvements on the equipment itself.  New and different applications for the technology 
will be devised.  Problems posed by the new product spur the development of knowledge to 
improve it.  Thus, Kp gives rise to Ki. 
5. Kp Can Give Rise To Ko 
The classical example here are the routines that were developed by Ford in order 
to operate an efficient assembly line.  A highly specialized organizational knowledge specific to 
the production of cars was developed on how to operate many machines and tools efficiently.  
This organizational knowledge is shaped by the characteristics of each machine and other 
physical assets required to operate the assembly line.  In this example, Kp thus gives rise to 
routines and other organizational knowledge Ko. 
6. Ko Can Be Transformed Into Kp 
Imagine that the team operating the assembly line realizes that they can save time 
by developing a specific tool to aid in their work.  The tool will be a form of Kp that originated 
from knowledge of the organizational routines of this assembly line, that is, from Ko.  Moreover, 
the development of the new tool presupposes knowledge of these particular organizational 
routines. 
7. Summary 
The processes described give us a rough idea of how different types of knowledge 
can transform over time.  They provide a stylized picture of how firms can change together with 
the nature of the knowledge they develop and deploy over time.86 A typical mass production 
 
86 For discussions of the coevolution of technology and institutions, see also, RICHARD NELSON, THE SOURCES 
OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 100-119 (1996). 
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firm (mainly based on Kp) might engage in more knowledge intensive activities as the operation 
of its machinery spurs research and development in order to maintain or improve its production 
process.87 The level of Ki in the firm will thus rise.  A high-tech firm (mainly based on Ki) 
might develop a product and then engage in its mass production (mainly based on Kp) thus 
eventually decreasing its reliance on Ki.88 Our thesis contends that in both situations the change 
in the degree to which a firm relies on a certain type of knowledge (increased Ki in the first 
example and increased Kp in the second example) will give rise to a change in the organizational 
structure of the firm. 
IV. LAW AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
The variables discussed so far reflect where the knowledge is embodied. We now 
turn to the problem of how firms appropriate knowledge. 
The easiest way to bind knowledge to the firm is structurally, by restricting access 
to valuable knowledge to all but a handful of insiders who run the firm.  This is one of the 
benefits of family owned businesses.89 In its early years (just after 1800), the DuPont company, 
for example, guarded most of the economically valuable knowledge about the chemistry and 
manufacture of gun power by restricting it to DuPont family members and their close 
associates:90 “The DuPonts managed the company and supervised its research throughout the 
nineteenth century.  Thus, the company’s approach to employee intellectual property depended 
on close family control supported by informal sanctions and self-help.”91 
Geographically isolating the firm provides another structural means to restricting 
the unwanted dissemination of knowledge.  Thus, DuPont’s Brandywine mills, for example, 
were located in a remote and self-contained enclave along the banks of the river, which along 
with power and water, supplied security from unwanted visitors.92 
Companies still jealously guard their business methods and other secrets by 
restricting access to information through a variety of structural means.  But the drawbacks of the 
above-described structural approaches are evident.  Restricting access to business knowledge to 
but a few members in the firm seriously restricts the potential improvements and innovations and 
therefore the competitiveness and growth potential of the organization.  Relevant knowledge is 
centralized at the highest levels of the organizational hierarchy, leaving little room for 
decentralized decision-making.  Thus, learning and joint knowledge production among 
employees at lower levels of the organizational hierarchy is diminished and the benefits of 
knowledge sharing are decreased.  Similarly, isolating the company geographically is often 
undesirable.  Economists have long recognized the importance of regional clusters for economic 
and technological development.93 Regional agglomeration of firms can result in significant 
 
87 See, e.g., CHANDLER, supra note ___, at __. 
88 See, e.g., our discussion of IBM, infra, supra notes ___ & accompanying text. 
89 Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trading Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise 
of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L. J.  441, 442-443 (2001), at 469. 
90  Id., at 468-69 
91  Fisk, supra note 89, at 489. 
92  Id., at 470. 
93  See Michael J. Enright, Regional Clusters and Firm Strategy in Peter Hagstr[m & Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., 
Perspectives on Firm Dynamics, in THE DYNAMIC FIRM 2 (Hagstrom & Chandler, Eds. 1998), 315, 331 (“Spillover 
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positive externalities, including knowledge spillover, causing input costs to decline.  Thus 
securing a firm’s knowledge from competitors by isolating its employees is likely to be a poor 
strategic decision.  
Powerful, alternative solutions for appropriating knowledge are provided by law 
and contract.   Legal rules and contractual arrangements regulate knowledge appropriation 
directly and/or indirectly and thereby affect firm structure by enabling, complicating or thwarting 
the efficient allocation of knowledge resources.  One obvious way in which law affects corporate 
organization is by binding knowledge to the firm, thereby enabling the dispersion and transfer of 
knowledge within the firm, while preventing, or at least containing, the threat of transferring 
knowledge assets outside the firm to competitors.94 
Knowledge can be protected by intellectual property rules (encompassing patents, 
trade secrets, copyrights) but also by private contracts that are specifically designed to protect 
firms’ knowledge assets, such as non- compete agreements, or confidentially agreements.  
Protection of knowledge assets through such law or contract, however, is imperfect.  As we will 
see, intellectual property rules do not protect all types of knowledge.  In addition, the protections 
of knowledge rights are connected to the level of enforcement of intellectual property rights rules 
and contracts.  We argue that the nature of the legal protection afforded will cause firms to 
develop specific governance structures and mechanisms to cope with the special hazards that 
knowledge resources pose. 
1. Law and Contract as Mechanisms of Knowledge Management 
In the following we reinterpret the existing legal framework and show that its 
development has affected the knowledge structure and thereby the organizational structure of 
firms.  Several bodies of law, which are generally not considered in the corporate organization 
debates, have important consequences for corporate structure.  For instance, the influence of 
intellectual property laws and covenants not compete on firm structure has been implicitly taken 
for granted by current corporate law literature.  As we shall see, intellectual property law helps 
firms address the problems of unwanted knowledge transfers that arise with the increased 
diffusion of knowledge within the firm and also between firms.  The connection between the 
increasing importance of human capital and the expansion of intellectual property law has 
become the object of increased attention.95 But the effect of such regulation on firm 
organization, while it has begun to be recognized,96 has not been considered systematically. 
 
of innovation from firm to firm is likely to be greater in regional clusters than among dispersed firms . . . . Local 
suppliers, buyers, family members, friends and acquaintances can all become sources of industry and company-
specific information.”); Ronald Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts, 74 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 575 (1999), at 580-81 (arguing that “[k]nowledge as an input is subject to increasing returns as a result of 
geographic proximity” in certain types of Marshallian agglomeration economies). 
94  Binding knowledge is crucial, for otherwise firms would not invest in generation of new products nor in 
training of employees.  The capacity to bind knowledge to the firm is key to competitiveness, especially in a 
knowledge intensive environment. 
95 See, e.g., Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work:  Disputes of the Ownership of Human Capital in the 
Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002) (Arguing that disputes over human capital have increased and 
that courts should attend to the new “implicit contract” between knowledge workers and their employers when they 
enforce intellectual property rights).  Stephen L. Sheinfeld & Jennifer M. Chow, Employees’ duties and Liabilities:  
Protecting Employer Confidences, 582 PLI/Lit 347 (1998) (detailing the “rapidly evolving” law of intellectual 
property and the “veritable explosion in non-competition and trade secrets disputes in the employment area”); 
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2. The Co-Evolution Of Intellectual Property Rules And Firm Governance 
Intellectual property laws do not at first appear to be connected with firm 
structure.  Patent and copyright protections were already written into the U.S. Constitution at a 
time when modern firms and corporations did not exist.97 Individuals can hold patents and 
copyrights just as firms can.  Patent and copyright laws address the public goods problems of 
knowledge resources faced by all who would market such resources.  These protections permit 
the conversion of ideas or techniques or other intangible intellectual products into marketable 
goods. 
Patent and copyright rules, however, become more relevant to firm structure when 
the law or contract specifies who holds ownership rights to economically valuable knowledge 
gained at work – the firm or the employee.  It is increasingly recognized that the tremendous 
economic development experienced during the late 19th and early 20th Centuries was very much 
fueled by technological development,98 and that the rise of modern corporations played a crucial 
role in technological development.99 Intellectual property, conceived in its broadest sense, 
accomplishes one of the most important tasks required to permit the effective use of knowledge.  
It binds knowledge to its proper owner (presumably owners are those who have invested in 
knowledge production or its purchase).  Now consider the typology developed in Section III 
above.  The different types of knowledge, Kp, Ko, Ki, raise different kinds of challenges for 
rules that would bind knowledge to its proper owner.  Legal personality gave corporations the 
ability to own intellectual property.  And legal doctrine increasingly evolved to favor corporate 
ownership of property over ownership by the employee. 100 
William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship:  Legal Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in High Technology Industries,
17 LAB. LAW. 25 (2001) (examining the legal implications of accelerated job hopping by employees in the high tech 
sector). 
96 Gilson, supra note __, at __. 
97 Such protections were seen as the hallmark of individualism.  See, e.g., Lincoln’s pronouncement that “In 
anciently inhabited countries, the dust of ages -- a real downright old-fogyism -- seems to settle upon, and smother 
the intellects and energies of man.”  But America had broken the “shackles” of the “slavery of mind” and had 
established “a habit of freedom of thought” that was necessary to the “discovery and production of new and useful 
things.”  The patent law nourished this habit of free thought by allowing the ingenious to profit; it added “the fuel of 
interest to the fire of genius.”  Abraham Lincoln, Second Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (Feb 11, 1859), in 
Roy P. Basler, ed, 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 356, 363 (Rutgers 1953). 
98 See generally, RICHARD NELSON, THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1996) 100-119, supra note 86, at __; 
HAGSTROM & CHANDLER, [NEED FULL CITE]. 
99 See, e.g., Chandler & Hikino, supra note __, at 26.   
100 See Fisk, supra note __, at __ (“A foundation of the modern law of intellectual property is that firms own 
some of the ideas that exist in the minds of their employees. Ownership of employee knowledge is a legal construct 
that is now an accepted part of our culture and economy.  Today’s practices and doctrines developed in the context 
of radical changes in the American law and workplace culture, which were brought about by the nineteenth-century 
industrial revolutions. The conflict between employee freedom and corporate control of intellectual property 
sharpened as courts realized the importance of knowledge to economic development and began to recognize 
workplace knowledge as an asset of the firm rather than an attribute of the employee.  The invention of the trade 
secret doctrine in the mid-nineteenth century enabled employers to enjoin revelation of secret information by current 
or former employees. At the same time, courts expanded the permissible uses of post-employment covenants not to 
compete so as to prevent dissemination of knowledge. Together, these doctrinal developments created a new 
obligation – sometimes articulated as an express or implied contract, and sometimes expressed as a ‘duty of trust and 
confidence’ –  not to use knowledge acquired on the job elsewhere.”   
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In the area of patent and copyright ownership the early nineteenth century rule 
was that employees usually owned the entire right to their inventions.101 The rule evolved into 
the later nineteenth century rule that employees owned their inventions but employers often had 
a license to use them.102 This arrangement was known as a ‘shop right’.103 By the mid-1880s 
courts thus began to award employers a license to use an employee’s invention where the 
employee invented it on the job.104 Finally, in the twentieth century, the rule became that 
employers own most employee inventions.105 
Given our thesis that knowledge regulation influences firm structure and 
vice-versa, it should not be surprising to learn that legal regimes governing patents and copyright 
evolved significantly together with the development of new organizational forms of production 
in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries.  Significant changes in the law occurred particularly 
around the time that modern limited liability corporations were created by new laws, during the 
1880s and 1890s.106 
Modern trade secrets doctrine and the enforcement of covenants-not-to-compete 
in the employment context only developed in the late 19th Century.107 In the antebellum period 
patents and copyright protections were the only intellectual property protections available.108 
Property in ideas was thought of only to the extent that it manifested itself in a physical thing, 
e.g., as a machine, or a secret recipe or process.  Moreover, copyright and patent protections 
required that technologies were made explicit before they could secure protection.  The concept 
that property could be had in the intangible ideas and even in the tacit, not-explicit knowledge 
embedded in another’s mind was not accepted by American courts in the antebellum period.  
Enticement laws existed, imposing penalties for soliciting another firm’s employees.  Such laws, 
however, applied regardless of whether employees had any valuable knowledge and did not 
prevent free employees from leaving after their contract term had expired and taking knowledge 
acquired at work to a competitor.109 
There was also a long history of restrictive covenants.  But prior to the Civil War, 
these were enforced only insofar as they concerned the protection of good will associated with 
the sale of a business, not as post-employment restrictions.  Finally trade secrets doctrine and the 
 
101 Catherine L. Fisk, Removing The ‘Fuel Of Interest’ From The ‘Fire Of Genius’:  Law And The Employee-
Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1998). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1151. 
105 Id. at 1128.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924), ended a period 
in which courts would apply a set of presumptions in favor of employee ownership of inventions in a dispute, in 
accordance with the “shop right” doctrine.  Instead courts would now look to the intended terms of the employment 
contract.  At the same time, employers increasingly used pre-invention assigning agreements.  Fisk, supra, note ___, 
at 1179. 
106 MORTON HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1992). 
107 See generally Fisk, supra note __, at __. 
108 See generally Fisk, supra note __, at __.
109 See generally Fisk, supra note __, at 450 (citing Boston Glass Manufactory v. Binney, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 425, 
428 (1827)).   See also John Nockleby, Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth 
Century:  The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1514-15 (1980). 
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use of contracts to control knowledge first emerged during the last two decades of the 19th 
Century, together with the rise of the modern corporation.110 
These developments in intellectual property law reflect radical changes in the 
structure of workplace organization and workplace culture.  They mark the dramatic shift from 
artisanal modes of production to industrial and mass production in large firms. 
In the artisanal model, it was possible for individuals or families to own their own 
workshops.  Craft knowledge was recognized as a prime resource and was transmitted from 
master to apprentice.  While the apprentice was not prohibited by law from exercising his craft 
and using the knowledge so obtained at a later date, the apprenticeship indenture governed the 
use and guarded the secrets of the craft knowledge during the apprenticeship relation.  The duty 
of the apprentice to guard the master’s secrets during the training period was a standard term of 
apprenticeship agreements, corresponding to the duty of the master to instruct the apprentice.  
The duration of the apprenticeship period can be seen to have performed a similar function to 
that of a restrictive covenant, in that it permitted the master to recuperate the training invested in 
the apprentice before the latter could leave and begin his own workshop.111 It thus secured the 
explicit knowledge conferred in virtue of a confidentiality agreement, while it secured the tacit 
knowledge for a time only by agreement to a limited, typically seven-year duration of the 
relationship. 
The governance structure of the apprenticeship agreement was thus designed to 
preserve the knowledge (the master’s Ki) within the “firm” structure of the master’s shop.  The 
knowledge differential was also the criterion that determined the hierarchy between masters and 
apprentices in the firm, thus reflecting an efficient allocation of knowledge resources.  The 
apprenticeship agreement, however, did not confer the same type of static property status on craft 
knowledge as did the later trade secrets doctrine,112 which permits, at least in principle, the 
indefinite exclusion of the employee or any competitor.  Interestingly, the apprenticeship relation 
did, however, also allow the growth of the “firm” to include a broader circle of initiates.113 
110 See, e.g., MORTON HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 (1992) (“The first sustained 
effort to reconceptualize the corporation in light of the triumph of general incorporation laws began during the 
1880s.”). 
111 See generally Fisk, supra note __, at 451. 
112 According to the UTSA, which has been adopted by many states, including California, a trade secret is:  
“Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program device, method, technique, or process, that:  1) 
Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other 
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and 2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d).  A court may enjoin “actual or 
threatened misappropriation” of a trade secret.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426(a).  A corporation misappropriates a trade 
secret when (1) it discloses or uses the trade secret of another without express or implied consent, and (2) at the time 
of the disclosure or use, it knew or had reason to know that its knowledge of the trade secret was derived from a 
person who owed a duty to the entity seeking relief to maintain the trade secret’s secrecy or limit its sue.  CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
113 “The secrecy of recipes and techniques that passed from generation to generation enabled a family or a firm to 
gain a reputation and to retain exclusive control of production. Apprenticeship indentures recognized the value of 
guarding secrecy while ensuring the passage of knowledge by specifying that the master was to instruct the 
apprentice and to reveal his “mystery” to him, and, in return, the apprentice pledged to keep these techniques secret 
during the term of the apprenticeship.”   Fisk, supra note __, at __ (citations omitted). 
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Industrialization changed the production process through new technology and 
dramatically different organization.  Work performed in the work shop in several steps 
coordinated by the master was scaled up and mechanized.  Craft knowledge previously 
embedded in master and apprentice now became embedded in machines and work routines.114 
Therefore, legal mechanisms were required that could make possible the 
propertizing of knowledge embedded in physical assets (Kp).  Such propertizing was achieved 
through the development of intellectual property law.  Entrepreneurs were thus able to rely on 
the protection afforded by patents in order to bind technology and expertise to the firm.115 Such 
propertization, however, also afforded toolmakers to sell their technology on the market thus 
encouraging investment in such products and their ready supply.   
Work on the factory floor required less skill and knowledge, substituting craft 
knowledge for machine specific work routines.  However, certain types of knowledge could not 
be simply stored in a product.  Mechanics and engineers with significant expertise were required 
to build and maintain machines used in production.  Chemists and other experts in the sciences 
were needed to develop and oversee new production processes.  And the coordination of 
production required increased managerial and technical knowledge and experience.  
Accordingly, the legal structure evolved to accommodate firms needs to bind organizational and 
individual knowledge. 
Trade secrets law originally recognized only the existence of property rights in 
physical things, but not in intangible information.  Until the mid-nineteenth century, there was no 
standard legal protection that would allocate to firms the value of an employee’s knowledge.116 
Courts were initially hostile to the enforcement of restrictive covenants, as a reflex of the 
tradition of the guild system.117 Judges were reluctant to understand intangible knowledge to be 
a firm’s asset.  But seminal cases in the development of intellectual property law began during 
the mid- to late 19th Century to recognize complaints by factory owners seeking to restrain 
 
114 The industrialization changed the production process, permitting that the “master knowledge” (Ki) become 
embedded in machines (Kp). After industrialization, the work that was coordinated by the master became largely 
standardized, due to the application of scientific methods to the production process. With the division of work, non-
skilled employees became able to operate machines that produced various units of the product which was previously 
hand made. An unprecedented change in knowledge organization in the firm took place. The type of knowledge 
necessary to be bound changed. 
115 See id. at 447. “The expansion of scientific and technological research at universities and the first corporate 
efforts to systematize the development of new technology through research and development also made their mark 
on the law. These profound changes in the organization of knowledge both contributed to the new legal rules and 
were made possible because judges and lawyers were prepared to regard knowledge as a business asset to be bought, 
managed, and sold.”(quotation omitted). 
116 See generally Fisk, supra note __, at 466 (arguing that:  “The court’s belief that patent was the only legal 
protection for technology reflects a widely held view during much of the nineteenth century”. Fisk discusses the 
case of DuPont which as early as 1904 started to require employees to assign patents to the firm. The DuPonts were 
one of the pioneers to realize that knowledge was a valuable asset and to engage in activities that would protect it. 
DuPont’s attention to the value of maintaining the secrecy of its production methods is not typical of all nineteenth-
century firms. Fisk argues that “The difference may be attributable to the fact that DuPont’s chemistry-based 
industry, as compared to an industry where employee skills are mechanical, used knowledge which was most easily 
characterized as secret information rather than as general skill or technique. The difference may also be attributed to 
the DuPonts’ view that they were more likely to be innovators than imitators, and thus they were generally likely to 
be more at risk from others learning their methods than from being unable to learn methods of others.”)) 
117 Id. p. 455 
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machinists, designers, engineers and chemists from taking their knowledge to competitors or 
using it to set up their own factories in competition with their former employer. 
For example, the first case in which a court articulated the duty of an employee to 
protect the trade secrets of his employer, involved a machinist.  In Norfolk v. Peabody (Mass. 
1868), plaintiff shop owner sued defendant machinist whom he allegedly had employed to assist 
in inventing and developing certain machinery.  The machinist, Norfolk, had agreed in writing 
not to reveal information about the machinery used in Peabody’s factory, which produced 
gunnery cloth from jute.  Norfolk, however, had quit his employment and had joined others in 
building a factory.  Peabody sought and obtained an injunction against Norfolk, restraining him 
from revealing “any knowledge of said machinery or of the models and plans of the same, from 
building any such machinery for any other person or persons, from communicating said secret 
process of manufacturing Jute cloth from Jute butts as aforesaid, and from using said process in 
company with any other persons or persons or by himself.”118 Norfolk had misappropriated 
certain drawings, which he was also ordered to return.119 
This development of trade secrets protections and the enforcement of restrictive 
covenants beginning in the 1890s accompanied and reflected the new shape of industrial 
organization in the modern corporation.  The new legal protections and doctrines of contract 
were directed at engineers and other experts with access to explicit and with tacit knowledge 
critical to a corporation’s competitiveness.  Drafts of machine designs and other knowledge 
embedded in machines received protection in addition to patents and copyright protection.  The 
move to implying duties of trust, confidentiality and to guard trade secrets into employment 
contracts “fit closely with the courts’ new understanding that firms, not individuals, had now 
become pioneers of new technology and that firms hired employees precisely for their 
knowledge . . .”120 
Gradually, courts started to recognize a firm’s property rights to general 
knowledge of its business activities.121 From 1890 to 1930, there were profound doctrinal 
changes expanding trade secrets and accepting restrictive covenants doctrines as a means to 
control the use of a broad range of workplace knowledge.  The duty to protect trade secrets came 
to be considered an implied term in employment agreements, where previously it depended in an 
 
118 Fisk, supra note __, at 486 (citing Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) (internal citations omitted). 
119 Norfolk’s new employer sought to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the confidentiality agreement was void 
as a restraint of trade in that it prevented Norfolk from ever using his skill and knowledge acquired at work during 
his life at any time or place.  He further argued that the design and operation of the machinery was not secret 
because it could be observed by anyone who visited the factory.  The court here saw the injunction as solidly within 
the tradition of patent law, given that theft of particular drawings was involved.  Fisk, supra note __, at 484-85. 
120 Fisk, supra note __, at 500.  See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, Co. v Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110, 116 (Sup Ct. 1892) 
(finding that it was Kodak’s “exercise of much skill and ingenuity [that built the business,] the capital of which 
consists largely in certain innovations and discoveries made by its officers, servants and agents”). 
121 “The judges’ growing understanding of the alienability and the value of employee skill led courts to recognize 
ever more legitimate uses for restrictive covenants. Courts eventually agreed that covenants could be used to protect 
“trade secrets,” a concept that became more capacious over time. Some courts further recognized that covenants 
could be used to protect an undefined category of “proprietary information” in addition to trade secrets. Similarly, 
courts changed their assessments of which relationships with customers were business goodwill, and hence company 
property, and which were simply an aspect of an employee’s personality or experience. Moreover, in applying the 
Mitchell rule that a covenant must be reasonably limited, the scope of a permissible covenant expanded to keep pace 
with the expanding category of knowledge that could be deemed as corporate asset.”  Fisk, supra note __, at 458. 
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express agreement.  The type of knowledge to be protected by this doctrine expanded from 
physical things to know-how embedded in the structure of the firm that had originated in 
improvements made by employees.  Employers were assigned ownership not only of drawings or 
objects, but also of ideas and mental concepts expressed in them.122 Thus trade secrets came to 
be applied to bind knowledge of organizational processes (Ko) to the firm.  To the extent that 
restrictive covenants prevented employees from using their own tacit knowledge in potentially 
competing activities after leaving their firms, restrictive covenants now succeeded in binding 
knowledge embedded in individuals (Ki) to the firm’s structure as well. 
As this brief history suggests, intellectual property protections were not neutral 
with regard to firm structure, but accompanied changes in firm structure.  Modern intellectual 
property protections, such as patents, copyright, trade secrets protections bind knowledge to the 
firm.  Patents and copyright protections mainly secure knowledge or technology embedded in 
physical things or products (Kp).  Trade secrets protections also secure knowledge embedded in 
the organization (Ko), such as business methods, that are not amenable to patenting or copyright 
protection, and knowledge embedded in the individual (Ki) but acquired during the course of 
work .  Finally, intellectual property protections based on contract, such as covenants not to 
compete and confidentiality agreements are solely focused on securing knowledge embedded in 
the individual (Ki).  It is, further, worth noting that patents and copyright protections are only 
effective in order to secure explicit or codified knowledge, but not tacit knowledge.  In contrast, 
restrictive covenants, especially covenants not to compete, are aimed at securing tacit 
knowledge.  Trade secrets protections lie somewhere in between. 
The expansion of technological research and the increased use of different forms 
of knowledge (Kp, Ko, Ki) in the production process made their mark on the law.  Legal 
developments have shaped the internal organization and governance of firms by assuring that 
they could bind employee knowledge developed during the course of work.123 The development 
of trade secrets, post-employment covenants not to compete, and non-disclosure agreements 
contributed to preventing the dissemination of knowledge outside the firm.  All these legal 
developments have not only affected competition, as is frequently claimed by scholars, but also 
internal firm structure.  If the law had not permitted such extensive appropriation of knowledge 
by the firms, we would expect to find different mechanisms to encourage employees to stay 
longer in the firm, and to bind themselves voluntarily to the firm in order to prevent knowledge 
losses or a different type of firm structure. 
We suggest that not just ownership rights to intellectual property were implicated 
by this shift in the law, but ownership of the corporation itself was implicated.  Without the 
 
122 Fisk, supra note __, at 493-494, 504. 
123 Fisk, supra note __, at 445 (“In devising new rules to govern ownership of ideas and skill, judges, treatise-
writers, and lawyers perceived the issue as one of economic policy and used the law to achieve certain economic 
goals. In enforcing contracts -- at first, only if they were express, and later by recognizing such contracts as implied -
- to maintain secrecy of the employer’s methods, courts created a new species of “intellectual” property at the 
expense of older notions of artisanal independence.”  As courts became aware of the value of employee knowledge 
to firms, they sought an expanded role for the law in facilitating economic development by allocating rights in that 
knowledge. Contract was rapidly becoming the dominant legal construct for analyzing the rights and obligations of 
all employment relations. At the same time, when the popularity of Frederick Winslow Taylor’s scientific 
management made it seem imperative that firms rationalize and control every detail of employment and production, 
contract provided the most powerful legitimating discourse for the significant loss of workplace autonomy that 
Taylorism entailed.  Id. at 503. 
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ability to tie valuable knowledge resources to the corporation, the purchase of shares would have 
been considerably less attractive to investors.  Conversely, without the ability to pool financial 
resources to acquire machines, technologies and physical assets, which provided a fertile 
environment for further knowledge creation within the firm, technological advances could not 
have been accomplished as rapidly, or perhaps at all.124 
One effect of creating a legal presumption in favor of corporate ownership of 
employee knowledge, however, and of enjoining employees from taking that knowledge with 
them to create their own new firms, was to reduce the stake that knowledge workers could 
demand in the corporate enterprise, thus favoring the separation of (stake) ownership and 
control.  Where the partnership model explicitly contemplated that a firm eventually would have 
to make an employee into a partner, if it wanted to retain his skill and expertise, the corporate 
model did not contemplate conferring such an ownership stake as an employee rose though the 
ranks.  For this reason, we suggest, firm structures would not have developed in quite the same 
way had it not been for the development of the above described legal doctrines of intellectual 
property that have helped bind knowledge to the firm.  The fact that such a relationship between 
intellectual property regimes and the separation of ownership and control obtains can be 
supported with the help of the following example:  the relationship between stock option grants 
in Silicon Valley and California’s prohibition against restrictive covenants.  We develop this 
thesis in item VI.D. 
Below we provide a quick summary of the intellectual property protections and 
the types of knowledge that they bind according to our typology. 
 
124 Chandler & Hikino, supra note __, at 26 (“An understanding of how the large industrial firm came to play the 
aforementioned roles requires an awareness of the complementary relationship between investment in plant and 
equipment (physical or tangible capital) and the human skills and knowledge developed in their operation 
(intangible capital).  Extensive investments in large-scale plant and equipment created a fertile ground for managers 
and other personnel to educate themselves about both the technical skills and the organizational process of new 
technology.”).  This was also recognized by courts in the late 19th Century. 
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TABLE __: MECHANISMS AND RULES THAT “PROPERTIZE” KNOWLEDGE 
Kpr (“Propertized” Knowledge) 
Kp Ko Ki 
Legal Rules And 
Private Contracts 
That Propertize 
Knowledge 
Structures 
• Patents 
• Copyrights125 
• Trade Secrets 
• Trade Secrets 
• Corporate Law Rules 
That Centralize 
Control In A Board Of 
Directors126 
• Restrictive 
Covenants 
• Trade Secrets 
• Copyrights 
• Confidentiality 
Agreements 
Source:  authors’ elaboration 
a) Patents and Copyrights bind Kp 
Recall our distinction between codified (standardized) and tacit knowledge.  
Codified knowledge is knowledge that has been expressed in mathematical formulas, graphics, 
drawings, books, writing notes, or even by voice.  When the knowledge is codified, it becomes 
easier to transfer it:  a person who has never studied or heard of that knowledge is able to 
understand its basics by having access to the formal information regarding the knowledge.127 
But, when knowledge becomes codified, it also becomes a public good.128 This means that 
people may engage in free-riding, extracting benefits from the knowledge without paying its 
value.  One imperfect way to solve this problem is through intellectual property protection.  
Patents and copyrights provide ownership rights to codified knowledge. 
According to the statute, any person who “invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent,” subject to the conditions and requirements specified 
in the law. 
In order to obtain a patent, it is necessary to codify all the know how, knowledge 
and processes.  The right conferred by the patent grant is “the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling” the invention in the United States or “importing” the 
invention into the United States.  In exchange of making the knowledge codified, and available 
to the public at large, the person receives from the government exclusive rights to use the  patent 
for a limited period of time.  Patent law permits that codified knowledge embedded in new 
products, Kp, is bound to its proper owner.  Patent rights solve the appropriability problem that 
come from the “impure public good” nature of knowledge, even in an imperfect way.  As 
 
125 Copyrights can both support Kp and Ki, depending on to whom the legal systems assigns property of 
copyrightable assets. The American legal system assigns property to the firm while the German legal system assigns 
property to the employee. These different legal rules may contribute to shaping different firm governance structures. 
126 CHANDLER, supra note ___, at 73. Rules that centralize decision making in the board of directors can support 
or undermine knowledge structures depending on the type of knowledge structure that exists in the organization. As 
we have been arguing if KI is the predominant type of knowledge, a decentralized system of control is likely to 
produce more efficient results. 
127 Tacit knowledge is the knowledge which has not been codified yet. It can be embedded in the organization 
and in the employee. 
128 See below in section V.. 
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explained, any person, by having access to the codified knowledge could steal the knowledge, 
without paying its value and use it.  Patents provide a means so that the firm can bind the new 
knowledge to its structure, and extract economic value.  These intellectual property protections 
enable the creation of a market for propertized knowledge. 
b) Trade Secrets Bind Kp And Ko And Ki 
The organization embodies knowledge of processes and routines.  Specific know 
how is protected by trade secrets doctrine.  The courts increasingly prevent employees from 
revealing the knowledge that they have acquired through learning and sharing knowledge while 
part of a firm’s organization.129 
As we explained, from a historical point of view the law of trade secrets has been 
changing and is being interpreted more expansively by courts since the end of the nineteenth 
century.  Where previously trade secret law was concerned with the protection of technical 
information, the definition now covers all commercially valuable information.130 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which now has been adopted by more than 30 
jurisdictions,131 has broadened the definition of a trade secret to include “any formula, pattern, 
device, or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives one the 
opportunity to obtain advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.”132, 133, 134 
Agreements to refrain from using or divulging trade secrets in competition are frequently made.  
And courts will enforce such contracts if they are deemed “reasonable.”135 
129 “The focus shifted from the drawings of a machine to the design innovations contained in them; from the list 
of the customers to the knowledge of their identities, locations, needs and their goodwill; and from the precise 
written formula for a substance to the general knowledge of the process and techniques for making it. Negative 
knowledge (i.e., what does not work to achieve a particular purpose) came to be recognized for the first time as a 
trade secret so that an employee could be restrained not only from using knowledge about what works to make a 
product, but also from using knowledge of what does not work. Compilations of publicly available facts gained 
protection. As the category of trade secrets expanded, the category of general knowledge, or even specialized skill 
and experience, diminished.”  Fisk, supra note __, at 504 (Emphasis added. quotations omitted.)  
130 Stone, supra note __, 757. 
131 114 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 13:14, n. 69 (4th ed. ____). 
132 RESTATEMENT (____) OF TORTS § 757, comment b (____). 
133 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 14 U.L.A. 50 (____). 
134 According to the UTSA, which is adopted by many states, including California, a trade secret is: 
“Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program device, method, technique, or process, that:  1) 
Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other 
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and 2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d).  A court may enjoin “actual or 
threatened misappropriation” of a trade secret.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426(a).  A corporation misappropriates a trade 
secret when (1) it discloses or uses the trade secret of another without express or implied consent, and (2) at the time 
of the disclosure or use, it knew or had reason to know that its knowledge of the trade secret was derived from a 
person who owed a duty to the entity seeking relief to maintain the trade secret’s secrecy or limit its sue.  CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(B)(iii).  Courts may order affirmative acts to protect a trade secret in appropriate 
circumstances. 
135 Courts have used a variety of factors in determining whether information is a trade secret which a former 
employee is not entitled to use when he leaves the firm. These factors include:  “the extent to which the information 
is know outside of the employer’s business; the extent to which it is known by employees and others engaged in his 
business; the measures which have been taken by the employer to ensure the continued secrecy of the information; 
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In order to be enforced a trade secret must be secret.  When information is 
deemed “general knowledge” available to outsiders then it cannot be property enforceable at law.  
The requirements that should be met for the enforcement of trade secrets may restrict the 
application of trade secrets doctrine in the task of binding knowledge to the firm.  The diffusion 
of knowledge throughout the firm that is needed for production vitiates to some extent the ability 
of the employer to prevent the employee from transferring it outside the firm by the threat of law 
suit.  So, to the extent that trade secrets bind only “specific knowledge”, other methods are 
necessary to bind more “general” knowledge to the firm, including structural solutions.  These 
will be discussed next. 
It is interesting to observe that the “specialized knowledge” which the courts 
aimed at protecting has been becoming more general knowledge in the sense that it is not 
codified but tacit.  Trade secrets protect the tacit knowledge developed in the organization (Ko).  
Moreover, trade secrets doctrine aim nowadays at protecting tacit knowledge that an employee 
acquired when he was sharing experiences inside de firm’s organization (Ki).  To be sure, trade 
secrets also protect codified knowledge, such as drawings and design of machines (Kp) which 
don’t enjoy the benefits of protection by means of patents. 
However, trade secrets still are insufficient to protect the type of tacit knowledge 
that is embedded in the employee (Ki).  Covenants to compete play this role.  Trade secrets are 
legitimate to protect business interests that can be enforced where there is a restrictive 
covenant.136 So, when combined with a restrictive covenant, the threat of revelation of trade 
secrets can very well allow an employer to restrain an employee from working for a competitor.  
This connection between trade secrets law and restrictive covenants does not only expand 
restrictive covenant law, but also the scope of the enforcement of trade secrets.  Trade secrets 
law complements and works together with restrictive covenants to bind knowledge to a firm.137 
c) Covenants Not To Compete Bind Ki 
When the firm contracts a covenant not to compete with its employee, it aims at 
not only protecting the knowledge that is possessed by several members in the organization, but 
also protecting the specific, tacit knowledge that each employee will develop while participating 
in the firm’s organization, and which the firm is not yet aware of its content (Ki).138 
the value of the information to him and to his competition; the amount of money and effort expended in developing 
the information; the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly applied or duplicated by others.”  
6 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §13:14 ([4] citing UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT 14). 
136 A potentially significant change in that general direction has been the acceptance of the “doctrine of inevitable 
disclosure” by the 7th Circuit in Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond.  The doctrine has prevented employees from taking their 
valuable knowledge to a competitor, even where they had not signed restrictive covenants, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 
1995).  The case has received much attention and criticism, and the doctrine has been rejected by New York and 
California courts, but it remains good law in many jurisdictions  See, e.g. Bayer Corporation v. Roche Molecular 
Systems, 72 F.Supp. 2d 1111, 1112  (N.D. Cal. 1999) (“The theory of ‘inevitable disclosure’ is not the law in 
California and, at trial, plaintiff will have to demonstrate actual use or disclosure, or actual threat thereof”),   is still 
valid in other states. 
137 Generally, in trade secret’s law and in restrictive covenants there’s been stronger enforcement in favor of 
employers. 
138 Much of the increasing critiques to covenants not to compete is that they are trying to transform tacit 
knowledge embedded in the employee in codified knowledge. For a critique of current policy regarding covenants 
not to compete see Stone, supra note __, at 271. 
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In knowledge intensive environments a firm’s competitive edge significantly 
depends upon highly knowledgeable and skilled employees.139 Firms compete fiercely to attract, 
enhance and retain “talent.”140 To achieve this purpose, firms thus provide extensive employee 
training, upskilling and networking opportunities, investing heavily in human capital.  In this 
regard, the R&D policy and the firm organization will pretty much depend on the ability that 
these firms have to bind their employees (or restrain the employees from using this knowledge 
outside the firm), and to bind the knowledge produced by them inside the firm’s structure.  
Hence, the importance of laws that regulate ownership of employee inventions and the 
compensation to be paid to these inventors. 
Restrictive covenants now appear in almost every employment contract.141 
Where previously non-compete clauses and other post-employment restraints were reserved for 
high-level management, they are now written into the contracts of at will employees and litigated 
much more frequently.142 While cases have proliferated, “courts have become increasingly 
receptive to employer efforts to limit employee use of human capital.”143 
Restrictive covenants fill important gaps in trade secrets law.  They provide 
protection where the information an employer seeks to protect is non-confidential information 
relating, for example, to actual customers or prospective customers with whom the employee had 
sustained contacts.  Trade secrets law can, for example, be applied to protect customer lists that 
have been kept confidential, but not to customer information which has not been kept 
confidential.  The most difficult problem with trade secrets law is the definition of what 
constitutes a trade secret, and its identification.  Restrictive covenants obviate this issue.144 
However, with the relaxation of what type of knowledge can constitute a trade secret, there is 
now a greater overlap. 
 
139 “Information and knowledge are the thermonuclear competitive weapons of our time.”  STEWART, supra note 
__ at 3-4. 
140 Stone, Knowledge at Work, supra note __, at 722. 
141 Cavico says that “one now sees these non-compete clauses in practically every employment contract.”  
“employers are fearful that their more ambitious, entrepreneurial, and mobile employees soon will be competing 
against them. Employers contend that they need these restrictive covenants to cope with ever-escalating competitive 
challenges.  Moreover, the increasing amount of mergers and acquisitions, layoffs, bankruptcies, and concomitant 
‘downsizings,’ ‘rightsizings,’ and ‘flexible’ staffing arrangements, including the increased use of ‘temporary’ 
employees, engenders a growing number of terminated, and very likely disgruntled, employees.  These former 
employees likely are sophisticated and knowledgeable, and were privy to sensitive information….Employers are 
alarmed, and not without reason, that these ex-employees will possess, and offer a new employer, a significant 
competitive ‘edge.’ This ‘edge’ is perceived as a real threat to a firm’s profits, and possibly even its existence.  A 
very volatile and risky business environment thereby is created, and a prudent firm must take care to guard its 
competitive advantages.  Restrictive covenants, therefore, have emerged as a prevalent and efficacious means for an 
employer to protect its business interests and hard-earned competitive ‘edge.’” Cavico, supra note __, at 3. 
142 ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE 
SURVEY (Brian M. Malsberger et al. eds, 2d ed. 1996);  ABA SECTION OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYEE 
DUTY OF LOYALTY: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian M. Malsberger et al. eds. 2d ed. 1998);  See also Stone, 
supra note __, at 739. 
143 Stone, supra note __, at 739. 
144 See, e.g., Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc., 410 F.2d 163, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1969) (“[S]ince it may be 
difficult to determine, as a matter of law, what is a trade secret, the covenant not to compete is a pragmatic solution 
to the problem of protecting confidential information”). 
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The enforcement of covenant not to compete depends on the observation of some 
requirements.  One example is the rule of reason, which most states came to adopt.  Under the 
rule of reason approach noncompete clauses are enforced if they (1) serve to protect and 
employer’s legitimate business interest, and the restrictions are (2) temporally and (2) 
geographically narrowly tailored to this purpose.145 As a rule, courts would strike down 
noncompete agreements in their entirety, when they imposed restraints that were broader than 
necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests, considering them unenforceable 
contracts in restraint of trade, or unconscionable contracts oppressive to the former employee.  
This has changed and courts now increasingly reform noncompetition agreements when they are 
drafted too broadly.146 This means that post-termination restrictions are more likely to be 
enforced. 
The most common argument for the enforcement of noncompetition clauses is the 
disclosure of trade secrets and confidential information.147 These are clearly legitimate business 
interests courts deem worthy of protection when they assess restrictive covenants in employment 
contracts.  Even in California, where Business and Professions Code section 16600 generally 
prohibits covenants not to compete, and public policy strongly favors employee mobility, 
covenants not to compete are enforceable if “necessary to protect the employer’s trade 
secrets.”148 
The law of trade secrets (also state law) and restrictive covenants are thus 
complementary.  And in assessing whether to enforce a noncompetition agreement, courts will 
therefore frequently discuss the factors that apply to trade secret protection.  Accordingly, courts 
will be more willing to enforce a noncompetition clause where an employee has acquired 
confidential information that would afford a competitive advantage to another business, but less 
willing where the employee could import only general knowledge of the business or industry.149 
The law and economics literature of the adequacy of covenants not to compete is now numerous.  
Many arguments pro or con the enforcement of covenants to compete have been 
 
145 [Complete] 
146 See, e.g., Solari Industries, Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 576, 264 A.2d 53 (1970) (adopting the judicial rule 
that noncompetitive agreements may receive total or partial enforcement to the extent reasonable under the 
circumstances). 
147 See, e.g., Vender Werf v. Zunica Realty Company, 59 Ill.App.2d 173, 208 N.E.2d 74,76 (1974) (Legitimate 
interests is only another term to describe those ‘special circumstances’ which render employee’s restraint necessary, 
but protection against ordinary competition itself is not sufficient.  The authorities indicate that the ‘special 
circumstances’ which have been controlling and important in determining the reasonableness of the restraint 
imposed generally involve elements of trade secrets and unfair dealings”). 
148 Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. (1965), 62 Cal.2d 239, 242, 42 Cal.Rptr. 107 (Traynor, J.).  See also 
Metro Traffic Control, inc. v. Shadow Traffic Network, 22 Cal.App.4th at 859.  California also does not invalidate a 
noncompetition agreement that merely prohibits solicitation of the former employer’s customers.  See generally,
Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal.App.4th 1443 at 1482, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 277 (2002). 
149 See, e.g., Whitmyer Bros. Inc. v. Doyle et al., 58 N.J. 25, 28-30, 274 A.2d 577 (N.J. Supreme Court, 1971) 
(“matters of general knowledge within the industry may not be classified as trade secrets or confidential information 
entitled to protection nor will routine or trivial differences in practices and methods suffice to support restraint of the 
employee’s competition”; referring to defendant’s argument that highway safety construction employee’s 
knowledge of bidding procedures and constituent elements were general business knowledge in the guard rail 
construction industry). 
42 KNOWLEDGE INPUTS, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FIRM STRUCTURE 
Doc #:NY7:262178.1 
advanced.150, 151, 152 However, we advance here a still unexplored connection of the law of 
restrictive covenants and its impact to firm internal governance structure (see part VI.D below). 
The enforcement of such restrictive covenants affects firm governance in the 
sense that if these contracts cannot be enforced in courts, employers and corporations may have 
to give employees greater incentives to stay in the firm, perhaps even ownership stakes. 
3. Other Bodies Of Law And Types Of Agreements 
While in this paper we only develop the idea of how law binds knowledge of Kp, 
Ko and Ki type by means of intellectual protections and agreements such as covenants not to 
compete, it is important to point out that other bodies of law do play a role in this regard as well.  
Employment regulation, for instance, may establish employee rights, assure job security and 
therefore help bind the knowledge embedded in an individual to firms structure.  Rules that 
affect co-decision procedures may also cause this effect to some extent.  Rules of Professional 
Conduct such as the ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct also can function as away to 
prevent knowledge transfer outside the firm.  Other types of agreements such as confidentiality 
agreements are also largely used in business practice and they do play an effect in helping firms 
bind knowledge to its structure. 
V. KNOWLEDGE ALLOCATION AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
A. Efficient Knowledge Allocation 
In order to analyze firm structure, we develop the following theoretical 
assumption:  Firms will try to maximize the use of knowledge resources in the production 
process.  This assumption is similar to the assumptions underlying certain economic models that 
firms will maximize profits and consumers will maximize their utility.  In order to maximize the 
use of knowledge resources, we now posit that firms should collocate decision-making authority 
with the relevant knowledge available within or to the firm.  A firm uses its knowledge resources 
most efficiently when it allocates decision-making authority to those (persons or groups) that 
have the relevant knowledge to make such decisions at the various levels of the firm hierarchy.153 
150 Eric A. Posner & George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective,
John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 137 (2d series), University of Chicago Law 
School, (arguing that the employers have incentives to overinvest in specific training, which is worthless to any 
other employer, if a third employer is going to reimburse them. Therefore, employers will tend to expand covenants 
not to compete to externalize the cost of worker training to as many prospective future employers as possible. To 
prevent this from happening and to promote the design of efficient covenants, given the possibility of renegotiation, 
the courts should investigate whether the restrictive covenant protects specific or more general training, enforcing 
the covenants only in the latter case.) 
151 Stone, Knowledge at Work, supra note __, at 271. (“the terms of new employment contract – specifically, the 
promise of training and networking opportunities – are undermined when courts are expansive in their approach to 
enforcement of restrictive covenants and the definitions of trade secrets.” ) 
152 Paul H. Rubin & Petter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. Leg. Stud. 93 (1981).  
Rubin and Shedd consider efficient/inefficient the enforcement of covenants depending on the case. 
153 See Jensen & Meckling, Specific and General Knowledge, supra note __, at 251-274 (“When knowledge is 
valuable in decision-making, there are benefits to collocating decision authority with the knowledge that is valuable 
to those decisions. There are two ways to collocate knowledge and decision rights. One is by moving the knowledge 
to those with the decision rights; the other is by moving the decision rights to those with the knowledge. The process 
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Knowledge resources are costly.  All else being equal, knowledge resources are 
wasted where decision-making authority is withheld from those with the knowledge required to 
make certain decisions.  There will be knowledge available in the organization without putting it 
to its most value-enhancing use.  Conversely, where a particular task or position within the firm 
hierarchy can be accomplished by substituting the knowledge of a supervisor/manager for that of 
an less knowledgeable employee, i.e. through direction of the employee, there is no need to pay 
the higher wage for the manager, because (from an economizing perspective) the task could be 
performed by a lower level employee.  To put it differently, if a position in the firm is occupied 
by someone who has more knowledge than is required to perform his work, knowledge resources 
are being wasted through inefficient allocation of knowledge resources.154 
From these observations it follows that:  Decision-making authority should be 
collocated with relevant knowledge within the organization in an economizing way.155 We call 
this the Principle of Efficient Knowledge Allocation.
Relationships between decisional hierarchies and knowledge distribution within 
the firm emerge in connection with this principle.  The first is that the firm hierarchy should be 
flatter and more decentralized, the greater and the more complex the knowledge distribution 
among the firm’s personnel.156 In contrast, decisional hierarchies should be steeper, and 
decision-making authority should be more centralized, the less knowledgeable the firm’s 
personnel and the less complex the organization’s knowledge capabilities.  In this situation, we 
will expect to find people who are more knowledgeable exercising top executive functions and 
therefore the pyramid of hierarchy will have a large base with few persons in the top positions.157 
The principle of maximizing the use of knowledge resources is a valuable tool for 
explaining how governance structures are shaped, from a positive perspective, or how 
governance structures should be shaped, from a normative perspective. 
Knowledge inputs in the form of human capital, as suggested by our discussion so 
far, directly affect the governance structure of an organization in a way that other inputs, such as 
physical assets, capital and raw materials, do not.  The value of knowledge consists in solving 
problems and making good decisions.158 Purchasing knowledge, but not making full use of it, or 
 
for moving knowledge to those with decision rights has received much attention from researchers and designers of 
management information systems. But the process for moving decision rights to those with the relevant knowledge 
has received relatively little attention in either economics or management.”  at 5-6)  
154 This assumes, of course, that the employee is being fully compensated for her skills. 
155 Jensen & Meckling, supra note __, at 19 argue:  “The key to efficiency is to assign decision rights to each 
agent at each level to minimize the sum of the costs owing to poor information and the costs owing to inconsistent 
objectives.” 
156 See, e.g., Stephen R. Barley, The Turn to a Horizontal Division of Labor:  On the Occupationalization of 
Firms and the Technization of Work, paper prepared for the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. 
Department of Education, January 1994, pp. 21, 32 (“As firms hire increasing numbers of professionals, as 
professions spawn specialties, and as new technologies create work that requires esoteric knowledge, expertise 
becomes more balkanized and firms begin to resemble confederacies of occupations rather than sleek pyramids of 
control . . . When those in authority no longer comprehend the work of their subordinates, chains of command 
should cease to be viable for coordination.”). 
157 Demsetz mentions that those who are to produce but don’t have knowledge must have their activities directed 
by those who possess more knowledge. Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, supra note __, at 171-172. 
158 The most significant economic value of knowledge consists in its problem-solving potential.  And problem-
solving ultimately results in decision.  Problem-solving capabilities, for the most part, are only fully engaged and 
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relying on those less knowledgeable to make the relevant decisions, is inefficient, and may well 
bring about failure in a competitive environment.  The purchase of knowledge is efficient only if 
it gets reflected in the governance structure or allocation of decision making authority of the 
organization, just as the purchase of a physical asset only makes sense if it is used in a 
productive way, or the borrowing of capital if applied to its best rate of return.159 
However, knowledge resources are not allocated in the firm by the price 
mechanism.  Therefore, the efficient allocation of decision making authority within organizations 
is subject to special difficulties that have to do with the nature of hierarchical organizations 
themselves, that is, with their relative rigidity.  As Jensen and Meckling point out, the fact that 
intrafirm decision making rights are typically not themselves alienable may, over time, lead to 
the inefficient allocation of knowledge resources: 
[T]he internal organization of the capitalist firm is also an 
instance of the absence of alienable decision rights.  Indeed, we 
distinguish activities within the firm from activities between the 
firm and the rest of the world by whether alienability is transferred 
to agents along with the decision rights.  In this view transfers of 
decision rights without the right to alienate those rights are 
intra-firm transactions. While firms can sell assets, workers in 
firms generally do not receive the rights to alienate their positions 
or any other assets or decision rights under their control.  They 
cannot pocket the proceeds.  This means there is no automatic 
decentralized process which tends to ensure that decision rights in 
the firm migrate to the agents that have the specific knowledge 
relevant to their exercise, and that there is no automatic 
performance measurement and reward system that motivates 
agents to use their decision rights in the interest of the 
organization.  Explicit managerial direction and the creation of 
mechanisms to substitute for alienability is required.160 
Because there are no clear property rights in knowledge assets inside the firm, the 
assignment of decision rights to promote efficient knowledge allocation faces special difficulties.  
Problems of information or knowledge asymmetry make it difficult to evaluate knowledge 
resources.  In the case of tacit knowledge, the asymmetry problem is exacerbated:  individuals 
themselves may not have information about what and how much they actually know.  Thus, one 
 
sharpened when the problem-solver is confronted with real choices.  Problem-solvers must therefore be genuinely 
engaged in a decision-making process, even if they do not have the last word.  While decision-makers do not need to 
have a grasp of all the details of a decision, and thus can delegate some, or even much or the problem-solving, good 
decisions require a good grasp of the alternatives, or on the reliance of those better informed.  While formally a 
decision might be ratified at a higher level of hierarchy, boundedness of rationality necessarily implies the diffusion 
of actual decision-making within an organization if this is the approach that will efficiently allocate knowledge 
resources.  The contract-based explanation of the firm, explaining its transaction cost savings by the fiat relationship 
between employer and employee as advanced by Coase simply ignore those considerations. 
159 See Sherwin Rose, Contracts and the Markets for Executives in CONTRACT ECONOMICS, supra note __, at 
184.  “Scarce talents of the most capable managers are economized by assigning them to positions at or near the top 
of the largest firms, where their ability is magnified to greater effect by spreading it over longer chains of command 
and larger scales of operations.” 
160 Jensen & Meckling, supra note__, at 14-15. 
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of the most important, and perhaps most difficult, problems that a firm has to solve, and one 
which can lead to its success or failure in a competitive environment is the one identified here:  
the collocation of decision making authority with relevant knowledge.  The use of knowledge is 
not frictionless and will always generate a certain amount of waste.  There are also costs due to 
mistaken decisions.  These are exacerbated where decision making authority is not collocated 
with the relevant knowledge. These costs have to be taken into account in assessing the efficient 
allocation of knowledge resources.161 
B. Knowledge Hazards 
In addition to the difficulties of efficient knowledge allocation already described, 
there are additional hazards that may impede efficient knowledge use by the firm, even if proper 
care has been taken to collocate decision rights with relevant knowledge.  While traditional 
moral hazards such as shirking will occur through an employee’s failure to apply her knowledge 
with the expected effort, there are additional hazards that are specific to the use of knowledge 
resources.  These specific knowledge hazards are caused by the public goods characteristics of 
knowledge resources, but also by the tacit nature of knowledge.  This is because tacit knowledge 
may not be observed at all if it is not communicated.   
1. The Public Goods Characteristics of Knowledge Resources 
Knowledge resources, as already indicated, have public goods characteristics.  A 
public good has two critical features: non-rivalrous consumption and non-excludability.  Non-
rivalrous consumption means that the consumption of the good by one individual does not 
detract from the ability of others to enjoy its consumption.  Non-excludability means that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to exclude an individual from enjoying the good.162 
Thus, knowledge resources are subject to significant hazards in market 
transactions. If a seller wants to sell knowledge in the market, she will have to disclose 
something about what she intends to sell so that the buyer develops an interest in buying.  
However, in this process, the seller already loses some of her property.163 Worse yet, once 
revealed that knowledge may be used not merely by the transferee, but by others to whom it is 
communicated, including potential competitors, thus undermining the ability of its proprietor to 
extract rents from her ownership.  
As we already discussed in section IV, while intellectual property protections are 
directed precisely to solving the problems of knowledge transfer, they rarely confer perfect 
 
161  Jensen & Meckling at 28. Thus, if knowledge valuable to a particular decision is to be used in making that 
decision,  there must be a system for assigning decision rights to individuals who have the knowledge and abilities 
or who can acquire or produce them at low cost. In addition, self-interest on the part of individual decision-makers 
means that a control system is required to motivate individuals to use their specific knowledge and decision rights 
properly. 
162  See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Public Good, Work Bank Lecture, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/knowledge/chiefecon/articles/ undpk2/ (“Knowledge of a mathematical theorem clearly 
satisfies both attributes [non-rivalrous consumption and non-excludability]: if I teach you the theorem, I continue to 
enjoy the knowledge of the theorem at the same time you do.  By the same token, once I publish the theorem, 
anyone can enjoy the theorem.  No one can be excluded.  They can use the theorem as the basis of their own further 
research.  The ‘ideas’ contained in the theorem may even stimulate others to have an idea with large commercial 
value”). 
163  Joseph Stiglitz, Public Policy for a Knowledge Economy, World Bank Lecture, January 1999, at 13. 
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appropriability,164 and do not apply to all kinds of knowledge.  Markets for knowledge and 
information therefore depend critically on reputation, on repeated interactions, and on trust.165 
It is easy to see the benefits of integrating knowledge production rather than 
procuring such resources through market transactions when the knowledge used in the 
production process is most susceptible to hazards – as, for instance, in the case of Ki.  We 
develop this latter point in sections VI.A and VI.F, below.  
To avoid moral hazards, firms also must design other mechanisms, such as 
compensation strategies, in accordance with the knowledge type that they deploy.  In this 
respect, we will discuss particular compensation systems used by high tech firms and law firms 
in sections VI.D and VI.E.  
Because such mechanisms ameliorate the hazards to which knowledge resources 
are susceptible, even if imperfectly, knowledge is usually distinguished as an impure public 
good.166 
2. Leakage 
Knowledge transfers are thus vulnerable to “leakage.”167 Leakage refers to the 
unwanted transfer of knowledge by its proprietor, permitting a third party to benefit from the 
knowledge without compensating the knowledge proprietor. 
3. Hoarding/Failure to Share  
Not only markets transactions, but also knowledge transfers within organizations 
are subject to special problems, given that knowledge that is not actively communicated may not 
be observed at all. 
Actors may fail to share knowledge in order to secure their decision making 
authority or to extract other advantages.  Such hard to detect opportunistic behavior could 
potentially provide very significant gains for the individual and lead to significant inefficiencies 
for the organization.  Hoarding or failure to share knowledge is potentially attractive to an 
employee (including, or especially, managers), because the employee may establish a monopoly 
over such knowledge and thereby extract rents.  One form of such behavior is the withholding of 
knowledge from the employer or other employees, because an actor wants sole credit for 
possessing such knowledge.  Whatever the motivation, hoarding or failure to share are hard to 
detect or measure.  As a result, knowledge resources existing within the firm may, therefore, be 
 
164  Products are easily reverse engineered.  Sidney G. Winter, Knowledge and Competence as Strategic Assets, in 
THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, (____, eds., ____); see also, David J. Teece, Profiting 
From Technological Innovation in ______________________ 186. 
165  Id. 
166 Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Public Good, (“because the returns to some knowledge can, to some extent, be 
appropriated there is some degree of non-excludability, knowledge is often thought of as an impure public good.”). 
167  We borrow this term from Merges & Arora. ______________________________. 
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underutilized.168 Thus, even if decision rights are collocated with the most appropriate 
knowledge, there are opportunism costs peculiar to the use of knowledge resources.169 
Underutilization, however, may also occur in the absence of opportunism where 
the knowledge transferor is committed to sharing his knowledge.  This may result from 
insufficient communication skills, insufficient knowledge on the part of the transferee, 
insufficient organizational opportunities for knowledge exchange, lack of appropriate settings 
within which to communicate tacit knowledge, etc. 
VI. REVISITING SOME ASPECTS OF FIRM ORGANIZATION 
FROM THE KNOWLEDGE RESOURCES PERSPECTIVE 
A. Correlating Knowledge Structures and Governance (Decisional/Ownership) Structures 
In this part, we apply our typology to different types of firm production.  We 
advance the hypothesis, for which we then produce evidence in subsequent sections, that firm 
organizational structures are influenced by the knowledge types that predominate in their 
particular production process.170 
We argue that production will be organized within a firm (as opposed to the 
market), as long as it can sell some kind of knowledge or expertise, or it can add some type of 
knowledge or expertise to a product or service which is already being sold in the market. 
Holding all the other variables constant, then, we argue that the level of 
knowledge specialization will delimit firm structures. 
Therefore, we advance the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The more the production relies on Kp/Kpr, the more we will 
expect production to be organized by means of market mechanisms. 
 
168 Note that we are not referring here to the problem of bounded rationality, which, per se, will generate constant 
underutilization of knowledge. We refer a particular situation where the knowledge could be effectively used if 
disclosed by its donor. 
169 Jensen & Meckling, supra note__, at 24 argue:  “Because all individuals in a firm are self-interested, simply 
delegating decision rights to them and dictating the objective function each is to maximize is not sufficient to 
accomplish the objective. A control system that ties the individual’s interest more closely to that of the organization 
is required. The control system specifies (a) the performance measurement and evaluation system for each 
subdivision of the firm and each decision agent, and (b) the reward and punishment system that relates individual’s 
rewards to their performance.” 
170 Demsetz, Comments on Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, supra note __, at 279-280. Demsetz has 
advanced some of the relations between knowledge resources and firm governance structure:  “Some firms, for 
example, earn revenues by performing repetitive and routine activities most of the time. Others are preoccupied with 
highly innovative activity. The difference in the tasks faced by these firms, I believe, dictates differences in their 
organization structures and compensation systems. Less hierarchy can be tolerated by firms engaged in innovative 
activity, and decision rights are probably dense in the middle of the hierarchy that exists. This is because the 
problems faced by such a firm, relative to one engaged in repetitive activities, cannot be solved as easily as 
routinizing procedures with rules and regulations. It should also be the case that a difference in compensation 
methods is required because decisions must be more decentralized for firms that engage in, for example, genetic 
research. Greater reliance on profit-based compensation is required to bring objective functions of dispersed holders 
of decisions rights into closer accord.” 
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Hypothesis 2:  The more the production relies on Ko and Ki, the more we will 
expect production to occur within the firm. 
 
Thus if we imagine a continuum of knowledge inputs from purely Kp inputs at 
one extreme to purely Ki inputs at the other extreme, we would expect to find production taking 
place exclusively through market transactions in the first instance, but exclusively within firms in 
the second instance. 
FIGURE 1: KNOWLEDGE TYPE AND PRODUCTION ORGANIZATION 
Market                                           Firm 
 
+ Kp / Kpr                                                                           + Ko / Ki 
Assume now that some level of tacit knowledge or Ki is applied in the production 
process.  Production will thus take place in the firm.  The structure of the firm hierarchy 
governing the product process will then be more or less centralized depending on the level of Kp 
that is added.  Because tacit knowledge is embedded in an individual, and because the more the 
knowledge is embedded in an individual, the less effective the management of knowledge 
through centralized governance structures, it follows that: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  The greater the reliance on Ki, the more decentralized the firm 
decisional hierarchies that will govern the production process. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  The greater the level of Kp/Kpr, and the less reliance is placed on 
Ki, the greater the centralization of decisional hierarchies that govern firm production. 
 
So on the continuum that describes the organizational structure of the firm, we 
can expect that, if at one extreme we have a firm that predominantly relies on Kp, this firm will 
have a centralized governance structure.  At the other extreme, if a firm uses exclusively Ki, then 
this firm will have a very decentralized governance structure, as follows. 
 
FIGURE 2: KNOWLEDGE TYPE AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Market                           Firm                              Firm 
 (centralized) (decentralized)
+ Kp                                                                                              Ki + 
 Kp = Ki 
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In the table below we distinguish some basic types of industries according to the 
nature of the knowledge that they use.  The knowledge type that is used (viz. Kp, Ko, Ki) varies 
depending on the different production technologies/techniques in a particular industry, and the 
organizational structure reflects the deployment of different knowledge types.171 
TABLE __: THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE FIRM 
Firm Structure Example Knowledge 
Structure 
1. Taylorist Mass 
Production 
General Motors Kp  + 
Ko  + 
Ki  – 
2. High Tech 
Engineering 
Microsoft Ki + 
Ko 
Kp – 
3. Low level service 
industry 
McDonalds Kp 
Ko + 
Ki – 
4. High level 
Professional Services  
Law firms Ki + 
Ko 
Kp – 
6. Risk Management/ 
Venture Capital Firms 
Venture Capital 
Firms 
Ki+ 
Ko + 
Kp – 
Of course there is a mixture of Kp, Ko and Ki in all types of firms.  What change 
is the degree to which these variables enter into each firm type as suggested above. 
1. Centralization vs. Decentralization of Decision Making and Knowledge Location 
Different and somewhat contradictory approaches have been taken with regard to 
the impact that knowledge resources have on the organization of the production process. 
Some scholars have proposed that the centralized organization of a firm is 
conducive to knowledge transfer and diffusion within the firm.  Kenneth Arrow, for example, 
argues that “authority, the centralization of decision-making, serves to economize on the 
transmission and handling of knowledge.”172 Similarly, Coase’s reliance on the superior 
 
171 In future elaborations, we intend to rely on SIC codes for which it should be easier to identify existing bodies 
of empirical data in the relevant specialized literatures. 
172 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 69 (1974). 
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allocation of resources through the fiat-control of the entrepreneur within the firm hierarchy 
appears to endorse the virtues of centralization for the efficient use of knowledge resources.  As 
one scholar contends, “Coase’s notion of authority” after all “assumes that a directing principal 
is at least as knowledgeable about the relevant tasks as the agent being directed.”173 
One of the ways in which firms economize in deploying knowledge resources is 
by “knowledge-substitution.”  If  X and Y are independent contractors in the market, then Y’s 
own knowledge is the final guide to his behavior. In contrast, if X and Y are coordinating their 
productive activities within a firm, Y can act on the basis of X’s knowledge without internalizing 
it.  In the firm, “knowledge-substitution” can thus allow an employee to perform a particular job 
relying on the knowledge of others without first engaging in laborious internalization.174 This 
expands the employees’ productive capabilities.175 
Knowledge substitution is even more important in the case of tacit knowledge, 
which  cannot be easily assimilated.  “[D]irection substitutes for education (that is, for the 
transfer of the knowledge itself).”176 In this way, a manager’s knowledge can leverage the 
productivity of an employee.  And more generally, it is possible “to generate more and richer 
coordinative activity [within the firm] than can be accomplished in markets.”177 
In contrast, Hayek argued that the market mechanism is superior and more 
efficient in producing goods, because knowledge is distributed throughout society and there are 
significant cognitive limitations faced by any set of decision makers in a centralized coordination 
process.  Hayek tried to explain the superiority of market production by reference to the 
characteristics of tacit knowledge.  He argued that the ability of the market to allocate knowledge 
resources was superior to their allocation in a managed economy, because of the inherently local 
and tacit character of much of the knowledge required in the production of goods.178 Tacit 
knowledge is not easily communicable, but is locally specific and can only be acquired through 
experience.  Tacit knowledge, therefore, cannot be readily gathered by a centralized decision 
making authority in the manner that data can be gathered and stored in a centralized computer.  
 
173 See Nicolai J. Foss, Coase vs Hayek, Copenhagen Business School, 2001, at 22, 
http://www.cbs.dk/staff/njf.html 
174 Kathleen R. Conner & C. K. Prahalad, supra note _.  There are instances where knowledge substitution is 
performed by means of products. Suppose I am using a product that was built relying on the knowledge of a third 
party. In this case, as the knowledge is embedded in a product (as we shall call Kp), knowledge substitution is  can 
be achieved in the market.. 
175 According to Conner & Prahalad:  “knowledge substitution is a fundamental response to cognitive limitations, 
having the effect on economizing on them . . . . A primary effect of firm organization – of the authority relationship 
– is to cause an individual to use the knowledge of another before the former fully understands or agrees with it. 
Conversely, a main effect of market contracting – of an autonomous relationship – is to oblige knowledge to be 
internalized before the individual agrees to modify its actions on the basis of that knowledge.”  Id., at 485. 
176 Demsetz, supra note __ at 172. 
177 R. P. Rumelt, Inertia and Transformation in (C.A. MONTGOMERY, ED.) RESOURCE-BASED AND 
EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF THE FIRM 124 (1995). 
178 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society. 35 AMER. ECON. REV. 519, 521-522 (Sep. 1945)  (“It is with 
respect to this that practically every individual has some advantage over all others in that he possesses unique 
information of which beneficial use might be, but of which can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left 
to him or are made with his active cooperation.  We need to remember only how much we have to learn in any 
occupation after we have completed our theoretical training, how big a part of our working life we spend learning 
particular jobs, and how valuable an asset in all walks of life is knowledge of people, of local conditions and special 
circumstances.”). 
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As a consequence, Hayek argues, decentralization achieved through the market is necessary, 
because it assures that the knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place will be 
promptly used by means of the price mechanism.179 
Summarizing the discussion, some scholars such as Arrow and Coase seem to 
point out the benefits of firm authority centralization in economizing knowledge resources by 
means of a process that can be described as “knowledge substitution.”  Other scholars such as 
Hayek point out the benefits of a decentralized structure that relies on knowledge specialization 
which occur in the market. 
However, the relations between producers that are rearranged within the firm also 
include a division of knowledge among different persons involved in a production process.180 
Firms restructure the decision making procedures of a production process, centralizing certain 
decisions and decentralizing others.  Indeed, the decentralization achieved through specialization 
in the firm is at least as important as the centralization of decision making achieved through 
steeper hierarchies. The efficient use of knowledge resources requires decentralized decision 
making under some circumstances – in markets or firms – and  centralized decision making 
under others.181 
The degree to which knowledge-substitution takes place within a firm will 
certainly affect firm organization.  The potential for knowledge substitution is a necessary 
condition for greater centralization and steeper hierarchies.  But it is not a sufficient condition.  
Where knowledge substitution is counterproductive or impossible, employees must rely on their 
own knowledge and firm organization will tend to be characterized by greater decentralization 
 
179 Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, at 528:  “Though [the price system] not only a division of labor but 
also a coordinated utilization of resources based on an equally divided knowledge has become possible.”  However 
Hayek does not explain why there is organization of production inside firms at all, and what implications firm 
organization would imply for knowledge development.  Hayek treats large firms, which do not use the price 
mechanism to allocate knowledge resources in their internal structures, as individuals. We believe this is so because 
Hayek, at the time he wrote, was concerned with pointing out the virtues of market allocations when compared to 
centralized allocations performed by the State in the function of an economy planner. This was a current theme is his 
writing, reflecting the debate posed by the Socialist regime at that time. See FRIEDRICK A. HAYEK, THE ROAD OF 
SERFDOM.
180 Hayek was the first to point out the importance of the division of knowledge:  “Clearly there is a problem of 
the Division of Knowledge which is quite analogous to, and at least as important as, the problem of the division of 
labour.  But while the latter has been one of the main subjects of investigation ever since the beginning of our 
science, the former has been as completely neglected, although it seems to me to be the really central problem of 
economics as a social science . . . “  F.A. von Hayek, 4 Economics and Knowledge. ECONOMICA, NEW SERIES 33-54, 
at 49 (1937). 
181 Conner & Prahalad, supra note __:  “An essential function of market contracting ... is to enable individuals to 
specialize in different aspects of business activity.  Each person need not possess the full range of understanding or 
skills necessary to complete all aspects of the work by itself.  The provisions of the market contract coordinate the 
individuals’ efforts, so that a unified product (and hence specialization itself) can emerge.  On the other hand, firm 
organization also enables specialization, since it too provides a means for coordinating individual efforts.  However, 
unlike market contracting, the firm entails a second means for minimizing the impact of limited cognitive abilities.  
Again looking at polar cases, because the employment contract creates the authority necessary for knowledge-
substitution, but a market contract does not, an employee need not internalize all the insights required to choose and 
carry out an action, while an independent contractor must.  The firm organization economizes on cognitive 
limitations through two methods:  specialization and knowledge-substitution.  In contrast, market contracting 
economizes through specialization alone. 
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and flatter hierarchies.182 Law firms, architectural firms, and partnerships are, more generally, 
examples of the latter, as we shall see. 
So a question that should be addressed is, after all, when is centralization or 
decentralization – in firms or in markets – the most desirable organization process so as to 
promote efficient knowledge allocation in the firm structure. 
2. The Nature of the Problem 
Jack Nickerson and Todd Zenger argue that markets are best at handling one type 
of problem (low-interaction/decomposable problems), whereas hierarchies are best at handling 
another type (high interaction/non-decomposable problems).183 
A problem is a low-interaction/decomposable problem, if its solution depends 
very little on interactions among different knowledge sets.  In searching for solutions to such 
problems, groups of individuals can independently apply their knowledge.  The aggregation of 
their independent efforts with the independent efforts of others who possess different knowledge 
sets can be expected to uncover a valuable solution to the problem.  One example of such a 
problem is the design of a higher-performing personal computer.  Performance can be increased 
by independently improving any number of subsystems, such as the disk drive, the monitor, the 
CPU, etc.  Such problems “can be subdivided into subproblems each of which draws from rather 
specialized knowledge sets.”184 A method of “directional search” is appropriate to the solution 
of such problems.  In directional search, individuals independently pursue trials and 
independently observe performance.  Individual actors perform multiple searches, altering design 
features associated with their knowledge sets, and then observe whether performance is 
increasing or declining as a result of the variation.  This method of problem-solving is efficient 
when there are low-interaction problems that are fully decomposable into subproblems.185 
A problem is a high-interaction/non-decomposable problem, if its solution is 
highly dependent on interactions among different knowledge sets.  Such problems cannot be 
separated into subproblems and therefore cannot be addressed by individuals familiar with one 
particular knowledge set.186 In order to solve such problems, directional search is inadequate, 
and instead, what Nickerson and Zenger call “heuristic search” must be used.187 Heuristic search 
requires the development of heuristics about the patterns of knowledge interactions, which will 
permit the selection of trials that maximize the probability of finding a high-value solution. Thus 
extensive communication and knowledge transfer are required to solve such problems. 
 
182 See Stiglitz, Public Policy for a Knowledge Economy, supra note __, at 19:  “In the firm, moving from simple 
repetitive work under central control (Taylorism) to more complex knowledge-based work requires a move 
towards a more decentralized and participative workplace.” 
183 Jack A. Nickerson & Todd R. Zenger, A Knowledge-based Theory of Governance Choice—A Problem-
Solving Approach, __ (Working Paper No. __, October, 2001). 
184 Id. at  4-5. 
185 Id. at 6. 
186 The design of a leading edge microprocessor circuit is currently such a problem that “demands numerous 
knowledge sets that extensively interact in determining the value of solutions . . . . the value of any particular design 
change will interact with a host of other potential design changes determined by actors possessing distinctly 
different knowledge sets.”  Id., at 5. 
187 Id. at 7. 
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The different types of problems identified above are handled most efficiently by 
different knowledge sets and governance structures.  Markets are ideally suited to conduct 
directional search for the solution of decomposable problems.  Markets support directional 
search, encouraging specialists to pursue trials that exploit their particular expertise. This 
division of knowledge could be used to explain why, for example, the personal computer is 
produced from components created worldwide. In the computer industry, Chandler explains how 
IBM outsourced the production of the components that would compose the personal computer:  
“…Estridge completed contracts with suppliers of components. Tandom made the disk drives in 
California; Zenith the PC power supplies in Michigan; the Silicon Valley division of SCI 
systems (a contract manufacturer) the circuit boards; a Japanese firm, Sieko Epson, the printers; 
IBM’s plan at Charlotte, North Carolina, the board assemblies; and its plant at Lexington, 
Kentucky, the keyboards.”188 
The costs of using markets increase, however, when problems become 
increasingly non-decomposable.189 In this case, their solution will require a mechanism that 
mitigates knowledge based exchange hazards that arise from the public goods nature of 
knowledge.  This mechanism is the firm hierarchy.190 
The firm can apply distinct solutions to the governance of knowledge formation:  
authority-based hierarchy and consensus-based hierarchy.  Authority-based hierarchy is 
consistent with centralized management of knowledge by individuals who supposedly are more 
knowledgeable.  It is appropriate to solving problems of relative complexity, while economizing 
on knowledge transfer.  In contrast, the solution of highly complexity problems requires greater 
decentralization and thus consensus-based hierarchy, as no particular actor will be 
knowledgeable enough to direct heuristic search. 
Therefore firm organization will differ depending on the nature of the problem 
that a firm needs to solve and its underlying knowledge requirements. The degree of interaction 
among knowledge sets required for the solution of problems encountered during the production 
process will influence whether firm production is more efficient than market production, and if 
so, whether steeper or flatter decisional hierarchies are appropriate. 
In the following, we discuss some characteristics of different types of firm 
production, the different types of knowledge resources that predominate in each, and examine 
organizational consequences that their respective knowledge structures have for the firm’s 
internal governance structure. 
 
188 Chandler, THE ELECTRONIC CENTURY, supra note __, at 137-38. 
189 Nickerson & Zenger, supra note __, at __.  The authors argue that markets exacerbate knowledge exchange 
hazards, discouraging investments in co-specialized knowledge and development of a common language that are 
essential to a heuristic search. Individuals don’t have appropriate incentives to deal with the public good nature of 
knowledge. 
190 Id., at 13. Markets are efficient when knowledge transmission is directed at solving decomposable problems.  
When problems are decomposable, knowledge is embedded in products and services and knowledge transmission is 
largely limited to that which can be contained in prices and bundled into products and services.  However, bundling 
knowledge sets within a single firm and exercising authority to direct search becomes efficient when problems 
become complex and efficient search demands extensive knowledge sharing and coordinated action.  Authority in 
hierarchies economizes on the extensive and costly knowledge sharing and education that would need to occur were 
the governance of solution search for complex problems organized through a market interface. 
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B. The Sole Proprietorship  and Small Partnerships 
The typical American enterprise before the Civil War, was the sole proprietorship 
or small partnership.  These forms of business organization had easily identifiable individuals 
who were fully responsible for the obligations of the business.191 
The system that was common in small factories prior to 1870 had certain 
particular features:  large investments were seldom required; there were no formal employment 
contracts; work rarely required complicated or costly machinery; work was mainly done at home 
by workers who owned their tools; workers had a considerable degree of personal autonomy; 
timing and pace of work, within limits, were left to workers; there was no need to tie up capital 
in expensive equipment.192 
We attribute the fact that we observe personal autonomy and decentralization in 
the production process to the type of knowledge required in the production process.  Workers 
were artisans who had command of their work.  They had the tools and, most importantly, the 
knowledge necessary to perform the work.  As the knowledge required to perform the handiwork 
was, relatively speaking, not very complex or technologically sophisticated, most of the 
manufacturing process depended on the expertise and work experience embedded in each worker 
(Ki).  Because of this, the governance structure of the production process was significantly 
decentralized and workers were assigned autonomy to control their tasks. This governance 
structure was the most efficient considering that the artisans had sufficient knowledge to perform 
their tasks independently. 
There also existed at the time systems of apprenticeship, where an artisan 
controlled and managed the production process and exercised decision-making authority.  This 
governance structure also can be explained in terms of the nature of the knowledge resources 
necessary for the production.  Here, the older artisan who had more technical knowledge (Ki+) 
retained the decision rights as the apprentices were in the process of learning the skills and 
abilities necessary to develop the product (Ki-). 
C. Mass Production Firms 
The governance structures typical of small manufacturing partnerships began to 
change with the advent of new production technologies after 1870.193 These technologies 
yielded significant inventions and new products.  Small factories gradually became 
manufacturing companies; their focus changed to large-scale production.  The ownership of large 
amounts of immobilized capital in the form of special machinery located on the production floor 
(Kp) thus became a key asset in the mass production system.  We argue that this predominance 
of Kp in the productive process determined many of the organizational features of the emerging 
mass production corporations. 
 
191 Richard Adelstein, supra note __, at 25, 29-30. 
192 Id. at 31-32. 
193 Id.  There was a growth in the number of engineers, and a new emphasis on formal science. There were efforts 
to rationalize the operations of the machine shop. The role played by engineers in the development of American 
manufacturing became extremely significant. At this time there was a rationalization of the accounting processes, 
necessity of coordination and scheduling, operational scale, monitoring and coordination by managers, creation of 
formal procedures in a hierarchized structure. It is important to note that this is also the beginning of rationalization 
of Ko. There was a development of professional management tools, development of the knowledge embedded in the 
organization, knowledge of the organization process in the improvement of routines. 
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Once knowledge became embedded in machines and work routines, workers 
increasingly became more replaceable.  Taylor’s system of scientific management perfected the 
mechanization of the production floor, taking the logic of mass production further than anyone 
had before.  The goal of Taylor’s scientific management was to embed all of the decentralized 
knowledge previously dispersed among employees into machines and production routines, thus 
bringing it under the more perfect control of management: 
Taylor’s alternative solution to the planner’s problem in the 
shop was to break the worker’s monopoly with the hammer of 
science and replace the decentralization of power based on craft 
knowledge with a hierarchically organized workplace in which 
expert managers told ignorant workers precisely what to do and 
how to do it. Every task in the shop would be reduced it to a series 
of minute “elementary operations” performed by a man on a 
machine, and with the aid of a stopwatch and a strong, agile 
worker, the time needed to complete each such operation would be 
computed... 
Management could gain possession of all the knowledge 
needed to control the shop.  It could then systematize and codify it, 
and return it to workers in the form of detailed instructions.194 
This “physical separation of thinkers and doers” required a separate class of 
managers.  At the top of the hierarchy were well-educated employees – the managerial class – 
who planned, executed and controlled production and marketing with the help of scientific 
knowledge.  These highly skilled employees were responsible for the organization of the firm.  
They were assigned most of the legal decision making rights.  At this level of the hierarchy, the 
new corporations of the 20th century thus dramatically increased the level of technical learning 
and tacit knowledge – the level of Ki.  In contrast, the heavy use of machines (Kp) and 
organizational routines (Ko) permitted the deskilling of workers on the production floor, 
requiring very little specialized knowledge of these lower-level workers, who thus became 
readily replaceable without causing any measurable loss to the company.195 
194 Id. at 41-42. See also at 46 [SOURCES MISSING] “The general principles of ‘working smarter” and the 
practical core of scientific management - the institutionalization of systematic analysis in the workplace, the division 
of mental as well as physical labor, the emphasis on planning and the separation of thinkers from doers, the 
substitution of theory for intuition and rules of thumb quickly took root in American industry and formed the 
conceptual basis for the nation’s emerging system of mass production.” 
195 We are not necessarily saying the line worker will be less knowledgeable. Our argument is that the system is 
designed in a way to reduce the reliance on knowledge embedded in the employee in the operation of the assembly 
line.  See William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, Big Business And Skill Formation In The Wealthiest Nations: The 
Organizational Revolution In The Twentieth Century, in ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., FRANCO AMATORI & TAKASHI 
HIKINO, BIG BUSINESS AND THE WEALTH OF THE NATIONS 501 (1977) discusses the relative absence of skill 
formation on the shop floor in American industry.  “In contrast to Britain, however, American reliance on skilled 
shop-floor labor to coordinate production activities was generally short-lived, as U.S. industrialists developed 
technological and organizational alternatives to leaving skills, and the control of work, on the shop floor. By 
employing unskilled immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, by investing in deskilling technological change, 
and by elaborating their managerial structure to plan and coordinate the productive transformation, U.S. industrial 
capitalists attacked the craft control that workers – typically of British and German origin - had staked out during the 
1870s and 1880s.”  The author describes that in the first decades of the last century, the top management positions 
were occupied increasingly by university graduates in search of careers with the incumbency of applying science to 
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As our theory predicts, governance structures become more centralized when Kp 
predominates in the production process.  This is necessary to achieve an efficient allocation of 
knowledge resources:  decision rights must be assigned where costly Ki is located, at the 
upper-levels of the firm hierarchy. Conversely, decision making will be more decentralized the 
greater the reliance is on Ki at different levels of the firm hierarchy, because, again, efficient 
knowledge allocation requires that decision rights are collocated with costly knowledge 
resources. 
1. The Shift from C-Form to the M-Form Structure 
Chandler distinguishes three main stages in the evolution of American 
manufacturing firms.  Between 1880 and the first World War, after the first wave of new 
technologies, there was a period of capital accumulation, characterized by large investments in 
physical assets and the expansion of production in order to achieve gains of scale in 
scale-dependent technologies.196 During this period, a heavy reliance on Kp, i.e., the embedding 
of technology in multiple machines, coincided with a rationalization of production processes that 
lead to the centralization of decision-making.  (C-Form corporation). 
The second period, from 1914 to 1950, was dominated by the new internal 
combustion engine and its applications in the motor vehicle industry.  In this period too, firms 
made large investments in tangible capital-accumulation and augmentation. 
The third period, from the end of  World War II to the 1980s, was characterized 
by a shift from the accumulation of tangible capital to the predominance of intangible capital.197 
Growth was increasingly more knowledge-intensive and science-intensive. 
We argue that the historical development of American manufacturing firms 
supports our theory that firms that rely heavily on Kp will centralize their decisional hierarchies, 
but firms that increase their reliance on Ki and Ko will be inefficient unless they decentralize 
decision-making at least to some degree.  When American firms relied mostly on Kp, they 
dramatically centralized their governance structures. (C-form).  After the second war, when firms 
deployed increasing levels of Ki and Ko in R&D for product improvement, innovation, and 
 
industry.  The shop-floor investment strategy has been to substitute machines and materials for the skills of workers.  
Id. at 519 
196 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The United States:  Engines of Economic Growth in the Capital-Intensive and 
Knowledge-Intensive Industries in CHANDLER, ET AL., BIG BUSINESS AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note __, 
at __. 
197 Id. at 64. Empirical evidence shows that since the 1960s the number of R&D scientists and engineers 
substantially increased. The private business sector, mostly manufacturing enterprises played a dominant role. R&D 
scientists represent full-time employees. The number increased from 348.4 thousands in 1965 to 726 thousands in 
1989. Id. at p. 38-39 Chandler & Hikino, supra note __, at __.  
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diversification, they began to decentralize198 and take on a multi-divisional structure (M-
form).199 
Chandler shows that after the 1890’s the great manufacturing companies 
centralized their headquarters. The headquarters were responsible for the decisions concerning 
nearly all the activities of the enterprise’s plants or marketing units.200 The embedding of 
knowledge inputs in products and machines and the standardization of production processes 
enabled economies of scale.201 According to industry insiders, the most important benefits of the 
new unified form of organization included the utilization of machinery and equipments to their 
fullest capacity, the ability to replace striking workers by switching operations to other plants, 
and the benefits from skilled managers at the top of the hierarchy undertaking decisions and 
supervising the enterprise in its entirety.202 Hence the major significance of Kp for such firm 
organization and the diminished use of Ki, concentrated at the upper levels of the organizational 
hierarchy. 
After the first stage of centralization, firms began to make use of their existing 
knowledge and skill-sets to diversify into related products and industries.  This diversification, 
 
198  Id at 42-43, see also at 45: “In those industries most affected by the new markets and new technology, growth 
came more by going overseas and still more by diversification. Of these two strategies, diversification was far more 
responsible for the adoption of the “decentralized” structure than overseas expansion. Diversification came when 
leading companies in these technologically advanced industries realized that their facilities and the scientific know-
how of their personnel could be easily transferred into the production and sale of new goods for new markets. (…)” 
199  According to Chandler’s definition, “An enterprise can be said to have adopted the new [M-] form if it came 
to have a general office with executives whose primary tasks were general rather than functional and if it also had at 
least two major multidepartmental, relatively autonomous divisions.” Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. STRATEGY AND 
STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE at 325. Id., at 42. This pattern 
of organization was gradually adopted by more industries as they started to expand their activities through 
diversification after the Second World War. Chandler mentions the examples of Hercules Powder and Monsanto 
(before 1940) and Celanese Corporation of America, Columbia Carbon, Carborundum, American Cyanamid, 
Koppers, Pittsburgh Coke & Chemical, Glidden, Atlas Powder, ….Shell Oil and Phillips Petroleum.  See also at 48, 
discussing the effect of product diversification  in oil enterprises.  Shell, Standard of California , Phillips Petroleum, 
Texaco, Standard (Indiana), Standard of Ohio, and continental Oil set up autonomous divisions to administer their 
new chemical products. 
200 ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR. STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 31 (____). 
201 According to Chandler, “The transformation of a loose alliance of manufacturing or marketing firms into a 
single consolidated organization with a central headquarters made possible economies of scale through 
standardization of processes and standardization in the procurement of the materials. Of more significance, 
consolidation permitted a concentration of production in a few large favorably located factories. By handling a high 
volume of output, consolidated factories reduced the cost of making each individual unit…”  CHANDLER, SCALE 
AND SCOPE supra note __, at 31. 
202 See a comment from Charles R. Flint, organizer of the United States Rubber Co. in 1899, regarding the 
benefits of consolidated management.   “The following are the principal ones:  raw material, bought in large 
quantities is secured at a lower price; the specialization of manufacture on a large scale, in separate plants, permits 
the fullest utilization of special machinery and processes, thus decreasing costs; the standard of quality is raised and 
fixed; the number of styles reduced, and the best standards are adopted; those plants which are best equipped and 
most advantageously situated are run continuously in preference to those less favored, in case of local strikes or 
fires, the work goes on elsewhere, thus preventing serious loss (…); greater skill in management accrues to the 
benefit of the whole, instead of the part; and large advantages are realized from comparative accounting and 
comparative administration…”  Id., at 33, 34. 
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however, typically brought about a measure of decentralization, given the different expertise 
required to run different types of businesses.  (M-Form corporation). 
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the leading enterprises came to face 
increasingly complex administrative problems, because of the great technological advances and 
the systematic application of science to industrial production.203 According to Chandler, these 
developments exposed serious weaknesses in these centralized firm structures:  there were too 
few decision makers for the great number of complex decisions that needed to be made.204 
We argue that this shift to the M-form structure was driven by changes in 
knowledge requirements necessary to support production.  The more bodies of knowledge a firm 
needed to master, the more decentralized their organizational structure needed to become.  A 
single management team in the top of the hierarchy could no longer master the many different 
bodies of knowledge needed to run different lines of business, especially in science intensive 
industries.  Different types of Kp deployed in the different production processes added 
significant complexity.  Supply lines and margins responded to different market conditions in 
different businesses.  Different organizational routines were required:  getting quotes for the 
price of raw materials differed significantly from one business to the next; so did the 
establishment of supply lines and related logistics.  Supply lines were subject to different 
hazards, market fluctuations, environmental events, etc. for the different products, thus requiring 
the creation of new and specialized organizational routines in each case, affecting both supply, 
production, and marketing of the products in each line of business. This increasing complexity 
required different types of management experience – with different types of Ki.205 
Organizations evolved by devolving discretion and decision rights upon those 
employees/managers who had greater specialized knowledge concerning the different products, 
and within each division, upon department heads with functional responsibilities.  This 
decentralization process was conducted in order to optimize the management of knowledge 
requirements according to an efficiency-enhancing knowledge allocation. 
DuPont is an interesting case study that illustrates the theory we have proposed 
above.  DuPont built large research departments to generate new products and improve existing 
ones. The application of science through institutionalized research resulted in diversification as 
new products were developed.206 Diversification, in turn, resulted in increased complexity of 
operational and entrepreneurial capabilities.207 Recognizing the centralized control placed 
ultimate decision-making authority in the hands of executives who did not possess the relevant 
knowledge in each case to manage the line of business, DuPont’s Chairman, Harry Haskel, 
exempted DuPont’s dye business from centralized control, even as DuPont was concentrating all 
decision-making authority concerning manufacturing operations in a single executive Vice 
 
203 CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE, supra note __, at 42. 
204 Id. at 41. 
205  Chandler and Hikino argue that as capital-intensive and science-based industries grew entering in new product 
markets, the initial centralized structure (unitary or U-form) became inefficient. “Senior managers became acutely 
aware that they did not have the time or the competence to coordinate and monitor – or to devise and implement 
long-term  strategies for their units operating in different geographical and product markets.”  They started to adopt 
a decentralized structure to meet their organization necessities. (the multidivisional M-form) note __, at 35.  The 
large industrial enterprise and the dynamics of modern economic growth, in _______, supra.
206 Id. at 43. 
207 Id. at 44. 
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Presidency around 1919.  Haskell explained, for example, that “it would be better for a few years 
to carry on the dye business as a separate entity.... because it is a developing, unstandardized 
industry and should merit independent attention just as the Parlin chemical mixtures business 
was better by itself until standardized – when it was merged with the regular sales and operating 
departments.”208 
Haskel, who at the time was one of the leaders of American industry, thus 
recognized both that standardized production techniques permitted centralized control, but that 
decentralization of decision-making authority was necessary where complex non-decomposable 
problems needed to be addressed by specialized managers with tacit knowledge in a specific 
field. 
When the government imposed antitrust restrictions on DuPont’s military powder 
business, DuPont saw itself with idle capacity in one of its plants and intensified its strategy to 
diversify its product lines.  DuPont’s search for potential products was clearly guided by a 
concern for making use of its existing knowledge sets.  According to Chandler, the products that 
DuPont chose were in “a field where the company’s technological experience, training, and 
resources could pay off.”209 
Seeking diversification based on its nitrocellulose experience with gunpowder, 
DuPont bought the International Smokeless Powder & Chemical Company, a manufacturer of 
both explosives and pyroxylin lacquers.  Subsequently, DuPont set up a small pilot plant to 
produce pyroxylin-based artificial leather.  The operation proved successful upon which 
DuPont’s Executive Committee decided to purchase one of the leading firms in the field, 
Fabrikoid Co., to “learn more about the business” instead of building its own artificial leather 
plants.210 
DuPont also pursued the production of pyroxylin from nitrocellulose based on 
short-staple cotton. However, upon investigation, it was concluded that DuPont would have 
difficulty supplying companies with their nitrocellulose requirements,  Firms would not buy 
from outsiders, because they would not  sacrifice control and supervision of their products.  To 
act as a supplier, DuPont would have to become knowledgeable about the details of 
manufacturing or composition of their customers’ products.  But firms regarded these details as 
valuable trade secrets, which they would not share with a potential competitor.211 Because of the 
close coordination required between supplier and manufacturer in the industry, DuPont instead 
pursued a policy of vertical integration.212 
DuPont’s increasing diversification resulted in inefficiencies in knowledge 
allocations.  According to Chandler, “[t]he development of plans and the appraisal of activities 
were made harder because executives with experience primarily in explosives were making 
decisions about paint, varnishes, dyes, chemicals and plastic products. Coordination became 
more complicated because different products called for different types of standards, procedures 
 
208 Id. at 68 
209 Id. at 81. 
210 Id. 
211  Id. at 82 
212 Id. at 82. 
60 KNOWLEDGE INPUTS, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FIRM STRUCTURE 
Doc #:NY7:262178.1 
and policies.”213 As a consequence, the company’s new ventures suffered from extremely poor 
performance.214 
Initially, DuPont stuck with its old centralized organization that concentrated 
decision rights in the hands of executives specialized in explosives.  Proceeding under this 
familiar organizational structure, DuPont lost money on every product except explosives, 
accumulating high deficits in the area of paints, varnishes and cellulose products.215 The 
company studied the problem and, after a six-month investigation, concluded that a new 
management structure was necessary.216 In a report that envisaged the restructuring of DuPont, it 
was concluded that “no member of the Executive Committee should have the direct individual 
authority or responsibility which he would if he was in charge of one or more functional 
activities of the Company.  His relation to such functions should be advisory only…”217 Further, 
according to the new plan, “the head of each Industrial Department [would henceforth] have full 
authority and responsibility for the operation of his industry, subject only to the authority of the 
Executive Committee as a whole.”218 
In the face of product diversification, DuPont thus decentralized its decisional 
hierarchy.    The new General Managers would handle the day-to-day administration of the 
divisions, whereas the Executive Committee would henceforth be responsible for over-all 
coordination, appraisal and policy planning.219 DuPont thus established autonomous, 
multi-departmental divisions and a general office with staff specialists and general executives in 
1921.  Each division had several departments and its own central office to administer them.220 
The new multi-divisional structure – called the M-Form – promoted an efficient 
allocation of knowledge resources.221 Chandler cites as one reason for the success of the 
decentralized structure that it removed executives responsible for the destiny of the entire 
enterprise from the more routine operational activities, providing them with more time, 
information and psychological commitment for long-term planning.222 Senior executives of the 
Company increasingly specialized, began to carry out entrepreneurial activities, and focused on 
strategic decisions.  Decentralization further resulted in the collocation of decision rights with 
relevant knowledge in that General Managers  of the divisions were granted authority to manage 
 
213 Id. at 91. 
214 Id. at 92. 
215 Id. at 104.  (“The strategy of diversification seemed to promise little more than difficulties and deficits”). 
216 Id. at 94. 
217 Id. at 107. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 107. 
220 Id. at 111. 
221 Chandler argues that “ If the general offices were better equipped to handle over-all strategic decisions, the 
division managers had full authority and the necessary facilities to make the day-to-day tactical ones. As each 
controlled the functional activities needed for making and selling one major line of products, each could determine, 
within the framework set and funds allotted by the Executive Committee, the most efficient ways to use the 
resources at his command.”  Id. at 11. 
222 Id. at 309. 
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operations in their own areas of expertise.  Once the new structure was in place, losses were soon 
converted into profits.223 
DuPont’s development shows that the decentralization of decisional hierarchies 
became necessary where the development and production of new products required mastery of 
new knowledge sets that had not yet been standardized, as well as research and individual 
expertise to find solutions to new and complex problems.  According to Chandler, 
“[d]iversification … brought the new decentralized structure, not because it increased the total 
output or size of operations, but because it so quickly enlarged the number and complexity of 
both tactical and strategic administrative decisions.224 As discussed above, the nature and 
complexity of the problems to be solved affects the degree of decentralization required by the 
decisional hierarchy.  More complex and non-decomposable problems require more 
decentralization.  In the case of DuPont’s new product lines, the problems encountered were both 
complex and industry specific, and thus could not be analyzed and processed in the same fashion 
by a single management team.  They required “the creation of a multidepartmental autonomous 
division for the administration of each major line of products.  (. . . .)”225 
In the electrical (including electronics), power machines (including automobiles) 
and chemical industries, nearly all the leading enterprises followed DuPont’s turn toward the 
new multidivisional form.  These industries devoted the most resources to systematic research 
and development.226 Institutionalized research brought diversification, which, in turn, brought 
decentralization of the organizational structure.227 
The evolution of organizations in other, much less diversified industries did not 
follow the same path.228 Among seventy companies studied by Chandler, those that did not 
adopt the new multidivisional structure by 1960 were concentrated in the metals and materials 
industries.229 In the areas of copper, nickel and zinc, moreover, major technological and market 
 
223 Id. at 112. 
224 Id. at 362. 
225  Id., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE at 
362. 
226 Not coincidentally, according to Chandler, the two major science-based industries were electrical equipment 
and chemicals. “They led the way both in the employment of highly skilled non-production workers and the creation 
of large research and development organizations. In chemicals (SIC 28), scientific personnel in 1921 accounted for 
30.4 percent of total scientific personnel employed in the U.S. manufacturing, followed by primary metals with 8.2 
percent and electrical equipment with 7.2 percent. By 1946 the figure for chemicals remained almost exactly the 
same, 30.6 percent. Electrical had risen to 15.5 and metals had dropped to 5.3.”  Chandler, The United States:  
Engines of Economic Growth, supra note __, at __; Chandler, Amatori & Hikino, supra note __ at 80. 
227 CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE, supra note __, at 378. (“Those enterprises whose technological 
potential rests on modern science, as well as few food companies, have been able to turn diversification into a highly 
rational and systematic strategy of growth.  Stimulated by institutionalized research, diversification in turn brought 
decentralization.”)  See also, p. 393:  “In the chemical, electrical and electronic, and power machinery industries, the 
same personnel using much the same facilities using much the same supplies of raw materials were able to develop 
new engines, new machines, new household appliances, new synthetic fivers, new films or plastics, or new electrical 
and electronic devices. Since the enterprises in these industries required the highest of technological skills, their 
administrators invested increasingly large amounts of their total resources in research and development. Such 
resources became less and less toed to any specific product line . (…).” 
228 Id. at 327-328. 
229 Id. at 326. 
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changes were absent.230 This permitted the standardization of operations and the routinization of 
decision-making procedures.231 In these industries, the centralized structure remained the most 
efficient one.  The centralized structure was similarly the most efficient in the oil industry, where 
“the fundamental purpose of structure [was] to unite all activities of the enterprise in meeting 
changing market demand.”  More generally, Chandler concludes that “[w]here a company’s line 
of end products was produced by the same manufacturing process from the same supply of raw 
materials for a relatively few sets of customers, the centralized, functionally departmentalized 
form provided that essential coordination.”232 The centralization structure therefore fit well in 
industries that relied on less diversified Kp, where problems were substantial less complex and 
the standardization of routines enabled an efficient knowledge allocation. 
A more recent example of a relatively hierarchical and centralized firm structure 
is that of IBM in the 1980s and 1990s.  While IBM initially defined the path of the computer 
industry, its business strategy for the personal computer was to develop expertise on mass 
production.233 Instead of developing all the required components, IBM decided to purchase most 
components from outside suppliers in order to rapidly benefit from new inventions and products 
available on the market.234 Thus IBM heavily relied on knowledge/technology embedded in 
products (Kp) that it purchased from suppliers, while still adding their own know-how in 
organizing the assembly, marketing and servicing of the personal computers it produced (Ko) 
and (Ki).  IBM created a service force to provide national support for its clients and developed a 
worldwide marketing strategy, spreading its franchised dealers worldwide.235 Thus focusing on 
mass production where profits largely come from increasing returns to scale and scope,236 IBM 
also developed a highly centralized organizational structure similar in certain respects to other 
mass production industries to manage its large structure.  Important decisions were typically 
initiated by Central Management Committee.237 
Chandler argues that as “Compaq and Apple began to build their global 
enterprises, IBM’s Entry Level System Division was becoming integrated back into the 
long-established, relatively centralized operating structure of one of the world’s largest industrial 
enterprises.”238 IBM’s focus on mass production and reliance on Kp, acquired from its suppliers 
in the form of technology embedded in products, thus made a more centralized, hierarchical 
structure the most efficient allocation of knowledge and decision rights. 
IBM’s open system based on market outsourcing created a demand for other 
companies to enter this market, in order to supply the components that IBM required.  These 
 
230 Id. at 329. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 360. 
233 ALFRED CHANDLER, INVENTING THE ELECTRONIC CENTER, at 132. 
234 Chandler, id. at 136. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 139. 
237 Id. at 136, 137 (“IBM’s Central Management Committee approved Lowe’s report, upgraded the task force to a 
full-scale project development group, appointed Philip ‘Don’ Estridge its chief, and gave him precisely one year to 
have the product on the market…”); “In 1983 IBM’s Central Management Committee created an entirely new Entry 
Level System Division to manage his explosive growth.”). 
238 Id. at 146. 
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high-tech companies had to master a demand for increasing innovation.  Because these suppliers 
of innovation and technology relied heavily on the scientific knowledge and skill of their 
employees, they had to resort to a very different organizational structure in order to manage their 
knowledge resources and remain competitive. 
D. High-Tech Engineering 
The organizational structure of firms engaged in constant innovation is different 
from the one of mass production firms.  These firms are concerned with solving problems, which 
require high levels of interaction and knowledge exchange.239 The knowledge necessary for 
achieving these tasks is mostly embedded in individuals (Ki) and therefore we suggest that these 
firms should develop more decentralized business structures if they are to maximize their gains 
from an efficient knowledge allocation. Employees will enjoy more autonomy in performing 
their tasks. 
Scholars have already studied the changes required in organizational structures in 
order to stimulate knowledge creation and knowledge retention.240 The success of new 
biotechnology firms, for example, depends on their ability to create rights over scientific 
knowledge. These firms need continuous innovation to find valuable and patentable products. 
The asset necessary for product development is an intellectual resource characterized by “severe 
immobility,” because there are few star researchers who have made commercially valuable 
discoveries, and many of them work at universities.241 
In these cases, where scientific knowledge is critical, different organizational 
arrangements are necessary.  By permitting scientist-employees to maintain exchanges with 
universities, new biotechnology firms have turned out to be flexible organizations where the 
knowledge used is mainly managed in a decentralized way by its employees. 
Knowledge production in the university structure to which such firms are linked is 
itself characterized by a unique governance structure.  This has influenced the structure of 
biotechnology firms.  In order to “attract and retain such scientists . . .  each [New Biotechnology 
Firm, or] NBF needed to maintain a ‘university-like’ organizational context as it developed.  
That is, the NBF’s organizational policies had to support both the formation and maintenance of 
boundary-spanning social network relationships as well as numerous other complementary 
activities such as rapid publication of research results and freedom of scientific inquiry.”242 
Not just the New Biotech Firms, but Silicon Valley firms more generally avoided 
hierarchies, creating organizations with considerable dispersed decision-making and flat 
 
239 Nickerson & Zenger, supra note __, at __. 
240 See e.g., Tomas Hellström, Ulf Malmquist, John Mikaelsson, Decentralizing Knowledge:  Managing 
Knowledge Work in a Software Engineering Firm, 12 JOURNAL OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT RESEARCH 25 
(2001) (Arguing that top-down management decisions may be misleading  in software engineering firms). 
241 Julia Porter Liebeskind, Amalya Lumerman Oliver, Lynne Zucker, & Marilynn Brewer, Social Networks, 
Learning and Flexibility:  Sourcing Scientific Knowledge in New Biotechnology Firms, 7 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 
428 (1996). 
242 Id. at 439. (internal quotations omitted). 
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authority structures.243 Decision making and coordinating activity by managers is reallocated in 
favor of self-coordination among experts. 
1. Restrictive Covenants and the Structure of High Tech Firms 
One example of the impact of intellectual property regimes on the ownership and 
decisional structure of firms emerges from Ron Gilson’s comparative analysis of Silicon Valley 
high tech firms.  Gilson has tried to show that different patterns of economic development 
between the high tech industrial districts of Silicon Valley, on the one hand, and Boston’s Route 
128, on the other hand, are connected to differences in intellectual property regimes in California 
and Massachusetts.  While Massachusetts has a long history of enforcing covenants not to 
compete and other post-employment restrictions, California’s civil Code prohibits them. 
Gilson argues that the inability to enforce non-competes thus supported a high 
velocity labor market in Silicon Valley, in which employees with significant technological 
expertise could move rapidly between competitor firms or leave their employer to start up their 
own companies in direct competition with their former employers.244, 245 Because employees 
could not be prevented by contract from appropriating tacit knowledge resources, the resulting 
knowledge spillovers permitted start-ups to thrive and allowed a greater number of smaller firms 
to specialize in developing technology required for new products.246 
In contrast, Massachusetts’s willingness to enjoin employees, who signed 
noncompete clauses, from competing with their former employers, discouraged employee 
mobility and knowledge spillovers, leading to the decline of the high tech industry along Route 
 
243 ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 
143 (1994). 
244 See also, in THE COMPANY OF OWNERS (Joseph Blasi et al. eds., 2003).  Blasi describes how the Nobel 
Laureate William Schockley left AT&T’s Bell Labs to create a semiconductor lab in Palo Alto, only to lose eight of 
his young researchers, who walked out on him to start their own company, Fairchild Semiconductors.  Fairchild, in 
turn, was stripped of much of its talent when it shed eight of its most promising researches, who went on to create 
companies such as Intel.  “Fairchild exploded like a seed pod and scattered the germs of new firms throughout the 
valley.  By 1970, forty-two new semiconductor companies had been founded by former Fairchild employees or by 
the firms they had started . . .”  Id. at 11.
245 Gilson, supra note __, at 594  (“The web of knowledge spillovers, personal relations, start-up businesses, and 
absence of vertical integration owes its existence to the ease with which employee move from employer to 
employer, from established company to start-up, from customer to supplier, taking their employer’s tacit knowledge 
with them and applying it in their new situations.  Lacking the ability to prevent knowledge spillovers, Silicon 
Valley companies adapted to their environment, and the characteristic Silicon Valley industrial organization 
evolved.”) (emphasis added). 
246 Gilson’s explains the ability of the legal infrastructure to affect the price of knowledge inputs for firms in high 
tech industrial districts by promoting Marshallian factor market externalities.  A Marshallian factor market 
externality is the propensity for an input’s relative price to be lower when the number of firms in a region that call 
for that input is higher.  Such a region constitutes an “agglomeration economy.”  Applying the Marshallian theory of 
agglomeration economies, and more particularly the principle of Marshallian factor market externality, Gilson 
shows the standard law and economics position that firms should be allowed to capture the gains of their knowledge 
investments, fails to appreciate the significance that knowledge spillovers played in lowering the price of knowledge 
inputs for firms in high tech industrial districts.  Gilson supra note __, at 581. 
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128. “Route 128 firms, in contrast, developed in a more traditional fashion, imitating the 
vertically integrated structures of the large mass-production company.”247 
While Gilson’s focus is on explaining legal factors that contributed to the creation 
of Silicon Valley’s regional agglomeration economy, we rely on his analysis to establish the 
relationship between differences in internal governance structure of high tech firms in Silicon 
Valley and Route 128 and the respective legal protections available to employers for binding 
tacit knowledge embedded in their employees (Ki) to the firm.  The traditional large, vertically 
integrated and more rigidly hierarchical corporate culture in Massachusetts was supported by a 
legal regime that bound tacit knowledge embedded in employees to the firm.  IBM provides the 
prime example of such a vertically integrated firm.  In contrast, a less integrated and less 
hierarchical firm structure was supported by a legal regime that did not recognize a firm’s 
property rights over employees’ tacit knowledge (Ki). 
We argue that the legal regulation of Ki had an effect on firm structure in an 
industry, which relies heavily on this type of knowledge. Tacit knowledge plays a different role 
in the different phases of innovation, product development and commercialization in an 
industrial district’s production life cycle.  Tacit knowledge is “critical to taking an innovation 
from conception to commercialization.”248 But it plays a lesser role during later stages in an 
industry’s life cycle once “most of the technical aspects of the product have become 
standardized, and the nature of demand is well known.”249 In the initial phases of a high tech 
industries life cycle, tacit knowledge is transferred from one firm to another through interfirm 
employee mobility. 
There is considerable evidence for the proposition that inter-firm mobility in 
Silicon Valley is exceptionally high.250 But clearly Silicon Valley’s high tech firms also needed 
to bind knowledge to the firm.  Gilson’s account of Silicon Valley knowledge of spillovers 
leaves us with a critical question:  If employee mobility was so pervasive how did the firms 
survive at all?  Key employees must have been retained for significant periods because otherwise 
most firms would have collapsed.  Presumably firms did find a way to keep employees.  Gilson 
does not pursue this aspect of the problem.  Firms’ adaptation to their regulatory environment 
and business culture in Silicon Valley was not limited to supporting their employees’ transfer of 
valuable knowledge assets outside of the firm to their competitors.  Lacking certain legal 
protections (viz. enforcement of covenants not to compete), firms were thus relegated to 
employing alternative devices to bind Ki to the firm.  While the threat of enforcing a restrictive 
 
247 Gilson, supra note __, at 591-92 “In contrast to the Brownian motion of Silicon Valley’s high velocity 
employment, career patterns of employers and managers in Route 128 companies were much more linear.  
Knowledge workers anticipated long-term employment with a single employer and career development that 
contemplated rising vertically within an organization, rather than success through lateral movement, as in Silicon 
Valley… ‘[t]he practice of leaving a large company to join a small firm or a promising new start-up was virtually 
unheard of.’  Consistent with this pattern, Route 128 gave rise to traditionally vertically integrated companies.  In 
this locality, knowledge transfer took place within, rather than across firms.”). 
248 Gilson, supra note __, at 582. 
249 Gilson, supra note __, at 584-585.  See also MARYANN P. FELDMAN, THE GEOGRAPHY OF INNOVATIVE 
CLUSTERS 254 (1994) (“[T]he propensity for innovative activity to geographically cluster will tend to be shaped by 
the stage of the industry life cycle….[T]he importance of tacit knowledge in generating innovative activity shapes 
the degree to which innovative activity will cluster.  And the relative importance of tacit knowledge in generating 
innovative activity varies considerably across the various stages of the industry life cycle.”). 
250 See Gilson supra note __ , at 590-92. 
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covenant provided disincentives for employees to strike out on their own in Massachusetts, high 
tech firms in Silicon Valley had to devise a new internal governance structure to provide 
incentives for employees to stay.  One aspect of this governance structure is compensation 
packages.  Firms employed the substantial incentive of employee stock option plans to bind Ki to 
the firm.  This device, in turn, encouraged and reflected a different type intrafirm decisional 
structure and different modes of financing. 
We argue that there is a reciprocal relationship between non-competes and 
compensation – and ultimately ownership - structure.  If there is no possibility to enforce a 
covenant not to compete, that is, to bind Ki by means of private agreements, then firms are 
forced to use other mechanism in order to retain these employees.  But if firms can enforce a 
non-compete, then essentially they can prevent a employee from leaving, and make it much 
harder for him to take the knowledge and information elsewhere. In firms where the use of 
covenants not to compete are widespread, we hypothesize that stock options should become less 
common, because the two are related in this way. The necessity of the firm to bind knowledge 
embedded in its employees can be managed in two ways:  (1) through enforcement of these 
restrictive covenants; or (2) through offer of special compensation packages and potential 
ownership rights. 
What is more, Gilson seems to attribute the performance deterioration of Route 
128 high tech district in Boston to the lack of knowledge spillover effects that were associated 
with employee mobility in Silicon Valley.251 While this should be a relevant factor, we believe 
that this is not the whole story. The predominance of vertically integrated firms in Route 128 
which were developed imitating the structure of the large mass-production company252 may well 
be considered another key factor in this respect. According to our theory, the deterioration of 
firms performance in Route 128 would be an example of how internal governance structures can 
affect the creation of knowledge resources and innovation. Our hypothesis is that the 
development of firm structures in Route 128 towards a mass production oriented structure, with 
steep hierarchical and centralized knowledge, may well have constrained new knowledge 
development and therefore affected innovation patterns.  According to Saxenian:  “Route 128’s 
technology enterprises imitated the structure of the traditional mass production corporation.  
While Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurs rejected the corporate practices of the large, established 
East Coast producers, the managers along Route 128 saw the same corporations as their models.  
One senior vice president at Data General (DG) commented:  “I constantly study the way larger 
companies organize themselves looking for ideas. I look at Texas Instruments, at IBM, at ITT, 
and at GE and GM.”253 Relying on interviews with industry executives, Saxenian describes what 
she calls “hierarchy and formalism” in the companies of Route 128. Managers conceived formal 
decision-making processes, conservative workplace procedures and work styles.254 “Vertical 
lines of decision-making authority ensured that flows of information and communications were 
formal and hierarchically controlled. Corporate Divisions were generally subject to the final 
 
251 Gilson supra note __ , at 591-592. 
252 SAXENIAN, supra note __, at 128, 70. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 73-74. 
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authority of a central office.”255 There was a system of corporate ranks where salaries, benefits, 
and authority relations created barriers between functions.256 
As we have suggested centralized structures tend to operate by means of 
knowledge-substitution mechanisms, which may not be efficient to promote the diffusion of 
knowledge in firm’s structure and to foster knowledge of Ki type. So the internal governance 
structure of the firm may well have affected the generation and development of new knowledge 
and products. 
2. Employee Stock Option Plans As An Alternative Means to Binding Knowledge to the 
Firm 
Authors typically view stock option grants as a means for containing agency costs 
and aligning the incentives of managers (the agents) with those of the shareholders (the 
principals).  Stock option grants, according to these proponents, is the “the best compensation 
mechanism we have” for “getting managers to act in ways that ensure the long-term success of 
their companies.”257 Thus critics of stock options plans in the wake of recent executive pay 
scandals258 who focus exclusively on incentive alignment grouse that the spread of stock option 
grants to employees “had the effect of transferring a growing portion of the future value of the 
company from the hands of shareholders into the hands of employees and managers.”259 Such 
critics single out especially the much higher percentage of outstanding stock devoted to stock 
option plans in the high tech industry, as compared with general industry companies who 
typically restrict stock options to executives:  “the percentage of outstanding stock devoted to 
stock option plans increased dramatically, rising from 3 to 5 percent in 1990 to 12 to 15 percent 
among general industry companies in 2001.  In high-technology companies the average is much 
higher – 18 to 25 percent, with some companies as high as 30 to 40 percent.”260 
When viewed from the knowledge-based perspective, however, the extension of 
stock options to mid- and lower-level knowledge workers in the high tech sector serves the goal 
of binding knowledge to the firm, as well as giving employees ownership-type stakes in the firm 
that have the effect of flattening the organizational hierarchy in a manner suitable to the 
knowledge-intensive environments of high tech production.  Stock options for employees in the 
high tech sector (in which broad employee stock options plans prevail)261 have a different 
purpose and function than stock options for executives in other sectors, who rarely have any 
 
255 Id. at 76. 
256 Id. at 77. 
257 Hall, supra note __, at *2.  Hall also believes that options are “the best compensation mechanism we have for 
getting managers to act in ways that ensure . . .the well-being of their workers and stockholders,” but he lumps 
together the stock options for executives with broad ESOPs without recognizing their distinct tendencies.  Note that 
the view that stock options provide incentives to managers (reducing agency costs) is based on an agency-cost 
explanation of stock options.  Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All 
Employees?:  An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories. 76 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 99 (2005). 
258 See, for example, most recently the stock options back-dating scandals.  The Perfect Payday. Some CEOs 
Reap Millions by Landing Stock Options When They Are Most Valuable. Luck – Or Something Else?  WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, March 18, 2006. 
259 DELVES, supra note __, at 39. 
260 Id. 
261 See generally BLASI ET AL., IN THE COMPANY OF OWNERS (2003). 
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incentive to leave their positions voluntarily, and whose centralized power of the company is 
only underlined by outsized compensation packages and huge stock options awards.  Further, 
there are ways for executives to side-step the incentive-structure of stock options awards, for 
example, by accelerated vesting of their own awards (so long as the board agrees).  Stock options 
for employees in the high tech industry in which they prevail are aimed at retention of 
knowledgeable employees.262 In addition they are viewed as a crucial tool for startups in the 
high tech industry and smaller firms with limited capital to attract talent.  These knowledge 
management considerations were neglected in the wake of the recent executive pay scandals. 
Employee stock options plans typically specify that the options only vest on some 
future date (for a period of years) and can only be exercised while the employee is employed by 
the company.  Thus, stock options act as a mechanism to bind employees to the firm (and thus 
avoid leakage). A recent empirical study by Oyer and Schaefer investigates alternative 
explanations for stock option compensation in the high tech sector but concludes by rejecting the 
agency cost explanation that has been broadly adopted.  This study analyses three alternative 
explanations for stock options: 
1) Agency Theory Explanation.  Stock options provide incentives to employees.  
They attach the employee’s wealth to the value of the firm in order to overcome agency 
problems and motivate the employee to perform according to the firm’s interest. 
2) Sorting Explanation.  Stock options induce employees to sort. Employees differ 
in their beliefs regarding firm’s prospects.  Options attract optimistic employees, willing to take 
the risk, and reduce overall compensation costs for the firm. 
3) Retention Explanation.  Stock options help firms retain employees.  Options 
are a form of deferred compensation.  They have a vesting period attached that increases the 
costs to employees of departing from the firm.  Options thus help firms retain employees.263 
262 The “retention” explanation better explains empirical evidence according to Oyer & Scott.  Id. See, e.g., the 
following Associated Press account of the debate on the new FASB requirement that stock options be expensed 
beginning in 2005: 
Proponents of mandatory counting of stock options as an expense, including Federal Reserve chairman 
Alan Greenspan and billionaire investor Warren Buffett, argue that without it investors will continue to get 
misleading information on companies’ financial performance. Awarding options to executives, which can 
be sold within a short time, gives them an incentive to recklessly pump up the stock price without regard to 
the company’s long-term future, proponents say. 
“But business interests -- especially high-tech companies that are generous campaign donors to both 
parties -- stiffly oppose such a change and their allies in Congress are moving against it. They are 
predicting dire consequences for high-tech, biotechnology and startup companies, and the U.S. economy, if 
businesses are required to treat employee stock options as an expense. 
“‘Rank and file employees would be the ones who lose out,’ Rep. Anna Eshoo, a California Democrat 
whose district embraces Silicon Valley, testified at a House hearing. 
“‘Broad-based stock option plans have turned employees into corporate partners by tying the interest 
of the employee together with the company and its shareholders,’ Eshoo told the House Financial Services 
subcommittee on capital markets. “Small, entrepreneurial companies with little or no capital use stock 
options to attract and retain bright and talented employees critical to that company’s success.” 
Possible Stock Option Bans Split Congress, AP, June 4, 2004. 
263 Oyer & Schaefer, supra note __, at __.   
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The study sample encompasses firms that offer broad-based stock option plans. 
The study focus is on options offered to middle-level executives.  These plans tend to be adopted 
at small firms knowledge intensive firms.  Oyer and Schaefer remark that new economy firms 
(that manufacture computers, semiconductors, telephone equipment, create software, or 
computer-related products) make up a substantial portion of the firms with broad stock options 
plans.264 
Oyer and Schaefer reject the incentives-based (agency-cost) explanation for 
broad-based stock option plans, because the risk premium stemming from option-based pay 
dwarfs the cost to the employee of the associated increase in effort.  If effort were contractible, 
the employee would be willing to exert additional effort for a payment dramatically smaller than 
the risk costs imposed on the firm by providing stock options.265 Given the existence of other 
means to evaluate subjective performance and to reward employees for the value they create, the 
authors conclude that stock options appear to be a very inefficient means to provide incentive to 
employees.266 
Interestingly, sorting and retention explanations are consistent with the data. The 
authors regard sorting or retention first-order determinants of the decision to adopt a broad-based 
stock option plan.  They believe that “firms that adopt broad option plans are those where the 
returns to cost effectively attracting and retaining employees is particularly high.”267 Skill-based 
industries, such as new economy firms, which rely on the intensive use of knowledge to deliver 
their services, are significantly more likely to grant stock options than other firms.268 
New economy firms tend to face more difficulty in hiring enough talented 
people.269 So firms need to pay special attention in designing incentives and compensation 
packages that will be suitable to stimulate employees to stay in the firm. While firms may design 
several packages of deferred compensation, granting options to workers that have higher skill 
levels is certainly one mechanism that serves the purpose of binding knowledge to the firm.270 
264 Id. at 9. 
265 Id. at 23. 
266 Id. at 23.  Stock options-as-incentives could perhaps be a sensible explanation under a very limited set of 
circumstances, where employees have the power to take actions that have large value implications for the firm, at 
very limited cost to the employees taking such actions, and where it is extremely difficult for firms to monitor such 
employees. 
267 Id. at 43. In order for the sorting explanation make sense, it must be the case that employees strictly prefer the 
observed salary plus options to all-cash package. At a expected return of 25% annual stock appreciation, the 
employees at nearly all the firms of the sample value their options packages significantly more than they would 
value comparable all-cash package. Authors believe this explanation to be significant. Cf. Hall, supra note __, at __.  
(“Adobe Systems, Apple Computer, E*Trade, Netscape, PeopleSoft, and Sybase have all repriced their options in 
recent years, despite the bad will it creates among shareholders. As one Silicon Valley executive told me, “You have 
to reprice. If you don’t, employees will walk across the street and reprice themselves.”) This shows that retaining 
employees is a first-order concern in Silicon Valley firms. 
268 Id.  “The fact that firms with higher volatility and in the new economy are more likely to have option plans 
could also be consistent with the retention model if market wages vary more for volatile firms or firms in the new 
economy.” 
269 Id. p. 42. 
270 See also Rebitzer & Taylor, supra note __, at 27.  “In high technology firms, many of the key assets of the 
enterprise are bound up in the brains of crucial employees. Property rights to some of these intellectual assets can be 
secured through patents or copyrights. When adequate control cannot be attained through intellectual property 
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Industry leaders believe that, in an environment of intensive competition for 
highly mobile employees trained in hardware and software engineering, stock options in Silicon 
Valley “act[ed] like financial magnets, binding employees to their companies for the long 
term.”271 As John Chambers, the CEO of CISCO Systems recognized that “[n]ot long ago . . . 
the output of machines was the fundamental driver of competitive advantage.  We taught our 
managers to focus on physical assets, the cost of capital, and the value chain.  Successful 
companies built more, for less.  In the internet economy, the dynamics are radically different.  
Intangible ideas – the output of people, in an economic sense – are the drivers of competitive 
advantage.”272 
CISCO’s extensive stock option plans were based on the understanding that 
acquiring and retaining human capital was key to success in the high tech industry:  “Each year 
Cisco gives employees the right to purchase $25,000 worth of company stock at 15 % off the 
opening or closing price of the previous six months, whichever is lower.”273 In stark contrast to 
the confinement of stock options to executives in the more traditional public corporations, 
CISCO’s stock options plan typically gives nonexecutives more than 90 % of all options handed 
out.274 
One analysis based on a benchmark group of the top 100 largest internet-based 
companies by revenue shows that “[ninety-eight] of these companies handed out options to at 
least 51 percent of their employees, compared with just six percent in a group of comparably 
sized, mostly non-tech companies traded on the New York Stock Exchange.”275 So the 
distinction between stock options for executives and stock options for employees deserves 
particular attention for the use that high tech companies have made of stock options seems very 
different from the way they were used mainly as an executive compensation tool in the rest of 
the economy. 
Employee stock option plans became a central feature of the high tech firm 
culture in Silicon Valley.  They resulted from a mixture of intense competition for talent, the 
need to bind tacit knowledge to the firm in face of the regulatory regime, and a drive for 
recognition on the part of talented scientists and other well-trained employees working in the 
 
tights, one should expect to see innovations in the employment relationship that reduce the firm’s vulnerability to 
losing valuable assets. In some instances, high technology companies reduce the incentive of key “knowledge 
workers” to leave through the use of stock options and other forms of deferred compensation that become 
dramatically less valuable when the employee exits the firm.” 
271 BLASI, supra note __, at 42; DELVES, supra note __, at 40 (“Like many other technology companies, the chip 
maker [Intel] has used options heavily as a recruiting and retention tool”) (citing The Wall Street Journal). 
272 Speech of John T. Chambers, quoted in BLASI, supra note __, at 37. 
273 Blasi et al., In The Company Of Owners 53 (2003). 
274 Id. at 53-4. Chambers took over as CEO in the mid-1990s after working at Wang Labs and IBM, both 
traditional corporate hierarchies with top-down cultures, which he regarded as imposing significant constraints on 
creativity and innovation.  At CISCO Chambers was committed to making the Silicon Valley business culture a 
principal resource.  Part of CISCO’s strategy under Chambers has been “to use stock options and a bottoms-up 
culture of employee ownership to propel phenomenal growth in the late 1990s much of it stemming from the 
acquisition of other small startups.”  Id. at 52. Chambers said in 2000:  “Our industry is not like the banking industry 
where you are acquiring branch banks and customers.  In our industry, you are acquiring people.  And if you don’t 
keep those people, you have made a terrible, terrible investment . . .”  Id. at 54. 
275 Stock Options Benefited Workers, San Jose Mercury News, 1/10/2003, available at www.mercurynews.com 
(last visited 7/10/2004). 
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private sector.  The ownership stake afforded to workers in high tech firms supported 
nontraditional, decentralized decisional structures.276 Such changes, in turn, promoted the 
creation of fertile environments for knowledge production in an industry that required constant 
and rapid knowledge innovation.  Thus, stock options also served to avoid the knowledge hazard 
of hoarding or failure on the part of an employee to fully disclose his knowledge at work. 
The change in ownership structure due to the need to bind tacit knowledge to the 
firm thus altered not only decisional hierarchies, but also information flows within the firm.  |It 
furthered bottom up decision making and innovation and frequently blurred the lines between 
worker and management.277 Finally, giving employees a greater stake and voice in the 
management of the firm can serve as an effective workplace monitoring device.  Knowledge of 
what goes on in the workplace is as crucial to monitoring as is the actual incentive to monitor.  
But independent monitors don’t have the same access to everyday problems as do the employees 
themselves.278 
While such anecdotal evidence has its limits, and the alternative business culture 
in Silicon Valley, to be sure, generates its own counterproductive tendencies,279 it is not in 
dispute that quite different organizational structures and financial arrangements characterize the 
 
276 See SAXENIAN, supra note__, at__; Stiglitz, Public Policy for a Knowledge Economy, (World Bank, Jan. 27, 
1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/jssp012799a.htm, at 1 (“the shift towards a 
knowledge-based economy involves a shift in organization away from top-down hierarchical structures to flatter 
structures such as networks of semi-autonomous teams.  Tayloristic vertical structures were designed to enforce and 
coordinate certain physical behaviors while knowledge-based work organization involves greater recognition of the 
autonomy and self-direction of the mind.”). 
277 BLASI, supra note __, at 40, 45. The following anecdotal evidence describes what has been termed the new 
“partnership capitalism” reflected in such high tech firm culture:  “Employees come to see taking important issues 
right to the door of management as appropriate, even to the door of the top executive.  In fact, some companies 
already have a term for walking problems and issues up to management.  They call it escalation, as in “She felt she 
had to escalate the issue, to bring it to the attention of the decision-maker who could sort the problem out.”  
“Sometimes, if an issue is important enough and involves the broadest interests of the company, an employee may 
even take it directly to the CEO.  Jack, the Portal employee, told us how that very morning he had talked to John 
Little, the company’s founder and CEO.  His advice:  Portal desperately needed a chief operating officer, someone 
to take over the day-to-day job of running the company.  Jack felt that the task had become too much for Little now 
that the company had grown to 1,500 employees.”  “My exercise price [on my options] is way lower than some of 
the other people at this table.  So I can make a lot of money even at $8.81 a share [the price Portal’s stock was 
trading at that day].  But a fifty- or sixty- or seventy-dollar stock price to me means a hell of a lot.  So I’m willing to 
talk to the CEO and tell him things that might in any other job limit my career.  I wasn’t afraid of doing it, escalating 
it, because of my strong financial stake.”  In early 2002, Portal did indeed create the position of President and Chief 
Operating Officer.”  Id., at 46.  While Portal was one of the companies that suffered a melt-down in 2000 & 2001, 
and is cited as an example of a “dark side” the late-1990s tech boom, workers below top management nevertheless 
benefited.  Stock Options Benefited Workers, San Jose Mercury News, 1/10/2000, at www.mercurynews.com (last 
visited 7/10/2004) (“Even when tech stocks were melting down in 2000 & 2001, workers below top management 
pocketed an estimated $25 billion – or an average of $125,000 – at companies that ranged from stalwarts such as 
CISCO Systems and Yahoo to flame-outs such as Excite@Home and Portal Software.”); How Portal leaders reaped 
a Huge Windfall, Dec. 9, 2002, at www.mercurynews.com (last visited 7/10/2004) 
278 BLASI, supra note __, at 43. For example, at a Palo Alto, California, company named Tibco Software 
Incorporated, a thirty-something events planner named Jennifer told us:  “When you have ownership in the 
company, you . . . watch costs.  We’re going to Hawaii next week for a sales trip.  Well, one person didn’t get their 
travel [arranged] . . . so I called him and said:  ‘What are you doing, book your travel, if you wait your ticket is 
going to be so much higher.’  You’re constantly watching that stuff when you’re an owner. 
279 See, e.g., DELVES, supra note __, at 40-41 (discussing the “skewed incentive system” set up by the get-rich-
quick culture of high tech start-ups). 
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Silicon Valley high tech firms.280 Employee stock options are widely regarded as an essential 
component to the partnership-style organization of these firms.  We suggest that this concern 
with designing compensations packages in a way to retain key employees was knowledge-based 
driven.  But, it could be argued that the main reason why the firms were adopting broad stock 
options plans was accounting-driven instead of knowledge-driven. In such reasoning, firms were 
issuing stock options because they had accounting incentives to do it, because of the 
non-expensing rule at that time.281 But then, if this incentive was the same for all the companies 
why just a few companies really adopted stock options as a broad plan available to non-executive 
employees as well? Most companies did give stock options to their executives – trend well 
documented – as there was an explosion in stock options.282 But why some companies, instead, 
gave options not only to managers, but also to other employees? The accounting-driven view 
cannot explain why there was a difference in the pattern of stock options distributed – namely to 
non-executive employees in some high tech firms. 
While the accounting rules may well diminish the incentives for firms to adopt 
broad stock option plans as a compensation mechanism,283 we conjecture that if stock options are 
an efficient way of binding Ki, they should continue to be used by high techs regardless of the 
expensing rule. Alternatively, managers may try to design alternative compensation plans based 
on deferred compensation in order to substitute stock options. If our view is accurate, high tech 
firms must employ some mechanisms to provide sufficient incentives in order to retain key 
employees. 
E. Law Firms 
Several commentators have argued that human capital is the most important asset 
of law firms.284 Based on our theory, we expect to find that key features of the internal 
organization of law firms can be explained by the need to allocate human knowledge resources 
efficiently.  The literature, however, has so far underestimated the impact of knowledge 
allocation on the structure of law firms. 
 
280 Among the voluminous literature on the subject, See, e.g., SAXENIAN, supra note __, at 128. 
281 Under rules initially published by the Accounting Principles Board (ARB) – the precursor to the Federal 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) – stock options did not need to appear as an expense on a corporation’s 
income statement, so long as they met certain criteria such as having a fixed exercise price and a fixed number of 
shares.  DELVES, supra note 130, at 44 (citing APB Opinion 25).  This meant that they were essentially free.  
Allowing companies to take the expense of stock options off their expense sheets to be sure, inflated earnings thus 
making such companies look much more profitable than they actually were.  This in effect created a significant 
subsidy in the form of the correspondingly lower cost of capital available to high tech firms. 
282 See e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE. THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION _[(__). 
283 After years of fruitless attempts to change the rules to require expensing of stock options in order to correct 
for the distortion of firm values, the FASB, in the wake of the dot.com bust and corporate compensation scandal in 
2001/2002, presented Congress with a rule require expensing since in 2005.  In addition to the new accounting rules, 
the SEC signed off on new stock-exchange rules (passed by the NYSE and the NASDAQ), that will require putting 
stock options and other compensation plans to a shareholder vote.  Representatives from Silicon Valley firms 
strongly argued that the new accounting rules would harm their ability to recruit and retain employees. 
284  Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: an Economic Inquiry into the 
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 324 (1985), Ronald J. Gilson & 
Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: the Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 567, 570 (1989). 
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Gilson and Mnookin’s portfolio and agency theory approach to law firm structure 
provides an example.  Gilson and Mnookin argue that diversification provides an explanation for 
the existence and structure of large law firms.  On their theory, law firms eliminate unsystematic 
risk by diversifying the areas in which they provide legal services.285 From this perspective, 
when an individual lawyer is admitted to partnership he exchanges his human capital for 
participation in a diversified portfolio with respect to the personal characteristics of lawyers and 
their expertise in the firm.286 The diversification will be achieved by sharing the future income 
of the firm equally between the partners according to a seniority system.287 Gilson and Mnookin 
argue that law firm organization is shaped by the effort to diversify and the difficulty of doing 
so.288 
Gilson and Mnookin further posit that “it is striking just how well diversified the 
portfolios of established firms are,”289 although they do not provide evidence for this claim.  
Whether law firms are really diversified is a question that can be answered only by the empirical 
evidence.  In a recent empirical study, sampling all law offices in the United States, Garicano 
and Hubbard analyze confidential office-level data from the 1992 Census of Service on the 
hierarchical organization of law firms and on field-specialization by attorneys and firms.  Their 
results show that “[l]awyers are more likely to work at the same firm with lawyers in the same 
field than in any other field.”290 
Garicano and Hubbard find evidence that a firm’s boundaries narrow as lawyers 
specialize in ex-post fields (resolving disputes):  
We also find that lawyers in ex ante fields that serve business 
demands tend to work at the same firm as lawyers in any of the ex 
ante business fields, and tend not to work at the same firm as 
lawyers in either ex post business fields or fields that serve 
individual demands.  For example, specialists in corporate law tend 
 
285  Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: an Economic Inquiry into the 
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STANF. L. REV. 313 (1985). The authors argue that a 
portfolio composed of a sufficient number of assets will neutralize the effects of an event that lowers the value of 
one asset by a favorable impact of the same event on the value of other assets.  If the portfolio is fully diversified it 
will not be subject to unsystematic risk.  Therefore, a law firm that can diversify the areas in which it provides legal 
services, can reduce its exposure to unsystematic risk.  Equity owners of a law firm thus can achieve gains from the 
diversification of their human capital, just as securities investors can achieve gains from the diversification of their 
securities portfolio. 
286  Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: an Economic Inquiry into the 
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STANF. L. REV. 313 (1985), p. 342. 
287  See id. ibid., p. 339– 343. 
288  Id., p. 322-323. Gilson and Mnookin argue that “… the creation of a full-service law firm – an agreement 
among lawyers that each will make human capital investments in different specialties and that the return to those 
investments will be shared on a predetermined basis rather than in accordance with actual outcomes – can be 
understood as an institutional innovation that allow lawyers to take advantage of gains from diversification.” (p. 
329). The authors give an example of a securities and a bankruptcy lawyer, arguing that when there is a bear market 
the lack of business in the securities area will be counterbalanced by the increase of work load in the bankruptcy 
area and vice-versa. 
289  Id. ibid., p. 342. 
290  Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor Within and 
Between Law Firms, Univ. Chic. Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 213, available at 213.  Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=404280, at 2. 
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to work at the same firm as specialists in real state law, but not 
specialists in insurance or criminal law.291 
This evidence is contrary to Gilson and Mnookin’s explanation of law firms’ 
organization based on diversification and risk-avoidance.  The evidence suggests that the typical 
law firm has a very imperfectly diversified portfolio at best.  Law firms may diversify across 
specializations with a given legal field.  This occurs, for instance, in the area of business law.  
Even in business law, however, firms seem to specialize in either ex-ante or ex-post legal 
services, that is in either consulting or litigation, but not both.292 A firm that provides services 
in securities law for the purposes of performing an IPO is less likely to also provide securities 
litigation services for the same client than a different firm.  This decreases the explanatory power 
of the diversification theory, because a well-diversified firm would want to offer the right 
balance between ex-ante and ex-post legal services.  In times of recession, litigation tends to be 
more profitable than consulting and other ex-ante transaction fields.  One would thus expect an 
optimum mix between ex-ante and ex-post areas if law firms aimed at portfolio-type 
diversification.  But such a business mix is not borne out by the average practice. 
The fact that ex-ante and ex-post legal services are mostly provided by different 
firms seems to point to a story based on knowledge specialization.  This is also consistent with 
the existence of law firms specializing in different types of litigation.  Litigation work requires 
mastering a body of legal knowledge and interactional skills (litigator vs. negotiator of 
transactions vs. regulatory compliance counselor) which are very specialized, producing gains 
from knowledge specialization.   
The data also reveal that specialists in patent law tend not to work together with 
specialists in any other field.293 They tend to work in firms specializing solely in intellectual 
property.  Garicano and Hubbard conclude that “[b]roadly, these patterns provide no support for 
the hypothesis that law firms’ field boundaries strongly reflect the risk-sharing benefits of 
revenue-sharing arrangements.  Lawyers in the same field or fields where demands are closely 
related tend to work at the same firm more than lawyers in fields where demands are less closely 
related.”294 Portfolio theory may provide an explanation – albeit a very incomplete explanation – 
for the organization of a small number of large law firms that service large corporations.  But it 
does not explain why the average law firm is specialized rather than diversified. 
A final piece of data derived from the research conducted by Garicano and 
Hubbard is revealing.  According to the study, 28 percent of law firms are specialized in a single 
field.295 The fact that such a significant number of law firms operate in one single area clearly 
points to specialization as an important factor in the structure of law firms. The empirical 
evidence available on boundaries of law firms thus suggests a knowledge-based explanation.  
Garicano and Hubbard advance a knowledge-sharing explanation of law firm structure and 
develop a model of hierarchy in which increasing returns are associated with the utilization of 
 
291  Garicano & Hubbard, supra note ___, at 2. 
292  Specialists in ex ante business law tend to work in the same firm as one another. According to the authors’ 
definition, business law includes banking, corporate, governmental, environmental, tax and real state law, but at  27. 
293  Garicano & Hubbard, supra note ____, at 27.  The only exception found by Garicano and Hubbard is that 
specialists in probate law tend to work in the same firm with ex ante business specialists.  Id. 
294  Id., at 27. 
295  Id., at 14. 
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knowledge.  Specialization and hierarchical organization, according the Garicano and Hubard, 
reflect an optimal use of costly knowledge resources.296 Lawyers are more likely to work 
together within the same firm when knowledge sharing provides added value.  Knowledge 
sharing can take the form of collaboration and referrals.297 When knowledge sharing is less 
valuable, lawyers may opt to work separately and cooperate where desirable through market 
exchanges.  
 
1. A Knowledge-Based View Of The Organizational Structure Of Law Firms 
The data supports our theory that firm structure is influenced by the efficient 
allocation of knowledge resources.  
We have hypothesized that when firm production relies more on Ki, the 
organizational structure of a firm will be less hierarchical.  Because law firms rely primarily on 
human capital, or Ki, we should expect that law firms will have flatter hierarchies compared to 
firms in other industries. 
This is indeed the case.  According to Garicano and Hubbard’s data, 73% of law 
offices have no associates. These “non-hierarchies” include single-lawyer offices and offices 
where there are several lawyer partners.298 The authors report that associate/partner ratios are 
low, even when the analysis is restricted to law firms that serve primarily business clients and 
have at least one associate.299 Nineteen percent of all law offices have associate/partner ratios 
greater than zero and less than or equal to one.  Only eight percent of all law offices have 
associate/partner ratios greater than one.300 This shows that law firms have very flat hierarchies, 
a consequence that we infer from the predominant type of knowledge used in its production 
process, that is, knowledge embedded in individuals (Ki). 
An interesting finding from this vantage point is that a law firm’s level of 
hierarchy correlates with the degree to which its lawyers are field-specialized.301 In other words, 
hierarchical organization reflects the human capital that lawyers bring to the table.  The share of 
lawyers who field-specialize is directly proportional to the associate/partner ratio of the firm.  
The level of field-specialization tends to be higher at offices where the associate/partner ratio is 
greater. According to the data, it increases from 45% at offices where the associate/partner ratio 
is zero to over than 80% at offices where the ratio is at least one.302 When the lawyer 
specializes, she is expected to be more knowledgeable in her field of expertise, an important 
 
296  Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard. Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge: Theory 
and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry, (March 2004). Univ. Chic. Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper 
No. 214, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=533183, at 2.  (“Hierarchies enable individuals to increase the 
utilization of expert knowledge by shielding experts from simple problems and allowing them to specialize in 
problems they have a comparative advantage in addressing.”)   
297  Garicano & Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and Markets, supra note ___, at 9. 
298  Garicano and Hubbard, Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge, supra note ____, at 5. 
299  Id., at 6. 
300  Id.
301  Id.  Field-specialization occurs when a lawyers work primarily in one of the thirteen fields defined by the 
Census (e.g. corporate, tax, probate law). 
302  Garicano and Hubbard, Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge, supra note ___, at 6. 
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condition for her to be a partner held responsible of the quality of the service provided.  The 
augmentation in hierarchical levels is thus explained by the increase in disparity of knowledge 
that individuals possess. 
So the data shows that even within the flatter hierarchies of law firms we can 
identify gradations of knowledge among employees and a corresponding hierarchy of decision 
making authority.  Accordingly, our typology can accommodate the fact that law firms, which 
rely predominantly on Ki, have hierarchies too, by distinguishing among individuals with 
varying degrees of technical or context specific knowledge  (Ki -,  Ki , and Ki+).  When applying 
the principle of efficient knowledge allocation, we would expect to find the most knowledgeable 
employees (Ki +) in top positions of a firm’s hierarchy, and less knowledgeable employees (Ki; 
Ki-) at lower levels. We would expect individuals with greater expertise to engage in significant 
“knowledge substitution”, guiding the behavior and decision making of those less 
knowledgeable, while conserving their own time by allowing those less knowledgeable to make 
judgments that are appropriate for them to make without the involvement of more senior 
personnel.303 
Law firms that follow the “Cravath system” fit this pattern.  They have 
traditionally had partners and associates.304 This distinction marks the attorney’s position in the 
firm hierarchy the relative distribution of knowledge and experience, and corresponds to a 
division of labor.305 Partners direct, guide, coordinate, train, and monitor the quality of 
associates’ work.  Partners exert decision making authority in law firm matters and get (most of) 
the residual claims.  Associates engage in tasks requiring less knowledge and experience, that are 
also more routine.306 Further, the associateship functions as a kind of apprenticeship.307 At the 
time of the initial hiring decision, the law firm does not yet foresee which associates will develop 
enough knowledge and personal attributes that the firm requires in a partner.308 The associate’s 
legal skills, ability to deal with existing clients and attract new ones is judged during the 
associateship period to determine whether he or she has the qualities necessary to become a 
partner.  In our framework, the associate thus has Ki- or Ki, whereas the partner, who is more 
knowledgeable, has Ki+. 
While law firm hierarchies are flat when compared with firms in other industries, 
there is thus nevertheless a hierarchy based on observed differences in Ki among the various 
 
303  Another example of flatter hierarchies would be universities. The distinction between tenure and untenured 
professors is also based on the amount of knowledge and personal experience that professors have. In order to 
manage this knowledge in an efficient way universities shaped their organizational structure by creating a system in 
which tenured professors are guaranteed stability through the privilege of tenure as well as greater decision rights 
than untenured professors. 
304  Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin. Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: the Economics of Associate 
Career Patterns. Stanf. L. Rev. 567 (1989). P. 567 
305  Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard. Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge: Theory 
and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry. (March 2004). U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper 
No. 214. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=533183, p. 5. 
306  Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: an Economic Inquiry into the 
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STANF. L. REV. 313, 359 (1985). 
307  Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin. Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: the Economics of Associate 
Career Patterns. 567 STANF. L. REV. 574- 577  (1989). 
308  Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin. Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: the Economics of Associate 
Career Patterns. 567 STANF. L. REV. 573 (1989).. 
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knowledge workers in the firm, as our theory predicts.  Because the firm must allocate 
knowledge resources efficiently, it will give decision making authority to the partner who is 
more knowledgeable, able to make better decisions, and to coordinate the work of associates.  
When associates gain knowledge their decision making authority increases, they are gradually 
less supervised, afforded greater autonomy, and are charged with supervising the work of lower-
level associates.  
To summarize, the “Cravath system” gives greater decision making authority and 
greater residual claims to the lawyers who have the greater knowledge and experience.  The 
partners retain control over client relationships, they concentrate the most complex work in their 
own hands and they train, supervise and monitor associates.  Partners have a surplus of human 
capital.  They lend this surplus out and monitor associates (human capital sharing). Younger 
associates borrow knowledge distributed by senior partners until they develop their own 
professional expertise.  Partners who concentrate greater knowledge in their hands are the 
residual claimants of the partnership.  In contrast, associate lawyers with less knowledge tend to 
receive a fixed salary.309 
More associates are hired than can be promoted to the partnership, and many 
associates will be dismissed before they acquire sufficient client knowledge to “grab and leave”.  
Rebitzer and Taylor argue that organizational features such as the use of "up-or-out" promotion 
contests and the practice of having winners become residual claimants in the firm, emerge as a 
consequence of the knowledge intensive setting in which these firms operate.310 The winners of 
the promotion contest become partners, with residual claims, because this solves the problem of 
binding knowledge assets to the firm.311 
Associates tend to be promoted into the partnership or dismissed, in order to avoid 
their acquisition of a key knowledge asset, the long-term client relationship.  This practice 
reduces the risk of leakage of client knowledge.  Associates tend to leave the firm as soon as they 
find out they will not be promoted, and law firms even help their associates find new jobs.  
However, if the firm can limit direct contact between clients and associates (and limit associate 
work experience) by restricting their work (and learning) to small pieces of more complex 
 
309  See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: an Economic Inquiry 
into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Exploit Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 (1985). See also, Ronald J. 
Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm. The Economics of Associated Career 
Patterns, 41 STAN. L REV. 567 (1989). 
310  James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure 
of Large Law Firms, September 2001, at 3.  Working Paper on file with authors.  (“Attorneys are "knowledge 
workers", who differ from other employees because they carry around many of the firm's assets in their brains. The 
knowledge assets these lawyers control -  an understanding of the needs and interests of clients - are obviously of 
greatest value when used with specific clients. This specificity gives individual attorneys considerable leverage over 
their employers. By threatening to "grab and leave" with an important client, attorneys can leverage an increased 
share of their firm's revenues. The up-or-out partnership system found in large law firms has evolved over time as a 
workable resolution to this particular problem. By forming partnerships and firing experienced attorneys who are not 
promoted to partnership positions, law firms limit the opportunity for experienced attorneys to grab and leave with 
the firm's valuable clients. Grabbing and leaving is more important in legal partnerships than in conventional firms 
because law firms cannot readily establish property rights over the knowledge  essential for serving particular 
clients.”). 
311  Id., at 4: ("net worth is tied to the knowledge of it's senior employees."). 
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operations, the length of the associate period can be increased.  If client contact could be 
eliminated entirely, associates could be employed indefinitely by the firm.312 
Another organizational feature that can be explained from a knowledge efficient 
allocation perspective is the law firm’s sharing model of compensation. Gilson and Mnookin 
defended the view that the sharing model serves the purposes of risk-sharing by splitting the 
profits on a predetermined basis to allow attorneys to take advantage of a “diversified portfolio’ 
in their law firm’s equity.313 We propose a different explanation.  Knowledge considerations 
suggest that profits are split so as to provide attorneys with the necessary incentives to pass on 
cases or clients they acquire to other attorneys within the firm who are more knowledgeable in 
the areas in which the services are being demanded; or share and consult with other more 
knowledgeable attorneys in the firm on such cases and clients.  Where profits are shared, 
attorneys will direct clients to other attorneys within the firm who have more expertise in solving 
a particulate legal problem.  Moreover, other attorneys in the firm will be more willing to devote 
their time and efforts to applying their knowledge in assisting another partner’s clients where 
profits are split.  This arrangement thus enhances efficient knowledge allocation within the firm 
in that each lawyer will have the proper incentives to perform those services for which she is 
most qualified.  Otherwise lawyers would have incentives to supply services to clients regardless 
of expertise. 
2. The changing organizational structure of law firms  
The structure of law firms has been changing during the past 15 years.  Law firm 
structure was characterized by only two categories of attorneys, partners and associates, but is 
expanding to include new non-equity partners,314 special counsel, permanent or superannuated 
associates, staff attorneys, and contract attorneys.  This expansion of different levels of personnel 
is in addition to the increase in different levels of paralegals and other layers of professional 
staff, such as word processors, IT personnel, practice support,, etc. that have increasingly 
augmented large firm practice.  These new professionals add new layers of hierarchy to the 
organizational structure of law firms.   
What is striking from our point of view is that this expansion of law firm 
hierarchy is occurring in conjunction with the increasing reliance of law firms on a different 
knowledge type, that of knowledge embedded in products and machines (Kp) capable of being 
claimed or held by the firm as a kind of property. 
Law firms have increasingly been storing knowledge in precedent information 
systems, client databases, and other sophisticated knowledge management systems.  Thousands 
of drafts contracts, legal opinions, briefs and client specific data are stored in the larger law 
firms’ proprietary electronic storage systems by the large corporate law firms.  Departments of 
“Knowledge Management" have emerged to maintain internal databases and to train the 
professionals who will operate and use them.  The knowledge base of large law firms has 
therefore been transforming from knowledge embedded almost exclusively in individuals (Ki) to 
knowledge embedded increasingly in information systems (Kp).   
 
312  Id., at 18. 
313  Supra note __, at__. 
314  Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: the Economics of Associate 
Career Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REV 567 (1989).  
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While record keeping devices have always been used in one form or another, the 
new transformation of knowledge through internal precedent systems and other database 
resources special and internal to the firm increasingly accomplishes the separation of knowledge 
from the attorney.  Knowledge is thereby standardized and made available to the next associate 
who can take up the case two years down the line to perform a particular task (e.g. write a brief, 
or summarize a past transaction, or prepare a term sheet based on client precedents), without 
prior experience in a particular case, or even firm style or format.  All that the associate needs to 
know is how to use the precedent system in order to apply more general professional knowledge 
to the replication of a typical firm product by following the example.  This dramatically reduces 
the need for partner involvement not merely in the initial stages of any project, but at every stage 
that can be sufficiently routinized and standardized.  The separation of the knowledge through 
codification and standardization thus turns the work of attorney’s into more of a production 
routine, and permits partners to assume a more managerial role with regard to their associates.  
According to our theory, when Kp’s importance increases in the productive 
process, the organizational structure of the firm will become more centralized and display steeper 
decisional hierarchies.  This shift from Ki to Kp has indeed brought about a corresponding 
change in law firm decision making structures.  In the new corporate law firm, low-level 
attorneys become more replaceable, as they increasingly rely on Kp to do their tasks.  Thus large 
firms now hire large numbers of staff attorneys who, for example, organize documents and 
databases, retrieve documents, and help prepare document reviews.  Staff attorneys can attend 
depositions, take notes and record information where necessary.  But they perform only a limited 
number of specific tasks and exercise judgment – though perhaps very expert judgment -- only 
within limited parameters. Staff attorneys are directed by partners and associates or senior staff 
attorneys (who in turn are directed by partners) and tend to have no client contact at all.  Staff 
attorneys also tend not to do any legal research at all.  In order to provide the client with 
competitively priced services while maintaining high quality, large corporate law firms thus 
employ professional staff attorneys as assistants to associates.  Such staff attorneys perform 
certain routine and standard tasks that do not require the knowledge and judgment demanded of 
an associate, in order to lower the cost of legal services by conserving more expensive associate 
and partner time.  Staff attorneys are not on a partnership track.  Thus their use has the added 
benefit of a potentially much more long-term relationship without the need to share residuals. 
In addition to staff attorneys, large law firms also hire so-called contract attorneys 
to fill fluctuating demand for additional legal work that is much more mechanical even than the 
work completed by staff attorneys.  In the litigation setting, for example, contract attorneys are 
hired as document “coders” to assist in processing the mammoth document productions 
characteristic of large, complex multi-party commercial disputes.  Such coders are given specific 
instructions on identifying and coding documents in order to load them onto a database and 
render them searchable.  Such work is mechanical work done at a computer terminal and 
controlled by software templates that permit only certain types of inputs. 
We therefore observe that the hierarchy of law firms is becoming steeper and 
more centralized in those firms in which the ratio between partners and other professionals 
(including staff lawyers, contract attorneys and paralegals) is higher than it used to be.  The 
embedding of knowledge in products has made many of these professionals who now perform 
more standardized routine work more easily replaceable, increasing the similarities between the 
structure of contemporary law firms and  mass production firms.  It is in this context, that many 
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of the large law firms have changed their business form and have moved from a partnership 
structure to the form of a limited liability corporation. 
F. The Implications of Knowledge Transfer for the Choice of Business Transactions 
A variety of motivations have been recognized for mergers and acquisitions, 
including for example such drivers as operating and financial synergy, portfolio diversification, 
and other strategies based on finance theory. 315 But traditional mergers and acquisitions theory 
does not make knowledge considerations central.316 A knowledge based perspective, we argue, 
can provide important insights on why firms engage in a range of transactions, such as mergers 
and acquisitions, joint ventures and licensing agreements.   
The literature has identified strength of intellectual property protections as a 
crucial variable in determining whether companies will purchase knowledge inputs (primarily in 
the form of Kp) through licensing agreements or whether they will produce them, either jointly 
or though integrating the activity.  Anand and Khanna have argued that licensing occurs in 
industries with strong intellectual property protections, but that joint ventures “should be more 
likely to occur in industries with weak IPRs [intellectual property protections] to the extent that it 
is easier to monitor and control the activities of partners in such arrangements than via arms-
length licensing contracts.”317 Arora and Merges argue that if there are strong patent protections 
related to a technological input, spin-offs would be more likely, because the benefits from greater 
customization afforded by the independent research firm would outweigh rent dissipation by the 
spin-off.318 According to this literature, markets for technology depend significantly on 
intellectual property protections.  Thus, it is only because technological innovation can be 
protected, even if imperfectly319, that markets for technology can develop and flourish.320 
315 RONALD GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, 259ff. 
(discussing the theoretical sources of operating synergy such as economies of scale, economies of multiplant 
operation, economies of scope and others). 
316 Generally knowledge problems are indirectly treated under the more general heading of “synergies,” or 
“economies of scope”.  Problems of knowledge hazards have been developed by studies mainly in the management 
area. See e.g, the excerpt by David Teece, Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise, in GILSON & BLACK,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 288 (discussing how intrafirm transfers of know how 
ameliorate the hazards of opportunism because transactions become more idiosyncratic). 
317 Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna, The Structure of Licensing Contracts, 48 J. OF INDUST. ECON. 103, 128 
(Mar. 2000). 
318 Ashish Arora & Robert Mergers, Property Rights, Firm Boundaries, and R & D Inputs. Working Paper, 
2001, at 17. 
319 See David Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, 
Licensing and Public Policy, in David Teece (ed.), THE COMPETITIVE CHALLENGE: STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRIAL 
INNOVATION AND RENEWAL.188 (1987), (“Rarely, if ever, do patents confer perfect appropriability although they do 
afford considerable protection on new chemical products and rather simple mechanical innovations. Many patents 
can be “invented around” at modest costs. They are specially ineffective at protecting process innovations. Often 
patents provide little protection because the legal requirements for upholding their validity or for providing their 
infringement are high.”). 
320 ARORA, ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY (__). 
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The traditional corporate R&D strategy was to retain technologies in-house.321 
But markets for technologies offer technology-based firms and high-tech start-ups the 
opportunity to specialize in technology development without having to invest in costly 
downstream assets.322 The development of downstream markets for technologies, permits the 
existence of smaller, specialized technology producers.323 At the same time, greater 
specialization in the production of technological inputs upstream benefits downstream users of 
technology.  With the increased development of markets for technology, integrating down- or 
upstream therefore becomes less attractive.  In this manner, markets for technology – and by 
extension legal mechanisms for appropriating innovations – “can imply a fundamental 
reconsideration of the appropriate boundaries of the firm.”324 
The knowledge taxonomy we have discussed can be helpful to generate 
hypotheses about when vertical integration or market contracting will take place.  For instance, it 
can explain which type of transaction will be chosen according to the knowledge type that is the 
main object of the transaction.  Not all knowledge can be propertized.325 The ability/inability of 
the firm to bind a particular type of knowledge and avoid knowledge hazards, given the 
intellectual property regime available, thus shapes business transactions and contractual 
arrangements.     
We hypothesize that, holding all the other variables constant, when knowledge is 
more perfectly embedded in the product (Kp), and no tacit knowledge (in the form of Ki or Ko) 
needs to be exchanged to render the product functional at the manufacturing plant, the buy 
decision becomes very attractive. If there are gains from specialization, the manufacturer will not 
vertically integrate, but each company will focus on producing a product it has a comparative 
advantage to produce.  Therefore, manufacturers will try to buy the complementary assets 
necessary to their business by means of market transactions, so that they do not have to incur 
costly learning (Ki) or acquire the human and organizational resources (Ki, Ko) necessary to 
produce the input.  The decomposable nature of Kp also accounts for the ability to outsource and 
 
321 Chandler, SCALE AND SCOPE; see also the management literature on rent dissipation. Leavy (1996:50):  “Even 
in the closest of outsourcing relationships, the partners will always remain potential future competitors.”  (from 
Arora and Merges). 
322 Arora, et al., supra note ___, at 224. 
323 DAVID C. MOWERY & NATHAN ROSENBERG, PATHS OF INNOVATION: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN 20TH 
CENTURY AMERICA 41 (1998). 
324 ARORA et al., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY 224; see also, ALAN S. GUTTERMAN, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S
GUIDE TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTIONS, VOL. I (2005) § 5.007. 
325  Tacit knowledge frequently cannot be rendered specific enough in order to be codified in the form of a patent.  
See Teece, supra note__, at 189 (arguing that codified knowledge is easer to transmitted and to be subject to 
imitation. Tacit knowledge is harder to be transferable because of its difficult to articulate nature).  Sidney Winter 
classifies knowledge continuums that have the following polar dimensions  tacit vs articulable, not teacheable vs 
teachable, not articulated vs. articulated, not observable in use vs. observable in use, complex vs. simple, an element 
of a system vs. independent. He argues that a position close to the left dimension of each continua is indicative that 
the knowledge may be difficult to transfer, while a position close to the right dimension is indicative of easy 
transferability. Sidney Winter, Knowledge and Competence as Strategic Assets, in DAVID TEECE (ed.), THE 
COMPETITIVE CHALLENGE: STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION AND RENEWAL, 170. 
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license codified technologies.326 Thus where production requires increased Kp-inputs, a firm 
will tend to rely more heavily on market transactions to procure such inputs.   
However, if the technology is such that a great deal of tacit knowledge needs to be 
exchanged between the producer of the technology input and the manufacturer in order to render 
the product functional at the plant, the buy decision becomes less attractive, and integration or 
other forms of joint production become more attractive, ceteris paribus. This is so, because tacit 
knowledge is more difficult to propertize, increasing the risk of exposure to hazards.327 The 
ability to capture the gains from investment in the production of tacit knowledge requires a 
variety of strategies.328 Therefore, the relative quantity of tacit knowledge a given business 
transaction affects the choice of the form of the transaction.  
Mergers and other forms of joint production such as joint ventures or R&D 
partnerships, are particularly appropriate to the development of innovations that rely on the use 
of Ki.  Mergers and joint ventures also allow the transfer of organizational knowledge (Ko) 
which cannot be easily blueprinted or packaged in licensing or market transactions.329 These 
integrated or quasi-integrated structures diminish the risk and decrease the cost of knowledge 
hazards.  
Looking only on the strength of intellectual property rights regimes does not tell 
us anything about the inputs required for production.  Even when there are strong intellectual 
property rights for the manufactured products (Kp), if the knowledge required in the production 
process is mostly Ki/Ko, then we will expect that joint production will occur anyway.  The 
development of hybrid automobile designs, currently the object of intense competition among 
car manufacturers provides an example.  Toyota was the first to dominate the technology.  This 
technology is now embedded in a product (Kp) and it is well- propertized so that Toyota can sell 
the hybrid cars and retain ownership of the technology via its patent(s).  GM and 
DaimlerChrysler have recently announced a hybrid engine joint venture.  Even if the property 
 
326  To the extent that the production process can be broken down and compartmentalized into decomposable 
problems, outsource can occur.  In the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, outsource has been increasing due to 
the availability of strong intellectual property regimes (and other factors).  ARORA, ET AL., MARKETS FOR 
TECHNOLOGY 231 (__).. 
327 Costs derive from the public nature of knowledge and include the possibility of leakage and problems of 
underutilization as described above. 
328  Each firm chooses the strategy of knowledge management according to a wealth maximization perspective. A 
firm may want to hinder involuntary transfers of knowledge, and therefore try to keep its knowledge sets as much 
non-codified as possible to avoid imitation by competitors. On the other hand, a firm may want to share its 
technological and organizational capabilities in order to benefit from licensing agreements, joint ventures or 
mergers. In this case, it may pursue a strategy in order to articulate it knowledge and make it teachable. Sidney 
Winter, supra note ___, at 174. Harbir Singh & Maurizio Zollo, The Impact of Knowledge Codification, Experience 
Trajectories and Integration, Strategies on the Performance of Corporate Acquisitions, 27-29 Working Paper, The 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.  The authors analyze knowledge management strategy in acquisitions. 
They measure codification by the number of post-acquisition processes developed in the organization to address 
several areas such as financial evaluation, due diligence, information systems, human resources and sales/product 
integration. Their results suggest that the high codification of post-acquisition processes have a positive effect on the 
performance of highly complex post-acquisition processes. On the other hand, high codification of post-acquisition 
processes can harm performance in the context of non-complexed processes, because it can lead to excessive 
bureaucratic load. These findings suggest that there is an optimum level of codification of knowledge necessary to 
make knowledge transfer effective. 
329 Kogut, Joint Ventures.
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rights are strong enough to assure that the product likely to be generated by the joint venture will 
be marketed, these companies decided to engage in a type of joint production, that can be viewed 
as quasi-integration.  They did so because of the type of knowledge required in the production 
process, and not because of the weakness of intellectual property type of rights in this industry, 
which, as the case of Toyota reflects, provide significant protection.  In this case, the nature of 
the knowledge input (and not the output) helps determine which type of transaction will take 
place. 
This discussion suggests that the stage of the technological cycle may impact the 
business form.  Knowledge generation that relies mostly on Ki is more suitable to joint-
production arrangements in opposition to market arrangements.  
There are at least two reasons for this.  First, there are special moral hazards 
associates with knowledge transfer contracts.  Leakage of knowledge resources both on the side 
of the producer, but also on the side of the manufacturer can occur. Hoarding or failure to share 
knowledge may be enhanced in market transactions. 
Second, transfer of tacit knowledge is costly, because it involves costly 
knowledge exchange and learning on the part of employees of the manufacturer and the producer 
of the technological input. If a firm must spend a great deal of time learning about how to use a 
knowledge input, then producing the input inhouse becomes more attractive.330 
The analysis of knowledge inputs, we suggest, is a very important variable 
influencing the form of business transactions.  While a thorough development of these 
relationships goes beyond the scope of this paper, we note the promising avenues for further 
inquiry. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The present article seeks to provide a new approach to corporate organizational 
structures, by focusing on knowledge inputs, an important variable that has remained largely 
neglected by legal scholars.  
We presented a typology that identifies the types of knowledge resources that 
firms employ in their production processes. We further analyzed how legal institutions impact 
firm organizational structure by showing how they bind these knowledge types to the firm 
structure.  With respect to law and knowledge management we showed that the development of 
intellectual property protections has deeply affected the internal structure of business entities. 
We then discussed how important characteristics of firm organizational structure are influenced 
by the predominance of each knowledge type and the legal and contractual mechanisms used to 
protect it.  
 
330 Arora et al., Markets for Technology 115 (“[T]here is a greater cognitive distance between organizations, 
which raises the cost of transferring tacit and context dependent information.  Different units within an organization 
are more likely to evolve a common shared understanding and a common code for communicating the knowledge 
than different units in separate organizations.  The shared context lowers the relative cost of transferring tacit 
knowledge inside an organization.”). 
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Firms will try to maximize the use of knowledge resources in order to maximize 
profits.  Firms will also try to diminish the occurrence of knowledge hazards such as leakage and 
hoarding. To cope with the problems of achieving an efficient knowledge allocation and 
preventing the occurrence of knowledge hazards, firms will create particular organizational 
arrangements. These organizational arrangements include, for example, the existence of steeper 
or flatter hierarchies, the adoption of particular compensation systems, and the engagement of 
certain types of business transactions.  Our article analyzed such features in the cases of mass 
production, high tech, and law firms as well as in business transactions.   
Hierarchies can be seen as a mechanism to provide knowledge-substitution so that 
a firm can efficiently use its costly knowledge embedded in individuals.  The adoption of steeper 
hierarchical organization systems in mass production firms and of flatter hierarchies in high tech 
and law firms have been explained in such terms.  Based on our principle of efficient knowledge 
allocation, we proposed that these different organizational structures result from the necessity to 
maximize the efficient use of knowledge resources.  
In our analysis of the development of American manufacturing firms, we argued that the 
change from the C-form structure to the M-form structure was largely driven by changes in 
corporate knowledge requirements.   
In high tech companies, the necessity to retain employees and deal with knowledge 
hazards such as leakage and hoarding has lead companies to adopt broad stock options plans in 
their compensation packages.  Therefore, knowledge considerations enable the distinction 
between the standard agency cost view in which stock options are used to incentivize the top 
management team and a retention view according to which stock options are assigned to other 
employees as a means of stimulate them to stick with the firm and share their knowledge.  As a 
normative conclusion, our analysis would warn against the current one-size-fits all approach in 
the debate of the use of stock options.  
 Knowledge considerations also have a strong explanatory power concerning the 
organization of law firms.  These firms are organized so as to achieve increasing gains of 
knowledge specialization.  The hierarchy among partners and associates is designed so as to 
efficiently allocate decision and residual rights to those considered more knowledgeable.  Client 
relationships are usually conducted by those who already share the residuals in order to avoid 
leakage from associates.  The sharing model of splitting profits, also promotes an efficient 
distribution of client cases among those most capable of handling them.  Recent changes in the 
organizational structure of law firms such as the increasing number of staff and contract 
attorneys, and the consequent increase of hierarchy levels are also explained by a change in the 
type of knowledge used in these organizations.   
In the case of business transactions, we suggested that deals that rely on different types of 
knowledge will assume different legal forms.  Market transactions will occur when knowledge is 
mostly embedded in products and arrangements of joint-production will tend to occur when 
individual knowledge is more important for a given transaction. 
Our paper initiates a new debate concerning the relation between law and knowledge 
resources for firm organization.  We have put forward several hypotheses that have to be 
empirically investigated and theoretically modeled.  We hope scholars accept 
the challenges posed by the ideas set forth in this article which is 
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intended to serve as an outline for a larger research agenda, that goes 
far beyond the points we discuss in this article 
At the same time, we hope to contribute to the development of the knowledge based 
theory of the firm in the economics literature. Organizational economics has already recognized 
the importance of legal rules to the knowledge structure of firms in the case of patents.  The 
impact of law on knowledge management, however, is much more extensive and will hopefully 
continue to be of increasing interest to economists. 
We believe that the typology we have developed for distinguishing different types of 
knowledge in the production process provides an important new perspective on the development 
of different types of firms.  It enables us to reframe some of the standard positive explanations 
for firm structure.  The principle of efficient knowledge allocation is also an interesting guide for 
normative proposals.  Policy makers should analyze the impact that intellectual property rights 
exert over internal knowledge management.  They should also consider and promote efficient 
knowledge allocation in corporate reforms.  Crucial to successful coordination and 
decision-making is the collocation of relevant knowledge with the decision-making 
rights/authority at the various levels of hierarchy within the business organization.  An 
interesting avenue would be to discuss whether the recent governance changes of Sarbanes-
Oxley promoted this rationale.  We leave this endeavor for future publications. 
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